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Abstract 
As the world largest carbon dioxide (CO2) emitter, China is under pressure to 
develop policies to mitigate carbon emissions, with market-based approaches under 
consideration. Emissions trading is theoretically the most efficient approach but 
some countries are starting with carbon/energy taxes. This research examines these 
two options through literature and practice in order to evaluate which might be most 
suitable for China and then to estimate the major economic impacts of the selected 
option.  
The thesis first looks at the limited cases of emissions trading, with a particular focus, 
using official reports and data and interviews, on the example of SO2 control in 
Taiyuan city. It is found that the Taiyuan SO2 emissions trading program does not 
seem to be functioning anything like the ideal emissions trading model and cannot be 
judged as a successful scheme in terms of emissions reductions, cost savings, 
innovation and investment in clean energy, and investment leakage. When combined 
with concerns about the limited development of truly free markets and the weak law 
basis in China, it is concluded that emissions trading may not be the best policy 
option at this stage and that a carbon tax might be the most practical interim measure.  
Next, the impacts of a carbon tax are considered through a computable general 
equilibrium (CGE) model for China. The simulation results show that overall the 
introduction of a carbon tax will have a negative impact on the economy, but this 
negative impact is relatively gentle if considered against the emissions reductions. 
After a carbon tax is imposed, carbon intensive sectors will suffer most seriously and 
there will be a shift away from high-carbon factors toward low-carbon or non-carbon 
factors. Moreover, the adverse effects of the tax on economy could be relieved to 
some extent by subsidizing households, through transfers of the tax revenue. From 
the experience of Australia, China could also use carbon tax as a transitional policy 
and then move to carbon emissions trading system when the market mechanism 
becomes mature.  
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Chapter 1   Introduction  
1.1   Background 
Climate change, the topic of this research, has become a major concern in the world 
(Stern 2007). It refers to ‘a change in the state of the climate that can be identified 
(using statistical tests) by changes in the mean and/or the variability of its properties, 
and that persists for an extended period, typically decades or longer’ (IPCC 2007a, p. 
943). The average temperature of the earth has increased 0.7  since 1900 (Brohan et 
al. 2006). There have been global sea level increases, consistent with warming, at an 
average rate of 3.1 mm per year from 1993 to 2003, compared with 1.8 mm per year 
from 1961 to 2003 (IPCC 2007b). The Fourth Assessment Report of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) concludes that ‘warming of the 
climate system is unequivocal’ (IPCC 2007b, p. 30). 
The impact of climate change is wide and serious. Climate change leads to 
agricultural change, infrastructure damage and human health deterioration (Pearce & 
Turner 1990). According to the World Trade Organization, an increase in  
temperature of 1  above the pre-industrial level could lead to at least 300 000 
people dying from climate change effects annually (Patz et al. 2005). With an 
increase of 2 , about 15–40% of species will become extinct, cereal production will 
decrease by 5% under weak carbon fertilization and 1–4 billion people will 
experience water shortages (Stern 2007). Even at more moderate levels of warming, 
climate change will impact seriously on world output, human life and the 
environment (Stern 2007). 
Climate change is mainly due to the increase in greenhouse gases (GHGs) caused by 
human activities (Garnaut 2008). Fossil fuel use and land use changes play 
significant roles in the global concentration of carbon dioxide (IPCC 2007b; CO2). 
The GHGs described by the Kyoto Protocol include carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous 
oxide, sulphur hexafluoride, hydrofluorocarbons and perfluorocarbons 
(Commonwealth of Australia 2008). They absorb thermal infrared radiation and trap 
some of the heat from the earth’s surface, which in turn increases the temperature of 
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the planet (Hengeveld & Bush 2008; Pearce & Turner 1990). Hereinafter these 
emissions are referred to as ‘carbon emissions’ for convenience.  
Observed evidence of climate change in China is also obvious. The annual average 
temperatures in the North China Plain and north-eastern China increased 0.20  and 
0.27  per decade respectively over the past 50 years (Shen & Varis 2001). As a 
developing country, China is considered likely to be one of the worst-affected 
regions in the world by climate change (IPCC 2007a). Because of drought caused by 
global warming, agricultural production in China could be reduced by 5–10% by 
2030, thus adding stress to a country with 20% of the world’s population but only 7% 
of the arable land (The People's Republic of China 2007; Zeng et al. 2008). 
In order to tackle the threat of global climate change, the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) adopted the Kyoto Protocol in 1997; it 
came into force in 2005. In the Kyoto Protocol, Annex I countries
1
 have committed 
to reducing carbon emissions over the period 2008–2012 by 5.2% below the level 
attained in 1990, while no such commitment has been taken by developing countries 
(UFCCC 1998). The Kyoto Protocol also provides three kinds of ‘flexible 
mechanisms’ for countries to comply with their targets: emissions trading, joint 
implementation
2
 (JI) and the clean development mechanism
3
 (UFCCC 1998; CDM ).  
Carbon emissions in China have shown an increasing trend over the last 50 years, 
particularly during the urbanization and industrialization periods of the last two 
decades (Feng et al. 2009; Guan et al. 2008). Moreover, China overtook the United 
States (US) and became the world’s largest CO2 emitter in 2006 (Netherlands 
Environmental Assessment Agency 2007). Thus it is expected that China, as a large 
emitter, should take on future targets to mitigate GHG emissions (Environmental 
Resources Management 2007). During the Copenhagen Summit 2009, China insisted 
on ‘common but different responsibilities’ between developing and developed 
                                                 
1
 Annex I countries refer to the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
countries and countries with economies in transition. These countries have committed themselves to 
GHG emissions targets. 
2
 ‘A market-based implementation mechanism defined in Article 6 of the Kyoto Protocol, allowing 
Annex I countries or companies from these countries to implement projects jointly that limit or reduce 
emissions or enhance sinks, and to share the Emissions Reduction Units’ (IPCC 2007c, p. 817). 
3
 ‘Certified  Emission Reduction Units from CDM projects undertaken in Non-Annex 1 countries that 
limit or reduce GHG emissions, when certified by operational entities designated by Conference of 
the Parties/Meeting of the Parties, can be accrued to the investor (government or industry) from 
parties in Annex B’ (IPCC 2007c, p. 811) . 
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countries, and made a voluntary commitment to reduce carbon emissions per Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) by 40–45% below its 2005 level in 2020 (Wen 2009).  
China attaches great importance to climate change and has made efforts to address 
the issue (Song 2009). By analysing the contributions to CO2 emissions growth 
between 1980 and 1997 in China, Zhang (1998b) concludes that even though the 
total amount of CO2 emissions is increasing due to economic growth and population 
expansion, China has made significant contributions to reducing global CO2 
emissions through cutting energy intensity. He summarizes four reasons for 
combating global climate change in China’s interest: 
(1) Climate-sensitive sectors such as agriculture still account for a much larger 
proportion of GDP in China than in the developed countries; (2) China is scarce in 
energy, with per capita energy endowments far below the world average; (3) China is 
already determined to push energy conservation and enhanced energy efficiency in 
general and more efficient coal usage in particular. (4) Limiting GHG emissions will 
contribute to the reductions in local pollutants and thus will be beneficial to a more 
sustainable development of the Chinese economy (Zhang 1998b, pp. 17-18). 
In summary, due to the broad and serious impacts of human-induced climate change, 
it is clear that combating carbon emissions is in the interest of all human beings. As 
the largest CO2 emitter in the world, China is facing increasing domestic and 
international pressure to set a good example in mitigating carbon emissions and 
reducing carbon emissions is in China’s best interests.  
1.2   Statement of the problem  
‘Climate change is an example of market failure involving externalities and public 
goods’ (Stern 2007, p. 25), therefore it cannot be corrected by the market itself. 
Usually four types of policies are considered for addressing environmental issues: 
regulation, Pigovian subsidies, Pigovian taxes and tradable permits (Daly & Farley 
2004). Regulation is a rule or directive made and maintained by an authority. A 
Pigovian subsidy refers to a subsidy provided to an activity on the grounds that the 
activity generates positive externalities, while a Pigovian tax is a tax levied on a 
market activity that generates negative externalities. A tradable permit is a licence, 
granted by a government, to pollute that can be bought and sold.  
4 
 
Regulation and subsidies are not popular among market-oriented economists (Pearce 
& Turner 1990). For them, the preferred economic instruments for meeting the 
carbon emission targets are an emissions trading scheme (ETS) or a carbon tax. 
These two market-based methods generate debates among economists (Stavins 2008). 
Cramton and Kerr (2002) recommend that permit trading systems, being transparent, 
may be more politically desirable than carbon taxes. Soleille (2006) believes that 
emissions trading schemes can be the most cost effective if there is the necessary 
political will and are designed and implemented properly. Furthermore, Akhurst et al. 
(2003) and Ellerman et al. (2003) suggest that emissions trading is suitable for 
solving the GHG emissions problem as a tonne of a given GHG will have the same 
effect on atmospheric concentration regardless of where it is emitted or mitigated, 
and the cost of reducing GHG emissions varies widely among sources and across 
countries. In contrast, Pizer (2002) argues that it would be preferable to use a tax to 
control carbon emissions, and he finds tax instruments produce six times the 
expected net gains of the most well-designed emission trading mechanisms by taking 
into account both the potential long-term climate change loss and the GHGs control 
cost. 
China mainly uses command-and-control regulation to control carbon emissions 
(The State Council of the People's Republic of China 2009), but there is an 
increasing consideration of whether a more effective carbon reduction policy should 
be introduced. Cooper (2005) and the Research Institute for Fiscal Science, Ministry 
of Finance in China (2009) suggest a carbon tax, while Tu (2008) and Raufer & Li 
(2009) support emissions trading. However, these suggestions were delivered as 
statements rather than as arguments explaining why either policy might be best in the 
Chinese context. 
Research on the suitability of the emissions trading system for China to reduce 
carbon emissions has been underdeveloped and the design features that could 
maximize carbon reductions remain largely unknown in the Chinese context. 
According to emissions trading theory and existing practices, several major elements 
such as targets, coverage, banking, borrowing and penalties need to be considered 
before the implementation of such a system. If, however, a carbon tax policy is more 
appropriate for China then sufficient evidence should be gathered to support this.  
5 
 
In summary, the carbon emissions problem considered here is not whether mitigation 
is important, but rather how to mitigate. However, at this stage, it is difficult to assert 
which economic instrument is more effective in reducing carbon emissions in China 
in the absence of large-scale applications and rigorous analysis. This research 
attempts to address this issue by documenting one of China’s existing emissions 
trading practices and evaluating which instrument may be most suitable at this stage.  
1.3   Motivation for this research  
As noted in the previous section, anthropogenic climate change is a serious problem 
and China is a major contributor to this problem. China has been and will be 
seriously affected by the consequences. Research that leads to the most appropriate 
policy response is thus critical.  
Although there is some evidence to support the use of tradable permits or cap-and-
trade programs, much of the research has involved sulphur dioxide (SO2) emissions 
in the US (Field & Field 2006), where programs have been running for some time. 
Worldwide there is also a growing interest in the carbon emissions trading pioneered 
in Denmark and the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS), which is 
so far the largest system of its kind (Ekins & Barker 2002; Soleille 2006). However, 
China still heavily relies on command-and-control regulation such as shutting down 
the seriously polluting enterprises, which usually involves high costs to the firms and 
society (The State Council of the People's Republic of China 2009). It is therefore 
necessary for China to consider adopting a more cost-effective policy. But at the 
current stage of China’s political and economic development, whether or not a 
market-based policy could work in China remains unknown. Therefore, this research 
is motivated by the wish to find a solution for China to meet its carbon reductions 
target by learning from international practice and considering its own special 
situation. 
1.4   Research objectives and questions 
This research has two main objectives. The first is to assess whether emissions 
trading is likely to be effective in reducing carbon emissions in China. This will be 
examined by looking at the existing emissions trading practice in China, collecting 
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GHGs perspectives from experts and considering the literature on experiences 
elsewhere. If carbon emissions trading is found to be effective for China, then the 
design features of a Chinese carbon emissions trading system can be proposed; 
otherwise, an alternative economic instrument such as a carbon tax regime needs to 
be considered. 
Therefore, the main research question to be investigated is: 
What policy option should China adopt to achieve carbon reductions? 
To answer this question several sub-questions are explored:  
Q1: Is emissions trading a suitable policy for achieving carbon reductions in China? 
If so  
Q2: What design features of a carbon trading system would maximize emission 
reductions in China?  
If not 
Q3: Is carbon tax a suitable policy for achieving carbon reductions in China? 
This last question will be considered by examining the impacts of a carbon tax, 
including emissions reductions and economic effects.  
1.5   Scope of this research 
This research focuses on environmental policy for mitigating carbon emissions in 
China. Most of the discussion will be on the possible economic instruments for 
mitigating carbon emissions, the suitability of emissions trading to help China 
achieve carbon reductions, and the decisions on the main features of a carbon trading 
system in the Chinese context (if applicable). It will not only review existing carbon 
trading practices around the world, but also investigate other emissions trading 
programs, in particular the SO2 emissions trading program in Taiyuan city, China. A 
carbon tax will be considered as an alternative policy if emissions trading is judged 
not suitable at this time. In that case, the rest of the research will focus on 
quantifying the effects of a carbon tax in China through a computable general 
equilibrium (CGE) model. 
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The instruments for reducing carbon emissions discussed in this research are limited 
to command-and-control regulation and market-based policies, excluding the 
development of new technology to enhance energy intensity and changes in energy 
production, transportation, land use and natural resources policies. The emissions 
trading schemes mentioned in this study particularly refer to cap-and-trade programs, 
not including credit-based and averaging programs. The various emissions trading 
types are elaborated in Table 1.1.  
Table 1.1 The three main types of emissions trading programs 
Program Type Definition Example 
Cap and Trade 
program  
A market-based policy tool that establishes an 
aggregate emission cap on total emissions from 
a group of sources and creates a financial 
incentive to reduce emissions. The emission 
cap is expressed as allowances distributed to 
individual emission sources that must 
surrender allowances to cover their emissions. 
EU ETS 
Project-based, 
Credit or Offset 
Program  
An emission reduction of a specific quantity of 
a pollutant (e.g., 1 tonne) verified through a 
project-based trading program. An offset can 
be applied to regulatory emission limits as an 
authorization to emit that specific quantity of 
pollutant. 
CDM, JI  
Rate-based or 
Averaging program 
A trading approach in which the regulating 
authority determines an emission rate 
performance standard (i.e., an amount of 
emissions allowed per unit of heat input or 
product output) for a sector (e.g., tonnes/kWh) 
and allows sources that over-and under-comply 
with the standard to trade credits.  
American lead in gasoline 
and heavy-duty engine 
emission standards 
programs  
 
New South Wales 
Greenhouse Gas Reduction 
Scheme  
Data source: adapted from EPA (2003a, pp. Glossory 2 - Glossory 4)   
1.6   The structure of the thesis  
The overall logic for this thesis can be summarized as follows (Figure 1.1). The 
policy options for mitigating carbon emissions are reviewed to suggest that 
emissions trading is theoretically the most effective policy instrument for reducing 
carbon emissions (Chapter 2). Being the world’s largest CO2 emitter, China is under 
increasing pressure to mitigate carbon emissions. Thus research Q1, ‘Is emissions 
trading a suitable policy for achieving carbon reductions in China?’, is proposed in 
Chapter 3. In order to answer research Q1, the case study research method designed 
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to investigate the Taiyuan SO2 emissions trading program is presented in Chapter 4, 
along with the collected experts’ views on using carbon emissions trading in China. 
It is found that China may not be ready for a carbon emissions trading system in the 
short run (Chapter 5).  
Then an alternative policy instrument carbon tax is considered. Thus the research Q3 
is proposed: ‘Is carbon tax a suitable policy for achieving carbon reductions in 
China?’ (Chapter 5). To examine this question, a Chinese carbon tax CGE model is 
developed to assess the effectiveness of a carbon tax in China (Chapter 6). It is found 
that the carbon tax is an effective policy in China as it can significantly decrease 
carbon emissions and does not dramatically impede economic growth. Meanwhile, 
the energy consumption structure can be improved (Chapter 7). Therefore, it is 
suggested that China should adopt a carbon tax for controlling carbon emissions in 
the short term, and transfer to a carbon emissions trading system gradually in the 
long term (Chapter 8).    
Specifically, Chapter 1 provides the background, the motivation, the research 
objectives and research problems as well as the scope of this study. Chapter 2 
reviews the literature in the area of policy options for mitigating carbon emissions, 
which include command-and-control regulations, subsidies, carbon tax and 
emissions trading. Chapter 3 is an institutional chapter describing China’s energy 
consumption, carbon emissions and climate change situation, existing policy in 
controlling carbon emissions, emissions trading practice and the necessary 
considerations for using carbon emissions trading policy. The case study and 
interview research methods employed in this study are explained in Chapter 4. 
Chapter 5 presents the results of the case study and interviews with experts, and 
discusses the suitability of using emissions trading to achieve carbon reductions in 
China.  
Chapter 6 develops a Chinese carbon tax CGE model to simulate the effectiveness of 
a carbon tax in reducing carbon emissions and its impacts on Chinese economy, as 
well as on its energy consumption structure. The chapter begins with a justification 
for using the CGE approach in this research, and then describes the model equations, 
followed a discussion of the data and software solutions for the model. Chapter 7 
presents the results from the CGE model, and the major findings from the 
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simulations are discussed. Chapter 8 is a summary of the findings, policy 
implications, contributions, limitations and suggestions for future research.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.1 Thesis framework  
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Chapter 2   Review of policy options for 
mitigating carbon emissions    
2.1   Introduction 
‘Public goods are products or services that are enjoyed in common, such as defense 
and air (clean or dirty)’ (Sterner 2003, p. 2). As a ‘global public good’, degradation 
of the atmosphere becomes a ‘tragedy of the commons’ as espoused by Lloyd (1833) 
and elaborated by Hardin (1968), where emissions are not restricted by any laws and 
every emitter believes that he/she has the right to emit. However, when consumers 
and producers emit into the atmosphere without any compensation, a cost is imposed 
on the rest of society as an ‘externality’ (FitzRoy & Papyrakis 2010). It is believed 
that GHG
4
 emissions result in climate change and a loss of welfare for society. 
Therefore, they are negative externalities (Daly & Farley 2004). Where there is a 
‘global public good’ and an ‘externality’, the free market does not result in optimal 
welfare (Sterner 2003). Anthropogenic climate change has therefore been described 
as the greatest market failure of all (Stern 2007).  
Several policy options are available for a government to correct the market failure of 
climate change. Some political scientists believe that there are three basic categories 
of policy instruments, ‘carrots, sticks and sermons’, which stand for economic 
incentives, legal instruments and informative instruments respectively (Bemelmans-
Videc et al. 2003). Generally, the main policy options for reducing emissions are 
well known: regulations such as emission standards, subsidies for alternatives, 
carbon taxes and related tradable permits for carbon emissions (FitzRoy & Papyrakis 
2010). This chapter reviews these four major types of policies that can be used to 
mitigate carbon emissions.  
This chapter will review the theory, practice and empirical studies or impacts of 
command-and-control regulations, subsidies, carbon taxes and emissions trading. 
Especially, an emissions trading market, key elements of a well-designed program, 
                                                 
4
 Hereinafter is referred to as ‘carbon emissions’ to match the short forms of ‘carbon tax’ and ‘carbon 
emissions trading’.  
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and lessons from early trading schemes for national carbon trading scheme will be 
discussed in section 2.6. Section 2.7 will discuss the criteria for choosing an 
appropriate policy for controlling climate change and compare the four policy 
options from different aspects. Some concluding remarks will be offered in section 
2.8.    
2.2   Command-and-control regulations 
2.2.1 The case for command-and-control regulations 
The setting of regulations is the traditional approach for addressing market failure 
due to environmental externalities (Field & Field 2006). Command-and-control 
regulation refers to a policy that relies on permission, prohibition, standards setting 
and enforcement. Failure to comply with the regulations generally leads to fines or 
other penalties (Daly & Farley 2004). Conventionally, command-and-control 
regulations achieve certain environmental goals by imposing uniform standards on 
firms through licensing and monitoring (Sandu 2007; Stavins 2003). These standards 
are either technology-based (by specifying methods or even equipment that firms 
must use to abate pollution or emissions) or performance-based (i.e., specific limits 
on emissions) (Stavins 2003; Sterner 2003).  
Command-and-control regulations can be an effective policy for addressing market 
failures and barriers associated with information, organization and other transactions 
costs (Bashmakov & Jepma 2001). They are reasonably easy to understand, can be 
monitored and enforced fairly cheaply and applied to everyone equally (Daly & 
Farley 2004). Environmental administrators prefer (or used to prefer) command-and-
control instruments as they can be introduced readily and appear to provide 
predictable environmental effectiveness and certainty for polluters (Opschoor & 
Turner 1994). In addition, environmental administrators may have a relatively high 
preference for regulations because they are familiar with using this option (Opschoor 
& Turner 1994). However, there are several flaws associated with this approach. 
First, it does not provide certainty in regard to the costs and the amount of emissions 
reductions (Nielson 2010). Second, it is deficient in flexibility and motivation and 
does not provide market signals that would encourage the uptake of cost-effective 
options for reducing emissions (Armstrong 1998; Owen 1992; Pearce 1991; Sandu 
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2007), such as developing or adopting clean technology (Stavins 1997). Third, 
setting the level of regulation is rather difficult (Parry & Pizer 2007). Finally, 
command-and-control regulations tend to enlarge the domain of bureaucratic control, 
which adds to the cost of government (Uzawa 2003). 
2.2.2 The practice of command-and-control regulations  
In the 1970s, in the early stages of environmental policy development, command-
and-control regulations were popular in the US (Harrington & Morgenstern 2004; 
Stuart 2006). The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act and the Clean Air Act 
are prime examples of regulations to promote environmental quality (Stuart 2006). 
However, economic incentive instruments have been used more frequently since the 
late 1980s (Harrington & Morgenstern 2004). This is perhaps due to the growing 
awareness of economic incentive approaches among policymakers and policy 
analysts between 1970 and 1990, and the consequent emergence of tradable 
emissions permits in the late 1970s, following the widespread disappointment with 
outcomes of the command-and-control regulations adopted in the 1970s (Harrington 
& Morgenstern 2004).  
Most members of the International Energy Agency (IEA) have employed 
environment-related regulatory standards to reduce carbon emissions. For example, 
the fuel efficiency standards or requirements to generate a certain amount of 
renewable energy by a certain date (IEA 2010b). California is a good example (Air 
Resources Board 2009). A de facto technology standard was enacted in Californian 
legislation in 2007 (Californian Senate Bill 1368), which prevents the state’s utilities 
having long-term contracts with generators emitting more than 1100 pounds of 
CO2/MWh of electricity output (Natural Resources Defense Council 2007; Nielson 
2010). In 2009 Australia reduced GHGs and private costs by simply banning 
inefficient incandescent light bulbs (FitzRoy & Papyrakis 2010). 
Some command-and-control regulations were opposed by the business lobbies who 
argued that the command-and-control regulations (e.g., standards) would lead to 
large losses of jobs and market share (FitzRoy & Papyrakis 2010). Campaigns for 
weaker requirements, or postponement of their introduction, are often successful. For 
example, after the industry failed to meet voluntary targets, proposed tough 
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restrictions on carbon emissions for new cars in 2007 were resisted by the 
manufacturers of the largest and most polluting cars in Germany and by their 
political allies (FitzRoy & Papyrakis 2010).  
2.2.3 Empirical studies of command-and-control 
regulations 
Energy efficiency standards have been proposed as an effective energy conservation 
policy instrument, especially in countries with low energy prices (Bashmakov & 
Jepma 2001). The introduction of an appliance energy performance standard in the 
US was estimated to save a total of 24 EJ of energy, US$46 billion in consumer life-
cycles costs and to reduce 400 Mt CO2 emissions from 1990 to 2010 (McMahon 
1992). For the refrigerator and freezer standards in the EU, cumulative electricity 
savings were estimated at 300 TWh from 1995 to 2000 (Lebo & Szabo 1996). 
Similar standards in Central and Eastern Europe were expected to generate 60 TWh 
of energy savings and 25 Mt CO2 emissions reductions (Bashmakov & Sorokina 
1996). A maximum of 140 Mt CO2 was expected to be reduced in Japan due to the 
effectiveness of the law on the rational use of energy in April 1999 (Bashmakov & 
Jepma 2001). IEA confirmed that the building codes in the residential sector in 
France, which were set in 1974 and made stricter in 1982 and 1988, led to 75% of 
the total energy savings over the past 20 years (Bashmakov & Jepma 2001). Overall, 
when taking into account the history, technology and institution, technology 
standards are considered an effective approach for the early stages of environmental 
policy development (Cole & Grossman 1999). 
While the effectiveness of energy efficiency standards on energy conservation is 
recognized, numerous empirical studies suggest that the command-and-control 
approach is not as cost effective as other economic instruments. The Australian 
Bureau of Agricultural and Resource Economics estimates that the implementation 
of a regulatory approach in Australia, such as an 11% mandatory renewable target 
for electricity generation, along with a 27% fuel efficiency improvement in transport 
by 2030, leads to twice the cost in GDP reduction than would be the case with a 
well-designed ETS in achieving the same emissions reductions (Prime Ministerial 
Task Group on Emissions Trading 2007). Several simulation models of evaluating 
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the cost effectiveness of the command-and-control strategy have been constructed 
for different pollutants for a variety of metropolitan areas (Table 2.1). As comparing 
the emissions costs among different research is not reasonable, Tietenberg (2004, p. 
269) proposes to calculate ‘the ratio of command and control (CAC) allocation costs 
to the lowest cost of meeting the same objective for each study’. For example, 
according to Seskin et al. (1983), to reduce nitrogen dioxide in Chicago, the CAC 
costs are estimated to be 14.4 times more expensive than the alternative least-cost 
approach. 
Table 2.1 Empirical studies of command-and-control regulations 
Study 
and Year 
Pollutants 
Covered 
Geographic Area CAC Benchmark 
Ratio of CAC 
Cost to Least 
Cost 
Atkinson and 
Lewis (1974) 
Particulates 
St Louis 
metropolitan area 
SIP regulations 6.00 
Roach et al. 
(1981) 
Sulphur dioxide 
Four corners in 
Utah, Colorado, 
Arizona, and New 
Mexico 
SIP regulations 4.25 
Hahn and Noll 
(1982) 
Sulphates 
Los Angeles 
standards 
California emission 1.07 
Krupnick 
(1986) 
Nitrogen dioxide 
Baltimore 
regulations 
Proposed RACT 
regulations  
5.96 
Seskin et al. 
(1983) 
Nitrogen dioxide Chicago 
Proposed RACT 
regulations 
14.40 
McGartland 
(1985) 
Particulates Baltimore SIP regulations 4.18 
Spofford (1985) 
Sulphur dioxide 
Lower Delaware 
Valley 
Uniform percentage 
reduction 
1.78 
Particulates 
Lower Delaware 
Valley 
Uniform percentage 
reduction 
22.00 
Maloney and 
Yandle (1984) 
Hydrocarbons 
All domestic Du 
Pont plants 
Uniform percentage 
reduction 
4.15 
O’Ryan (1996) Particulates Santiago, Chile PER/APS 1.31 
Definitions: APS = Ambient permit system 
                    CAC = Command-and-control, the traditional regulatory approach 
                    PER = Percentage emission reduction 
                    SIP = State implementation plan 
                    RACT = Reasonable available control technologies, a set of standards imposed on 
existing sources in nonattainment areas 
Source: adopted from Tietenberg (2004, p. 269). 
In achieving the same amount of reduction of CO2 emissions, it has also been 
confirmed that command-and-control regulations are less cost effective than other 
economic instruments. Beuusejour et al. (1995) find emission standards on four 
industries (iron and steel, electric utilities, transportation and services) lead to 33% 
more GDP loss than an energy tax in stabilizing Canada’s CO2 emissions at the 1990 
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levels in the year 2000. Shrum (2007) concludes that command-and-control policy 
could increase costs ten times compared to other approaches to achieve the same 
amount of GHG reductions. Regulatory mandates on particular solutions (e.g., 
Renewable Portfolio Standards) increase demand for certain products and then lead 
to higher prices for consumers and a subsidy for producers.  
Command-and-control regulations could also have many negative economic impacts 
on sensitive sectors such as the agricultural industry. The command-and-control 
program for GHG emissions is proposed as not suitable for agriculture as the 
industry has limited chances to offset the costs of the regulations by passing on price 
increases (EPA 2008). According to the American Farm Bureau Federation, farmers 
and ranchers would need to pay US$175 per dairy cow, US$87.50 per beef cow and 
US$21.87 per hog if GHGs were regulated under the Clean Air Act (Grondine & 
Harke 2009). In addition, some well-intentioned regulations turned out to be failures. 
EU legislation requiring that 5% of petrol and diesel consist of biofuels by 2010 (and 
10% by 2020) combined with huge subsidies for first-generation biofuels in the EU 
and the US actually led to an increase in carbon emissions and food prices and also 
accelerated tropical deforestation (FitzRoy & Papyrakis 2010). 
In summary, command-and-control regulations have played a significant role in 
improving the environment, particularly at the early stage of environmental 
regulation. Some of the regulations, such as energy efficiency standards, are 
effective. However, studies show that command-and-control regulations are far less 
cost effective than other economic instruments and negative economic impacts could 
arise in some sensitive sectors. Therefore, mitigating carbon emissions by the 
command-and-control instrument does not seem to be an ideal policy option.   
2.3   Subsidies 
2.3.1 The case for subsidies  
Subsidies are bonuses or payment for doing something (Daly & Farley 2004). In the 
early 20
th
 century, economist Arthur Pigou proposed internalizing environmental 
externalities by paying a subsidy to firms for reducing pollution, in which the 
subsidy equals the marginal benefit to society of abating pollution (Pigou 1952 ). 
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This is called a Pigovian subsidy (Daly & Farley 2004). A Pigovian subsidy implies 
that polluters have the right to pollute and society must pay them not to (Farley 2004) 
and so does not fulfill the polluter pays principle (Sterner 2003). It is a ‘carrot’ in the 
view of political economists (Bemelmans-Videc et al. 2003; United Nations 
Environment Programme 2008). Therefore, as a financial aid, subsidy is generally 
used under certain conditions. It is limited to well-defined transitional periods, or 
used to avoid creating significant distortions in international trade and investment, or 
employed to assist polluters in bearing the costs of pollution control in those parts of 
the economy where otherwise severe difficulties would occur (OECD 1997). 
There are many forms of subsidies, from direct grants and tax exemptions to indirect 
payments in support of certain activities, such as financing technology research and 
providing public goods (Pershing & Mackenzie 2004; Sterner 2003). An emission 
reduction subsidy acts as a reward for reducing emissions. A public authority would 
pay an entity a specific amount per ton of emissions for every ton of emissions it 
reduces (Bashmakov & Jepma 2001; Field & Field 2006). Such a subsidy may 
encourage polluters to implement measures that are less costly than the subsidy to 
reduce emissions (Bashmakov & Jepma 2001). An energy subsidy is one of the most 
widely used subsidies. It is commonly defined as a payment by a government to 
energy producers or consumers for producing or using a certain type of energy 
(United Nations Environment Programme 2008).  
Various types of subsidies may have different impacts. Fossil fuel-based subsidies 
promote the production and the use of fossil fuels, which inevitably boosts carbon 
emissions, while subsidizing the use of renewable energy and energy-efficient 
technologies may help to reduce emissions (United Nations Environment 
Programme 2008). Although an emission reduction subsidy would encourage each 
individual polluter to install abatement equipment to reduce emissions, total 
emissions may actually increase as the subsidy attracts more new firms to join the 
industry, thereby not guaranteeing a particular level of emissions (Bashmakov & 
Jepma 2001; Field & Field 2006; Xie 1995).  
Meanwhile, subsidies are a drain on public revenue (Gunningham et al. 1998; 
Pershing & Mackenzie 2004). Especially for developing countries, they are 
expensive instruments as the opportunity cost of public funds is high (Sterner 2003). 
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Subsidies without time restriction can become locked-in and be difficult to remove 
(Nielson 2010). Some subsidies may cut down the marginal costs of firms, resulting 
in excess output and emissions (Nielson 2010). In addition, subsidies may encourage 
some firms’ ‘strategic behaviour’, meaning that firms participate in certain activities 
only in order to gain the subsidy (Nielson 2010).   
2.3.2 The practice of subsidies 
In practice, a large number of subsidies are used for environmental policy purposes, 
such as promoting the diffusion of environmentally friendly products (e.g., 
residential insulation), rewarding environmentally friendly behaviour (e.g., 
compliance with environmental regulation), financing environmental infrastructure 
investments (e.g., renewable energy) and encouraging research and development 
(R&D). A typical example is the subsidy for the Mandatory Renewable Energy 
Target, which requires an increasing proportion use of renewable energy (Nielson 
2010). By adopting such subsidies in Europe and Australia, the usage of renewable 
sources has been increased successfully, coupled with a reduction in emissions 
(Nielson 2010).  
Energy subsidies, most of which flow to fossil fuels, are widespread due to the 
rationale of supporting economic growth (Moor 2001). According to IEA research, 
the amount of energy subsidies was about US$220 billion in the twenty largest non-
OECD countries in 2005, of which fossil fuels-based subsidies accounted for around 
US$170 billion (United Nations Environment Programme 2008). Assuming other 
non-OECD countries had the same subsidy on each unit of energy consumption and 
the consumption subsidies were small in the OECD countries, worldwide energy 
subsidies are estimated at around US$300 billion per year, which accounts for 0.7% 
of world GDP (United Nations Environment Programme 2008). Research carried out 
by the National Academies of Sciences estimates that the US government has 
subsidized the energy industry by US$644 billion (in 2003 dollars) since 1950, most 
of which is in the form of tax breaks (43.7%) and R&D (18.7%) (Bezdek & 
Wendling 2006). Around half of the subsidies (US$302 billion) have gone to the oil 
industry.                                                                                                           
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Although fossil fuels still receive most of the energy subsidies, subsidies for clean 
energy technology have been growing steadily in recent years (United Nations 
Environment Programme 2008). Stern (2007) indicates that there are around 
US$26 billion in subsidies per year supporting the worldwide development of low-
carbon energy sources, of which subsidies to renewable sources of electricity and 
existing nuclear power account for US$10 billion and about US$16 billion 
respectively. Moreover, biofuels also receive around US$6.4 billion (assuming 
global production of 40 billion litres) (Stern 2007). The National Academies of 
Sciences estimates that the US’s renewable energies, including hydropower and 
geothermal, have received a total of US$111 billion since 1950 (Bezdek & Wendling 
2006). According to a study by the Global Subsidies Initiative of the International 
Institute for Sustainable Development (2007), almost US$11 billion subsidies were 
spent on biofuels by only OECD countries in 2006.  
Since some subsidies promote environmentally destructive behaviors (e.g., fossil 
fuels-based subsidies contribute to increases in carbon emissions and climate 
change), reform or removal of these kinds of environmentally harmful subsidies have 
started (OECD 2001; Sterner 2003; United Nations Environment Programme 2008). 
Angola cut its gasoline and diesel subsidies in September 2010 (IEA 2011). The 
German federal and state governments, the unions and Ruhrkohle AG agreed in 2007 
to end coal-mining subsidies in Germany by 2018, which have been in existence for 
more than half a century (United Nations Environment Programme 2008). In 
September 2009 the leaders of the Group of Twenty countries agreed on removing 
damaging fossil-fuel subsidies in the medium term (The Global Subsidies Initiative 
2010). Egypt also planned to eliminate energy subsidies to all industries by the end 
of 2011 (IEA 2011). 
2.3.3 Empirical studies of subsidies  
Various empirical studies confirm that subsidies to fossil-fuel consumption lead to 
larger GHG emissions and high economic cost (United Nations Environment 
Programme 2008). Kammen & Pacca (2004) estimate that the energy industry 
subsidy structure has contributed 1–7% of the total US carbon emissions. A study by 
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IEA (1999) indicates that US$257 billion per year is lost in only the eight largest 
non-OECD countries
5
 as a result of consumer energy subsidies.  
A series of studies have simulated the effects of removing fossil-fuel or other 
harmful energy subsidies. One study estimates that subsidy reform could achieve 8% 
CO2 emissions reductions by 2035 (Dernbach & Koplow 2001). Research by the 
OECD reveals that the removal of all the subsidies around the world, used for 
lowering the price of fuels in industry and power sector, would reduce global CO2 
emissions by more than 6% and increase income by 0.1% by 2020 (United Nations 
Environment Programme 2008). According to a study by IEA (1999), primary 
energy use would be reduced by 13%, CO2 emissions would be lowered by 16%, 
GDP would increase by almost 1% on average and annual economic growth rate 
would rise by 0.73% as a whole if the energy consumption subsidies were removed  
in the eight largest non-OECD countries. Removing energy subsidies can not only 
save energy and reduce GHGs, but also increase overall economic efficiency (Toman 
2003).  
The social implication of reforming fossil-fuel subsidies has also been explored. 
Burniaux et al. (1992) reveal that the removal of energy consumer subsidies in non-
OECD countries would increase global welfare by US$35 billion and the real income 
for the whole world by 0.7% annually. However, the distribution of this welfare 
would be uneven. They further find that GDP and real income would decline greatly 
in some non-OECD countries even if the aggregate GDP and real income effect were 
positive for the overall global and non-OECD countries (Burniaux et al. 2009). Moor 
(2001) proposes that the distributive effects of fossil-fuel subsidy reforms are quite 
modest. The income decreases slightly more than 3% at maximum but the low-
income urban households that depend on commercial fuels are affected most.  
In summary, the economic, environmental and social effects of subsidies are 
complex and depend on the precise nature of the subsidy and energy source. 
However, it is clear that the removal of harmful energy subsidies would reduce 
governments’ budget burdens, increase energy savings and lead to emission 
reductions, economic growth and economic efficiency, even though it may have a 
                                                 
5
 The eight largest non-OECD countries mentioned by IEA (1999) are China, The Russian Federation, 
India, Indonesia, Iran, South Africa, Venezuela and Kazakhstan.  
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negative distributional effect. In practice, subsidizing alternatives (clean or less 
carbon-intensive energy sources) and removing environment damaging subsidies 
(e.g., for fossil fuels) are common in mitigating carbon emissions, while the use of 
direct emissions reduction subsidies appears to be rare. However, no country is 
relying on pro-reduction subsidies to achieve its carbon reductions target. This may 
be due to the nature of subsidies (i.e., against polluter pay principle), the uncertainty 
of emissions levels and the drain on public revenue. Moreover, some pro-reduction 
subsidies are introduced for purposes other than reducing emissions. For example, 
subsidies to nuclear power in several countries are explained by the need to reduce  
independence on imported energy (United Nations Environment Programme 2008). 
In addition, a problem with subsidies is the notion of ‘picking winners’. It might be 
that a number of clean energy technologies could be subsidized, with no certainty of 
which ones will be widely adopted. Therefore, it seems that subsidizing the 
alternatives along with removing the harmful subsidies cannot be used as a major 
policy for achieving the carbon reduction target. Rather, it is more suitable to act as a 
supplementary instrument in supporting the main policy for mitigating carbon 
emissions.  
2.4   Pollution Taxes 
2.4.1 The case for a carbon tax  
The concept of a carbon tax is based on the polluter pays principle (Sandu 2007). A 
carbon tax is one kind of Pigovian taxes that aims for convergence between social 
and private cost by imposing a tax supposedly equal to the marginal social cost 
(Helm 2005; Tomás et al. 2010). It mitigates carbon emissions by reducing energy 
consumption and changing fuel choice through a price mechanism (Zhang & 
Baranzini 2004). A carbon tax can be implemented on the basis of the carbon content 
of fuels, requiring the payment of a fixed fee for every ton of CO2 emitted (Hoeller 
& Wallin 1991). It is widely supported by economists for reducing GHG emissions 
(Shrum 2007). 
A carbon tax can raise revenue for a government and stimulate energy savings, 
innovation and investment in clean technology (Ekins & Barker 2002). A carbon tax 
is considered as the easiest policy to implement and monitor through making use of 
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existing tax structures (Ekins & Barker 2002; Owen 1992). With a carbon tax the 
cost of reducing emissions is predictable (Nielson 2010). It is also argued that 
environmental taxes may result in a ‘double dividend’, which means an improvement 
in both environment and economic efficiency at the same time (Pearce 1991). 
However, due to uncertainty about the equity of Pigovian taxes and the appropriate 
damage cost, the level at which the tax is set to achieve the optimal outcomes is not 
known in advance (Nielson 2010; Pearce & Turner 1990). In addition, a carbon tax is 
likely to be politically unpopular (Nielson 2010). Businesses are unsatisfied with it 
as they have to transfer revenue to the government, while environmental groups 
oppose it as it fails to guarantee a particular level of emissions (Pizer 2002). It is also 
argued that carbon taxes have regressive impacts on the international competiveness 
of economies and the distribution of income (Zhang & Baranzini 2004). 
2.4.2 Carbon taxes in practice 
In response to emissions reduction commitments under the UNFCC, some European 
countries have implemented either a carbon tax or an energy tax based partly on 
carbon content (Bashmakov & Jepma 2001). These include Finland (1990), Sweden 
and Norway (1991), Denmark and Netherlands (1992), Austria (1995), Slovenia 
(1998), Italy, Germany and Luxembourg (1999), the United Kingdom (UK; 2001), 
Belgium (2003), and Switzerland (2008) (Baranzini et al. 2000; Ekins & Barker 
2002; IEA 2010b; Martini 2009; Scrimgeour et al. 2005). The Republic of Ireland 
introduced a carbon tax in 2010 (Ireland Business 2009). However, none of these 
countries has been able to introduce a uniform carbon tax for fuels in all sectors and 
various forms of exemptions exist in most cases. The EU has attempted to introduce 
a unitary carbon tax for all EU member states several times since the early 1990s, but 
it has failed due to industrial lobbying (Pearce 2005). In 2010 the European 
Commission considered implementing a pan-European minimum tax on pollution 
permits purchased under the EU ETS (Kanter 2010). As the tax was based on carbon 
content rather than volume, fuels with high carbon concentration would carry high 
prices. 
In addition to the abundant carbon tax experiences in Europe, some countries or 
regions in other continents have used carbon taxes even though the coverage is 
relatively limited. These include South Africa, Costa Rico, India, the US and Canada 
22 
 
(City of Boulder 2011; Meyer 2010; Ministry of Environment and Forests 
Government of India 2010; The Canada 2008; Xinhua 2010). The carbon tax in 
South Africa only covers new motor vehicles and the tax in India is limited to coal 
products (2010). Although a federal carbon tax has not been introduced in the US or 
Canada, carbon taxes have been implemented in some American states and Canadian 
provinces. In 2006 Boulder in Colorado introduced the first municipality-level 
carbon tax in the US (City of Boulder 2011). The carbon tax in Montgomery County, 
Maryland is said to be the US’s first county-level carbon tax (Dernoga 2010). Table 
2.1 summarises information about the energy or carbon taxes which have been 
implemented around the world. 
Some countries or regions such as Australia and Taiwan are currently introducing or 
considering carbon taxes. On 8 November 2011 Australia passed the Clean Energy 
Bill to introduce a carbon tax of $23/tC, which would increase by 2.5% annually, on 
the 500 largest polluters from 1 July 2012 for three to five years, followed by a move 
to an emissions trading system (Gillard  2011; Thompson 2011). Taiwan’s plan to 
adopt a carbon tax in 2011 met opposition from the public but the policy is still 
under consideration (Patel 2011).  
Carbon or energy taxes proposals in some countries have been delayed or failed (e.g., 
Japan, South Korea, New Zealand and France). Japanese authorities proposed an 
environmental tax in 2005, but it was delayed due to major opposition from the 
Petroleum Association of Japan, other industries and consumers (Maeda 2009). 
South Korea announced plans to replace the transportation tax by a carbon tax in 
2010 (Hyun-cheol 2008), but it failed because of strong opposition from the Korean 
Chamber of Commerce and Industry (Yoo-chul 2010). New Zealand’s proposed 
carbon tax in 2005 was scheduled to take effect from April 2007, but it was 
abandoned in December 2005 (Hodgson 2005; New Zealand Press Association 
2005). A new carbon tax in France was intended to come into effect on 1 January 
2010, but it was blocked by the French Constitutional Council on the day before it 
became effective (Kanter 2009). 
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Table 2.1 Worldwide experience in carbon tax and energy tax (by year) 
Region 
/Country 
Tax 
Program 
Implemen
tation 
year 
Main features 
Finland CO2 tax 1990 
The first country in the 1990s to introduce a CO2 tax. 
Currently, energy-intensive firms are partially 
excluded. 
Norway CO2 tax 1991 
Applies to fossil fuels and the production of oil and gas 
offshore. 
Among the highest carbon taxes in the OECD. 
According to IEA 2005 Review of Norway, Norway’s 
CO2 tax covers about 64% of Norwegian CO2 
emissions and 52% of total GHG emissions. 
Sweden CO2 tax 1991 
Based on the use of oil, coal, natural gas, liquefied 
petroleum gas, petrol, and aviation fuel used in 
domestic travel. 
In 2007 the tax was SEK 930 (€101) per ton of CO2. 
Denmark CO2 tax 1992 
The CO2 tax applies to all energy users, including the 
industrial sector. But the industrial companies can be 
taxed differently according to two principles: the 
process the energy is used for, and whether or not the 
company has entered into a voluntary agreement to 
apply energy efficiency measures. 
Netherlands 
Carbon/ 
energy tax 
1992 
Assessed partly on carbon content and partly on energy 
content. 
UK 
Fuel duty 
escalator 
(FDE) 
 
 
 
Climate 
change 
levy 
1993-2000 
 
 
 
2001 
The tax was on retail petroleum products and was 
explicitly designed to reduce CO2 emissions in the 
transport sector. 
Since carbon is in fixed ratio to the quantity of fuel, the 
FDE roughly approximated a carbon tax. 
The fuel price escalator was set at an annual increase of 
3% ahead of inflation, later rising to 5%. 
 
Adds about 15% to the cost of electricity. 
The revenues are recycled by reducing the National 
Insurance contributions of those who pay the levy. 
Part of the revenue is also used to assist businesses 
adopt energy efficiency. 
Austria Energy tax 1995 
Started from oil products and covered gas and 
electricity in 1996. 
The tax does not consider the carbon content of the 
energy products. 
Costa Rica Carbon tax 1997 
A portion of the funds generated by the tax go to the 
‘Payment for Environmental Services’ program which 
gives incentives to property owners to practice 
sustainable development and forest conservation. 
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Region 
/Country 
Tax 
Program 
Implemen
tation 
year 
Main features 
Slovenia Carbon tax 
1998, 
2005 
The carbon tax was first introduced in 1998 and it was 
replaced with a new carbon tax in May 2005. 
It covers only relatively smaller installations as the 
energy intensive installations, which are part of the EU 
ETS, are exempted from the carbon tax payment. 
It has different taxation levels for different fuels. 
Italy Carbon tax 1999 
The tax is on the consumption of energy products. 
The excises had to be raised every year for the next 
five years in order to meet a target level in 2005. 
Germany 
Ecological 
tax 
1999 
The tax is on heating fuel, petrol, natural gas and 
electricity. 
The tax was slowly increased from 2000 to 2003 and 
now remains at 2003 levels. 
Luxembourg Energy tax 1999 
The businesses that undergo voluntary energy or 
environmental audits and demonstrate other efforts to 
increase efficiency are exempted from the tax. 
Belgium Energy tax 2003 
On fuels and electricity (increase for liquid petroleum 
products, decrease for natural gas for households). 
Boulder, 
Colorado, 
US 
Carbon tax 
Nov. 2006-
31 Mar. 
2013 
The first municipal carbon tax. 
It is a tax on electricity consumption (utility bills) with 
deductions for using electricity from renewable 
sources. 
Alberta, 
Canada 
Carbon tax 
1 July 
2007 
Only covers the companies that emit more than 
100 000 t of GHG annually. 
Quebec, 
Canada 
Carbon tax 
1 Oct. 
2007 
The first province in Canada to introduce a carbon tax. 
The tax is imposed on energy producers. 
The revenue is used for energy-efficiency programs, 
including public transit. 
Switzerland CO2 tax Jan. 2008 
The tax is on all fossil fuels unless they are used for 
energy. 
Companies are allowed to exempt themselves from the 
tax by participating in a Swiss cap-and-trade ETS. 
The tax is revenue neutral. 
California, 
US 
Carbon tax May 2008 A carbon tax on businesses of 4.4 cents/t of CO2. 
British 
Columbia, 
Canada 
Carbon tax 
1 July 
2008 
The tax will increase each year until 2012, reaching a 
final price of $30/t (7.2 c/L at the pump). 
The legislation will keep the pending carbon tax 
revenue neutral by reducing corporate and income 
taxes at an equivalent rate. 
Republic of 
Ireland 
Carbon tax 2010 
The carbon tax is levied at €15/t of CO2 emissions. 
The carbon tax applies to kerosene, marked gas oil, 
liquid petroleum gas, fuel oil and natural gas. 
The natural gas carbon tax does not apply to electricity 
because the cost of electricity is already included in 
pricing under the Single Electricity Market. 
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Region 
/Country 
Tax 
Program 
Implemen
tation 
year 
Main features 
Montgomery 
County, 
Maryland, 
US 
Carbon tax May 2010 
It is the first county-level carbon tax in the US. 
Any stationary source emitting more than a million 
tons of CO2 during a calendar year need to pay US$5/t 
of CO2 emissions. 
India Carbon tax 
1 July 
2010 
A nationwide carbon tax of 50 rupees/t (US$1/t) of 
coal both produced and imported into India. 
South Africa CO2 tax 
1 Sep. 
2010 
The tax is implemented on new motor vehicles, but 
limited to new passenger vehicles and new light 
commercial vehicles (double cabs and small bakkies). 
It applies at the time of sale and relates to the amount 
of CO2 emitted by the vehicles. 
Based on the certified CO2 emissions at 75 rands/g/km 
(US$10.26/g/km) for each g/km above 120 g/km. 
Sources: Baranzini et al. (2000), CBC News (2008), City of Boulder (2011), Dergona (2010), Ekins 
& Barker (2002), Kranjcevic (2007), Lauber (2002), Martini (2009), Ministry of Environment and 
Forests Government of India (2010), ODYSSEE (2011), OECD (1997), Parliament of Australia 
(2011), Pearson (2010), Scrimgeour et al. (2005), The Canada (2008), Xinhua (2010) and Zito (2008). 
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The carbon tax impacts on emissions reductions by making energy savings initiatives 
more viable, by promoting technological development of energy-saving products, 
and by reducing consumption (Andersen et al. 2000). The literature offers a range of 
ex ante and empirical studies of the extent to which a carbon tax can reduce 
emissions, but the results vary among different studies. In 1997 the Swedish 
Ministry of Environment projected that 20–25% CO2 reductions would be achieved 
in 2000 on the basis of 1990 levels by the Swedish CO2 tax (Johansson 2000). But 
the Swedish Environmental Protection Agency (1997) evaluated the Swedish CO2 
tax and found that the emissions in 1994 were only about 5 Mt lower than the 
business-as-usual scenario. The Danish Environmental Protection Agency (1999) 
estimates that 1.6% CO2 emissions would be reduced by the Danish CO2 tax. By 
doing a counterfactual analysis of the Norwegian CO2 tax, Larsen & Nesbakken 
(1997) find that it has contributed 3–4% CO2 reductions in Norway during the period 
from 1991 to 1993. Another empirical study of the Norwegian carbon tax shows that 
the outcomes from this policy are small, involving only 2% emission reductions 
(Bruvoll & Larsen 2004). A summary of various studies in the 1990s of the 
emissions reduction effect of Norwegian CO2 tax has estimated a range from 2.5% to 
11% compared with the business-as-usual scenarios (Prasad 2008). 
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The macroeconomic effects of carbon taxes have been extensively modelled, with 
dynamic optimisation, CGE and marcroeconomic simulation being the three main 
approaches (Ekins & Barker 2002). The model results are influenced by the models 
used and assumptions concerning the recycling of tax revenues (Repetto & Austin 
1997). By doing a comparative study of the results from US models, Repetto and 
Austin (1997) estimate that a 30% reduction in US baseline emissions by 2020 
would reduce GDP by 3% in the worst case, and increase GDP by 2.5% in the best 
case. The total of 5.5% cost difference in GDP can be attributed to the model 
approaches adopted and the recycling (of the revenue) assumptions. For carbon taxes 
with lump-sum recycling, Ekins & Barker (2002) summarize a number of individual 
country studies and find that the general results are that 15–25% CO2 emissions 
reductions by 2010 would lead to a GDP loss of 0.1–1.2%. However, a series of 
studies confirm the findings of Repetto & Austin (1997) that GDP could rise above 
the baseline with a carbon tax under the assumption that the tax revenues are used to 
reduce employment taxes, a tax swith (Barker 1999; Barker & Köhler 1998; 
Garbaccio et al. 1999, 2000; Houghton et al. 1996; Jorgenson & Wilcoxen 1993; 
McDougall & Dixon 1996; Zhang 1998c).  
This economic effect is the ‘double dividend’, which was first set out by Pearce 
(1991). Jorgenson and Wilcoxen (1993) find that a 1.7% GDP loss under lump-sum 
redistribution is converted to a 0.69% loss when the carbon tax is used to reduce 
labour taxes, and there would be a 1.1% gain if the carbon tax is used to reduce 
capital taxes. By employing a CGE model in China, Zhang (1996) finds that welfare 
may be improved if carbon taxes are used to reduce some other taxes. Garbaccio et al. 
(1999, 2000) with another dynamic CGE model for China, but using carbon tax 
revenues to reduce all other taxes, suggest that GDP would increase in the long run. 
But some studies argue that the use of revenues to reduce employment taxes does not 
generally appear to increase the GDP (Goulder 1995; Jorgenson et al. 1995; 
Shackleton et al. 1996). The existence of the double dividend in practice is still under 
debate.  
The distributional effects of a carbon tax are complex, including both intended and 
unintended impacts. The different impacts of a carbon tax on the competitiveness of 
different sectors is an example of intended effect, since the relatively carbon-
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intensive sectors experience a higher tax burden (Ekins & Barker 2002). Pezzey 
(1992) simulates the introduction of a carbon tax of US$100/t in the UK and finds 
that only the four most carbon intensive sectors (iron and steel, chemicals, non-
ferrous metals and non-metallic minerals) experience cost increases when the 
revenues are redistributed to the sectors relative to their output. By using data from 
21 OECD countries and nine sample energy-intensive industries, Zhao (2011) finds 
that a carbon tax has a negative impact on the international competitiveness of 
energy-intensive countries. However, there can be unintended effects on different 
regions or income groups (Ekins & Barker 2002). In most instances, firms can pass 
the costs of a carbon price to consumers by increasing product prices (Neuhoff 2008). 
Low-income families may suffer more as they spend a larger fraction of their 
available income on energy-intensive goods than high-income people do (Neuhoff 
2008). Smith (1992) reveals that fuel expenditures relative to total expenditures for 
the lowest income quartile are 1.2% higher than for the highest quartile in Italy, 1.9% 
in Spain, 2.7% in Netherlands, 3.4% in France, 3.5% in Germany and 5.8% in 
Ireland. Results from empirical studies show that carbon taxes are generally 
regressive, but less than first expected (Barde 1997; OECD 1997). The regressive 
distributive impacts of a carbon tax could be relieved by tax exemptions or 
household transfers (Bashmakov & Jepma 2001). 
The impact of carbon taxes has been examined from three main aspects: 
environmental, economic and distributional effects. Overall, a carbon tax would 
likely to reduce emissions but it may have negative macroeconomic effects and 
regressive distributional effects. However, if the revenues were used to offset other 
taxes, there is the possibility of the double dividend effect. In practice, a carbon tax 
is usually accompanied by tax exemptions or subsidies to support the energy-
intensive sectors and low-income groups. Therefore, the negative impacts of a 
carbon tax may be less than expected. The review of the experience of carbon taxes 
in this section suggests that a carbon tax appears to be a desirable policy instrument 
that can be used to mitigate carbon emissions, but it is not ideal for achieving 
particular targets, which is where emissions trading has an advantage.  
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2.5  Emissions trading 
2.5.1 The case for emissions trading 
The idea of emissions trading, introduced by Dales (1968) and later formalized by 
Montgomery (1972), was based on the Coase Therorem. Externality theory, 
economic transaction cost theory and property theory for environmental capacity 
resources are the three major theories behind emissions trading (Jutila 2008). It is 
argued that much environmental depletion and pollution is caused by inadequately 
defined and insecure property rights (Gunningham et al. 1998). In response to this 
problem, the Coase Theorem suggests that ‘if there were (a) no wealth effects on 
demand, (b) no transaction costs and (c) rights to pollute or control pollution, the 
allocative solution would be invariant and optimal, regardless of the initial 
assignment of rights’ (Frech 1973, p. 254). By creating property rights for a public 
good (Sterner 2003), which in this case is the atmosphere, ‘emission trading schemes 
assign private property rights to emitters and according to the Coase Theorem this 
should be sufficient to lead to an efficient outcome’ (Betz 2006, p. 2).  
By using a model of a perfect market with pollution allowances (permits), 
Montgomery (1972) finds that a cost minimum equilibrium exists when an 
environmental target is given to companies. Therefore, according to the supply-and-
demand theory in microeconomics, the permit price should increase under a cap-and-
trade system in the long term, which provides greater incentives for business to make 
efficient investment decisions (Egenhofer 2007). According to Montgomery (1972), 
an ETS with this price mechanism would be an efficient instrument for achieving 
environmental targets. 
Besides providing more certainty about emission levels, it can be linked to other 
countries’ carbon reduction programs (Stavins 2008). Emissions trading allows 
entities the flexibility to take the most cost-effective action to meet limits and it 
could improve long-term predictability, provide certainty and minimize the 
distortions to competition in the market (Egenhofer 2007; Leung et al. 2009; Tomás 
et al. 2010; Zhang 1998a). Moreover, it may provide growth for new business and 
trading opportunities (Leung et al. 2009). Emissions trading has several 
disadvantages, including high start-up costs, long set-up time and political barriers 
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(Leung et al. 2009). In addition, cap-and-trade emissions trading schemes rely on 
markets, which could be severely affected by unforeseen events (Nielson 2010).  
2.5.2 Emissions trading practice 
Early emission trading practice took place in a relatively small number of countries, 
predominantly in the US, before becoming popular throughout the world (OECD 
2002). To date, there have been numerous applications for the issuing of tradable 
permits. A survey by the OECD (1999) reported nine applications in air-pollution 
control, seventy-five in fisheries, eight for water and five for land use by 1999. More 
recent developments include tradable renewable energy certificates (green 
certificates), tradable energy efficiency improvement certificates (white certificates) 
and trading in waste, transport emissions and GHGs (OECD 2002).  
The US Acid Rain Program was introduced in 1990 following the passage of the 
1990 US Clean Air Act to reduce SO2 from electric power plants (Kinsman 2002), 
which is the best-known and most successful experience with emission trading 
(Ellerman et al. 2003; Kinsman 2002). The reasons for this success summarized by 
Kinsman (2002) include the use of an attainable cap with reasonable deadlines, two 
phases of reduction, flexibility for sources to achieve compliance, accurate 
measurement of emission and severe penalties for non-compliance.  
The EU ETS, which has followed the practices pioneered by the US Acid Rain 
Program, was introduced in 2005 and is by far the largest carbon trading system in 
the world. It sets mandatory caps on CO2 emissions for the 27 member countries of 
the EU, representing 99% of the volume of allowances traded globally in 2006 (King 
2008a). The EU experience with emissions trading suggests that the rules for a cap-
and-trade system should be clear and easily enforced, otherwise market function will 
suffer and transaction costs will increase (King 2008a).  
Emissions trading began to be discussed and piloted in China early in the 1980s, but 
it was primarily conceptual with few applications because of legal and regulatory 
constraints. It was first used to control sewage in Jiangsu Province and Shanghai 
Municipality in 1987 (Lin & Feng 2008; Zhou 2009). In 1994 the Chinese State 
Environmental Protection Administration (SEPA) conducted policy experiments in 
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air pollutant emission trading in six cities
6
 (Yang et al. 2003). Then in 2001 Taiyuan 
city introduced a SO2 trading program with financial assistance from the Asian 
Development Bank (ADB) and technical assistance from the US Resource for the 
Future (RFF) and Chinese Academy for Environmental Planning (CAEP). The SO2 
emission trading program was extended to seven provinces or cities
7
 in 2002.  
Carbon emissions trading programs have been introduced in several countries, 
including Canada, the US, Japan, New Zealand, the Netherlands, Switzerland and the 
UK (Climate Change Information New Zealand 2011; Leung et al. 2009). However, 
most of these programs are not mandatory and/or are not implemented at the national 
level, or are not cap-and-trade programs. Carbon trading systems have also been 
implemented at a local government and company level, including the New South 
Wales Greenhouse Gas Abatement Scheme in Australia and CO2 trading in the state 
of Massachusetts in the US, and in BP, Royal Dutch Shell and the Chicago Climate 
Exchange (Philibert & Reinaud 2004). A summary of the worldwide experiences in 
air pollutants emissions trading is presented in Table 2.3. 
Table 2.3 Worldwide experiences in air pollutants emissions trading (by year) 
Region/ 
Country 
Program 
Trading 
pollutant 
Implementati
on year 
Main features 
US 
Southern 
California’s 
RECLAIM 
Program 
SO2 and 
NOX 
1994 
Include over 40 companies and 
industrial facilities in the Los 
Angeles area. 
Acid Rain 
Program 
SO2 
1995 (phase 1) 
2000 (phase 2) 
A cap-and-trade system for SO2; 
Mainly among electric utilities; 
Two-phase. 
Chicago 
Climate 
Exchange 
CO2, 
CH4,N2O,
HFC,PFC,
SF6 
2002 
2005 
First voluntary carbon trading 
scheme implemented in the US; 
Companies with emissions over 
250 000 t e-CO2, 33 entities; 
Participants can choose 
reducing emissions directly, 
purchasing permits from other 
participants or getting credits 
from agricultural or other offset 
projects to meet the 
commitment.  
                                                 
6
 Baotou, Kaiyuan, Liuzhou, Taiyuan, Pingdingshan and Guiyang. 
7
 The seven provinces or cities are Tianjin, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Shanghai, Shanxi, Henan and Guangxi. 
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Region/ 
Country 
Program 
Trading 
pollutant 
Implementati
on year 
Main features 
US 
Regional 
Greenhouse Gas 
Initiative 
(RGGI) 
GHGs 2009 
A mandatory cap-and-trade 
scheme covering 209 fossil fuel 
electricity generators across ten 
northeastern states in the US.  
Canada 
Pilot Emissions 
Reduction 
Trading (PERT) 
Project 
GHGs and 
other 
pollutants 
1996 
A think tank was established 
and has coordinated pilot trades 
between American and 
Canadian companies; 
Revealed that a project-based 
GHGs emission reducing 
trading is feasible. 
EU 
Eurelectric’s 
Pilot Project 
CO2 2000 
Involved 40 major European 
companies in various sectors; 
EU ETS CO2 
2005 (phase 1) 
2008 (phase 2) 
The first and largest mandatory 
cap-and-trade scheme for CO2 in 
the world; 
It covers all 27 EU members 
states and three non-members 
(Iceland, Liechtenstein and 
Norway); 
Targets across four broad 
sectors: iron and steel, minerals, 
energy, and pulp and paper. 
BP  CO2, CH4 2000 
Participation is voluntary for 
BP, but mandatory for the 
operating units. 
Shell  CO2, CH4 2000-2002 
Voluntary basis; 
6 business units in Annex I 
countries. 
Denmark CO2 ETS CO2 2001 
Targeted at CO2 emissions from 
power plants that were not 
covered by CO2 taxes; 
The main focus for this scheme 
was to transit into the EU ETS. 
UK 
Greenhouse Gas 
Emissions 
Trading 
Program 
CO2 2001 
Voluntary basis; 
Covering all UK-based entities 
not covered by other agreements 
or directives; 
Reduction target and financial 
incentive are determined 
through an action process. 
CRC Energy 
Efficiency 
Scheme 
CO2 2010 
A mandatory cap-and-trade 
scheme applying to large non 
energy-intensive organizations 
in the public and private sectors 
that are not covered by the EU 
ETS; 
The organizations are 
responsible for about 10% of the 
UK’s emissions. 
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Region/ 
Country 
Program 
Trading 
pollutant 
Implementati
on year 
Main features 
The 
Netherlands 
Emission 
Reduction Units 
Procurement 
Tender (ERU-
PT) 
CO2 2001 
The Dutch Government 
provides funds for acquisition of 
ERUs from eastern European 
countries; 
A single buyer (the Dutch 
Government) purchasing ERU 
from multiple sellers in other 
countries. 
China 
4-3-1 Emissions 
Trading Project 
SO2 2002 
Involve four provinces, three 
cities and one enterprise. 
New South 
Wales, 
Australia 
Greenhouse Gas 
Abatement 
Scheme 
CO2 2003 
For electricity retailers and 
other parties; 
Participants may purchase or 
use abatement certificates to 
offset emission; 
May also reduce emission to 
generate certificates. 
Japan Domestic ETS CO2 2008 
Voluntary domestic ETS; 
Cover large-scale emissions 
from industry, industrial process 
and energy conversion sectors; 
A policy mix consisting of an 
ETS and a tax on emissions. 
Switzerland Swiss ETS CO2 2008 
A voluntary scheme run in 
conjunction with an exemption 
from the mandatory CO2 taxes; 
Plan to link to the EU ETS. 
New 
Zealand 
New Zealand 
ETS 
GHGs 2008 
A national all-sectors all GHGs 
all-free allocation uncapped 
ETS; 
Individual sectors of the 
economy have different ‘entry 
day’. 
Data source: adapted from Haites et al. (2001), Leung et al. (2009) and Climate Change Information 
New Zealand (2011). 
More countries are developing carbon emissions trading schemes. For example, 
Korea plans to begin a scheme in 2015 (Climate Change Information New Zealand 
2011). However, not all the attempts to establish an emissions trading approach have 
succeeded: early proposals in Norway (OECD 1999; Tietenberg 2003), Germany 
(Scharer 1999), Poland (OECD 1999; Tietenberg 2003; Zylicz 1999) and the UK 
(OECD 1999; Sorrell 1999; Tietenberg 2003) failed. The Australian Government’s 
‘White Paper’ in December 2008 outlined a Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme 
(CPRS) that would be implemented in July 2010, but this plan was rejected twice by 
the Senate. It was subsequently delayed and then revamped to be in the Clean 
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Energy Act in November 2011 (Commonwealth of Australia 2008; Kelly 2010; 
Thompson 2011). The RECLAIM program for mitigating nitric oxide (NOX) and 
SO2 emissions among stationary sources in America was another failure. Soleille 
(2006) identified lessons to be learnt from this program: it should take time to 
prepare; the market is very important; the participation should be enlarged; the 
penalty for non-compliance should be automatic; and the banking of allowances 
should be allowed. Another obvious lesson from this program is that trading should 
involve low transaction costs (Stavins 1997). 
2.5.3 Impacts of emissions trading  
The impacts of emissions trading schemes so far have been analyzed from different 
viewpoints. Emission reductions, emission cost, innovation and investment in clean 
technology and leakage are the four major perspectives. Some researchers have 
investigated the actual performance of the emissions trading systems, while many 
can only simulate the possible outcomes due to the limited number of practices or 
data unavailability. 
The first set of research examines the emission reductions attributed to the emission 
trading programs. About 15 months after the introduction of the emissions trading 
program in Sweden, a survey conducted in the emission trading sectors shows that 
the EU ETS does make participants take action and/or plan to reduce emissions 
(Sandoff & Schaad 2009). However, the emissions data of EU ETS during 2005–07 
indicates that CO2 emission reductions are not noticeable (Jutila 2008). One 
explanation is that the caps are not low enough to push the companies to take 
emission control actions in the short term (Jutila 2008). Statistics from the US 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) show that the US Acid Rain Program was 
estimated to have achieved about 40% emission reductions of the 1980 levels by 
2001 and the reductions would increase to 50% by 2010 (Kinsman 2002). Hidalgo et 
al. (2005) forecast that the global direct emissions from the iron and steel sector will 
reduce by 15% in 2030 in the context of CO2 emission trading.  
The second research area is concerned with the cost effectiveness of emissions 
trading. Historic examples have revealed that a cap-and-trade ETS is by far the most 
cost-effective instrument for regulating emissions (Agricultural Carbon Market 
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Working Group 2010). Compared with command-and-control regulations for SO2, a 
cap-and-trade program is found to have achieved US$1 billion cost savings annually 
(Stavins 1998). A survey by Burtraw (2000) finds that the US Acid Rain Program 
contributed tremendous cost savings compared to the conventional approach and 
even compared to original forecasts, with the actual costs being just one-half to one-
quarter of the initial projection. This achievement is also supported by the statistics 
from the US EPA (Kinsman 2002). By reviewing the empirical literature on US 
emission trading schemes, Gagelmann and Frondel (2005) conclude that an ETS is a 
low-cost strategy.  
The third and most popular area of ETS studies assesses the impact of emission 
trading on innovation and investment in clean technologies. Using a duration model 
applied to a panel of refineries from 1971 to 1999, Kerr and Newell (2003) note that 
the tradable permits system used during the phasedown of lead in gasoline really 
resulted in more R&D and more efficient technology adoptions. From investigating 
the power sector in Finland, Laurikka and Koljonen (2006) find that a quantitative 
investment appraisal is affected greatly by the ETS through several variables such as 
output price. Peace and Juliani (2009) argue that the US future cap-and-trade 
program will provide a larger incentive for innovation in low-carbon technologies by 
placing a price on carbon emissions and creating a market. According to a survey 
carried out by the European Commission during June to September 2005, about half 
of the companies announced that their decisions to invest in clean technology could 
be attributed to the EU ETS at least half or more (European Commission et al. 2006). 
However, after reviewing the literature on previous emission trading systems in US, 
Gagelmann and Frondel (2005) expect only limited innovation effects from the EU 
ETS in the first years. By explaining the mechanism of EU ETS, Bleischwitz et al. 
(2007) also find the EU ETS has not yet provided incentives for long-term 
innovation dynamics such as the transition to a hydrogen economy.  
In addition, other possible impacts such as price increases and leakages have been 
investigated. Sousa et al. (2005) develop a simulator to assess the impact of CO2 
emission trading on the Iberian electricity industry and discover that the electricity 
prices will rise when CO2 constraints are in place. Koljonen and Savolainen (2004) 
arrive at the same conclusion by applying a stochastic electricity price model in the 
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Nordic area. Under the assumption that carbon prices are likely to increase, 
Bleischwitz et al. (2007) reveal that the EU ETS may make some energy intensive 
industries relocate their production to outside the EU. Hidalgo et al. (2005) also 
conclude that the emissions and production will leak from EU15
8
 to the rest of the 
world, mainly China, when the EU15 emission trading is implemented. However, an 
empirical study of the US Acid Rain Program finds that the scheme has not resulted 
in a geographic shifting of emissions (Environmental Defense Fund 2009) 
Theoretically, a successful ETS would result in a series of desirable outcomes such 
as reducing emissions, saving emission reduction costs, promoting innovation and 
increasing investment in clean technology, without inducing companies to relocate 
(named as the Theoretical Emissions Trading Response Model in this research). The 
above literature review shows that the emissions trading programs do have an impact 
on the companies’ behaviours, which suggests that emissions trading could be an 
effective policy in reducing carbon emissions. However, our review also reveals 
some unintended consequences from the ETS, which suggests that the actual effect 
should be examined on a case-by-case basis. While many studies investigate the 
possible or actual impacts of emissions trading in developed countries, little attention 
has been given to the outcomes of the existing emissions trading practice in China. 
Whether an ideal outcome can be realized in China as suggested by the theory 
remains to be answered.  
2.5.4 Emissions trading markets 
The foremost foundation of emissions trading instruments is based on the idea of 
market efficiency, so the emissions trading market plays a significant role in 
evaluating the practice of an emissions trading program. Observations from the 
existing emissions trading markets of the US SO2 program and the EU ETS provide 
preliminary insights for problems that might arise in other emissions trading markets. 
The participants in the US SO2 trading program have been provided with many 
compliance choices, including buying permits from the market, switching to low-
sulphur energy sources, employing clean technology, increased use of non-sulphur 
                                                 
8
 Include Austria, Belgium, Luxembourg, Denmark, Spain, Finland, France, the UK, Greece, Ireland, 
Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Germany and Sweden.  
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energy sources (nuclear, hydropower, wind and thermal energy etc.) or adopting 
energy conservation measures to reduce energy demand and emissions (Rico 1995). 
A public report published by the US EPA in 1993 showed that only 9% of 
companies, which had announced their compliance strategies during Phase 1 (1995–
99) and Phase 11 (2000–10), would employ the permits trading strategy, while 63% 
of participants decided to take the fuel switching strategy (Rico 1995). Excluding 
transactions through the annual auction, slightly more than 2.3 million allowances 
had occurred involving 27 major trades (more than 10 000 permits) and only 12 
firms had bought more than 5000 permits from other utilities by early 1995 (Burtraw 
1996).  
A number of studies and reviews explore the reasons why so few permit trades took 
place at the early stage of the US SO2 trading program. One reason is because of the 
transaction costs involved (Stavins 1995). Another explanation points to the conflict 
between the existing standard regulation of electric utilities and the trading program 
(Bohi & Burtraw 1991). Furthermore, the limits of the earnings on capital gains but 
not capital losses expose the participants to a great risk in buying permits from the 
market (Burtraw 1996). Moreover, the evolution of regulatory policy is uncertain, 
which makes the firms cautious in participating in trading (Burtraw 1996). In 
addition, the permit costs are not covered until the permits are used, which imposes 
an interest burden on the firms (Burtraw 1996). Finally, negative public attitudes 
toward permits trade erodes the enthusiasm for trading (Burtraw 1996).  
A web survey conducted by Sandoff & Schaad (2009) in 2006 on the 221 Swedish 
companies covered by the EU ETS shows that even the trading frequency between 
large companies was every low and only half of the respondents had engaged in 
trading until the survey time, about 15 months after the scheme started. Typically, 
most of the companies that engaged in trading only traded once a year. In addition, 
the majority of the companies used brokers to engage in trade while less than one in 
five trades happened directly at a CO2 exchange
9
. All the findings from the survey 
indicate that very few companies were interested in the permit trading market. The 
infrequent trading can be explained by the companies’ trading strategies to some 
                                                 
9
 Three methods are available for allowances trading in EU ETS: by brokers, by one of the official 
CO2 exchanges or through bilateral agreements with companies covered by the EU ETS (Sandoff & 
Schaad 2009). 
37 
 
extent (Sandoff & Schaad 2009). Some companies adopt risk management strategies 
to avoid the price uncertainty of the emission market. For example, a cost averaging 
strategy enables companies to sell or buy permits spread over a long period with the 
intention that they can avoid buying large volumes at the high price or selling at the 
bottom of the market (Kruger 2005b; Sandoff & Schaad 2009). This has also been 
observed in the US SO2 trading program (Kruger 2005b).  
Another explanation for low frequency trading is that the companies predict that they 
have been already provided with enough permits during the first trading period 
(Sandoff & Schaad 2009). According to the experience from the US SO2 trading 
program (Burtraw 1996), a possible reason for this phenomenon is that the 
participants rely on other measures to achieve permits balance rather than trading. 
These measures include reducing emissions by improving the equipment of the 
company, getting extra permits by investing in project-based mechanisms under the 
Kyoto Protocol and relocating permits between the branches located in different 
countries within the EU ETS (Sandoff & Schaad 2009). In that sense the cap acts 
more like a regulation than as part of the market mechanism.  
The price of carbon emissions per tonne in the EU ETS trading market has 
experienced great fluctuation (MacKenzie 2007). The carbon price rose markedly 
from January 2005 to March 2006, peaking at €31/t. On 26 April the European 
carbon price fell 30%, and the carbon allowances were traded as low as €9 by mid-
May 2006. In early 2007 one could buy the right to emit a tonne of CO2 for as little 
as €1. The EU carbon market could be said to be a failure because too many permits 
had been distributed and the caps on emissions had not been set tightly enough, with 
supply greatly exceeding demand (FitzRoy & Papyrakis 2010; MacKenzie 2007). 
After this experience, the EU took the initiative to cut emission caps and push up the 
price of carbon permits (with plans but no firm commitments to auction permits in 
the future) (FitzRoy & Papyrakis 2010). This experience with the EU ETS indicates 
that the design and setting of the ETS is of great importance in fostering an efficient 
trading market.  
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2.5.5 Key elements of a well-designed emissions trading 
program     
Many studies have expressed the same views on the key elements of designing 
emissions trading schemes (Muller & Mestelman 1998; Philibert & Reinaud 2004; 
Svendsen & Vesterdal 2003). These include targets, coverage of the scheme, 
allocation methods, banking and borrowing, linkage and the compliance system. 
However, difficulties arise in deciding the design features appropriate for a particular 
country (Hahn 2000). 
Targets 
When setting up a specific overall target, a country will have to consider whether 
other countries can accept the target and whether the economy can afford to achieve 
this target (Huang & Lee 2009). In addition, countries need to make the decision 
between absolute targets (expressed as total emissions in a specified period) and 
relative/rate-based targets (expressed as an emission rate per unit of output or input 
or activity) (Philibert & Reinaud 2004). It is argued that the relative target is more 
flexible and popular (Gielen et al. 2002) and has the economic incentive to increase 
output (Bode 2002; Burtraw et al. 2001), while an absolute target does not (Philibert 
& Reinaud 2004). Yet Ellerman (2005) finds little support for this argument from the 
US experience. 
Coverage 
There is a common understanding that the wider the coverage, the greater the 
potential for individual entities in lowering overall costs (Baron & Bygrave 2002; 
Commission of the European Communities 2000). Yet, by considering uncertainty 
and monitoring cost, a trading program may initially cover only some sources of the 
targeted emissions (Ellerman et al. 2003). In practice, all the emissions trading 
schemes so far only cover some of the emissions (Philibert & Reinaud 2004): see the 
EU ETS (Egenhofer 2007) and the US Acid Rain Program (Ellerman et al. 2003) in 
particular.  
Allocation  
How to allocate emission permits is a key decision in emissions trading schemes 
(Ekins & Barker 2002). Grandfathering and auctioning are two main methods used 
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by governments internationally (Huang & Lee 2009). Grandfathering distributes free 
allowance to participants on the basis of historical emissions (Huang & Lee 2009). 
The principal reason for grandfathering allocations is to ‘buy’ acceptance and 
support from existing parties (Egenhofer 2007; Markussen & Svendsen 2005; 
Tietenberg 2002). But it may create an incentive for polluters to be as dirty as 
possible in the periods prior to setting the allocation. Many studies support 
auctioning because it is more efficient (Fullerton & Metcalf 2001; Goulder et al. 
1999), technically preferable, more transparent and simpler (Questions and Answers 
on the Revised EU Emissions Trading System  2008). In addition, it can raise 
revenue for governments (Ackerman & Stewart 1985) and provide the greatest 
incentive for investing on low-carbon technology (Questions and Answers on the 
Revised EU Emissions Trading System  2008). However, Vesterdal & Svendsen 
(2004) argue that auctioning allowances may not be politically feasible. Experience 
from the US and EU trading schemes indicate that allocation choices need to 
consider both political and economic feasibility (Boemare & Quirion 2002).  
Banking and borrowing 
Banking, the transfer of unused allowances to future years, has been allowed in most 
emissions trading programs (Boemare & Quirion 2002). Theoretical and practical 
experiences show that banking reduces overall compliance costs by creating inter-
temporal flexibility because cost savings can be traded over time (Akhurst et al. 2003; 
Hansjürgens 2005; Kling & Rubin 1997; Schleich et al. 2006). Heavy use of banking 
in the US SO2 trading led to early reductions and fewer compliance costs (Ellerman 
et al. 2003; Tietenberg 2003). Conversely, the lack of banking terms may lead to 
enormous price fluctuations, such as in the EU ETS (King 2008b) and the 
RECLAIM program (Ellerman 2007). Nevertheless, it is recommended to limit both 
the number of permits that can be banked and the longest term allowed for banking 
so as to avoid the risk to future GHG reductions which could be raised by 
accumulating a large bank of allowances (Boemare & Quirion 2002; Philibert & 
Reinaud 2004). 
Borrowing, the flexibility of allowing firms to delay commitment, is not clearly 
allowed in any emissions trading experiences as it will cause difficulty in ensuring 
targets are met (Boemare & Quirion 2002). Godard (2001) points out that borrowing 
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may create two problems: firms delay their emission reductions for several years and 
then ask to renegotiate reduced commitments to their benefits. 
Linkage 
Linkage in a national ETS includes linking with other relevant policy instruments at 
national level and with other emissions trading schemes at the international level 
(Mavrakis & Konidari 2003). As it is too expensive to include all plants and 
households in the carbon trading scheme, Svendsen & Vesterdal (2003) suggest 
using a tax or some other measures on the non-participating plants and households to 
make sure that they are faced with approximately the same cost. When linking other 
trading schemes, monitoring, accounting and verifying, compliance mechanisms and 
mutual recognition of trading units are essential elements to be considered (Blyth & 
Bossi 2004; Haites & Mullins 2001; Peterson 2004).  
Compliance system 
Akhurst et al. (2003) are convinced that data quality is the key to a successful trading 
system, especially at the early stage of a climate program. The US EPA measures 
emissions by requiring most emission sources to install Continuous Emission 
Monitoring (CEM) equipment and creating a data registry to collect, audit, manage, 
and disseminate emissions data (Yang et al. 2003).  
To ensure that the GHG emissions do not increase, Svendsen and Vesterdal (2003) 
propose that a participant whose emissions exceed its permits must be fined and then 
reduce the excess amount in the next year. Strict and foreseeable penalties make the 
US Acid Rain Program successful in complying with the terms (Commission of the 
European Communities 2000; King 2008b). However, Shell failed to meet its target 
because no sanctions were taken for non-compliance (De Coninck & Van der Linden 
2003). Cheating with emissions data is another great threat to compliance (Peeters 
2006). There is, therefore, a need for a well-developed compliance system of 
monitoring and enforcement, including anti-corruption measures.  
The literature shows that the design of an emissions trading program has a great 
influence on the operation of the ETS. To the best knowledge of the author, no 
literature has examined the design of the existing emissions trading programs and 
their impacts on the emissions trading practice in China. Furthermore, an ETS to 
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reduce carbon emissions has not been in place in China. Previous experiences and 
lessons of designing emissions trading programs will eventually help to design an 
efficient carbon trading framework for China.  
2.5.6 Lessons from early trading schemes  
Much literature has reviewed the lessons learned from SO2 trading programs to apply 
them to GHG trading (Burtraw et al. 2005; Ellerman 2005; Ellerman et al. 2003; 
Environmental Law Institute 1997; Harrison et al. 2008; Kruger 2005a; Stavins 1998; 
Tietenberg 2003). Harrison et al. (2008) discuss the important policy issues for GHG 
emissions trading by studying the US cap-and-trade programs for conventional air 
pollutants, including SO2 and NOX. Parsons et al. (2009) examine the performance 
of the EU CO2 market and the US SO2 market when designing a US market for CO2.  
At the same time, several researchers argue that the climate change issue is different 
from conventional air pollution problems because of differences in sources, science, 
mitigation options and economics (Johnston et al. 2008; Kruger 2005a). SO2 is a 
more conventional pollutant that had been long regulated before the emissions 
trading program started (Ellerman & Buchner 2007) and it is a regional problem 
while CO2 is a global problem (Ellerman 2005). Moreover, the abatement cost for 
CO2 is likely to be much more expensive than that for SO2 because the installation of 
scrubbers is an option for reducing SO2 emissions but not for all GHGs (Johnston et 
al. 2008). 
Nonetheless, ‘although the US SO2 and the European Carbon market are likely to 
differ in some key issues, the US experience provides important insights that help 
model the stochastic part of the price path’ (Benz & Trück 2006, p. 6). As emissions 
trading is not widely explored in Europe, Benz and Trück (2006) summarize some 
experience from the US SO2 trading market before finding the price drivers and the 
potential impact on price for the European carbon market. Johnston et al. (2008) 
examine the valuation implications of SO2 emissions allowances instead since the 
data necessary to examine the valuation implications of GHG emissions allowances 
is not yet available. They believe that there are similar characteristics between the 
SO2 and GHG emissions trading markets though they have different scientific and 
economic attributes. Kruger (2005a) further identifies five aspects from the literature 
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about the modifications that would be needed to make SO2 trading program suitable 
for GHG trading: GHG trading would be an economy-wide program; all the GHGs 
should be covered to achieve cost-effectiveness; auctioning, flexible mechanisms of 
reducing price risks and international trading should be considered in a GHG trading 
system.  
In practice, the SO2 programs have had a great influence on the EU ETS, as noted by 
EU officials and others (Christiansen & Wettestad 2003; Delbeke 2003; Dimas 2005; 
Zapfel & Vainio 2003). Hence the EU ETS and the US SO2 program share many 
characteristics (Johnston et al. 2008). Ellerman and Buchner (2007), however, 
summarize four significant differences. First, the EU ETS is much larger, covering 
more sources and more emissions. Second, the allowances price in the EU ETS is 
much higher. Third, the EU ETS has a highly decentralized implementation and has 
been considered as a multinational system. Last, the emissions are different in 
origins and impacts. 
Therefore, ‘there is general agreement that the SO2 program “prove the concept” of 
emissions trading for a greenhouse gas program’ (Kruger 2005a, p. 3) and certain 
features of the SO2 program could be modified for a GHG trading program after 
analysing the similarities and differences between SO2 and GHGS. Finally, there is 
so little experience of large-scale programs that the SO2 emissions trading schemes 
are the only existing air pollutant emissions trading in China. On the grounds that 
this is the best available data for emissions trading in the Chinese context, and the 
extrapolation has been used elsewhere, and across jurisdictions, it is argued that 
deriving lessons from SO2 is justified. 
2.6   A comparison of policy instruments 
Determining which policy option is the best depends on the context, such as the 
pollutant to be regulated, the structure of the industry and the likely acceptance by 
stakeholders (Soleille 2006). By analysing the lessons from US SO2 trading, Stavins 
(1998) concludes that the best instrument depends on characteristics of the specific 
environmental problem, and the social, political and economic context in which the 
instrument is to be implemented. Stavins (1997) puts forward several criteria for 
assessing climate change policy instruments: efficiency, cost effectiveness, dynamic 
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effects on technological change, distributional equity and political feasibility. Stavins 
(1997) proposes that the ultimate test will be whether it is scientifically effective, 
economically rational, and politically feasible. Furthermore, Stavins (1997) points 
out that since the cost of addressing the threat of climate change will be extremely 
high, the relative cost effectiveness of policy instruments becomes the principal 
criteria. A comparison of policy options is given in Table 2.4. 
Both carbon tax and carbon emissions trading are market-based policies that aim to 
internalize the costs of emitting GHGS (Shrum 2007). Compared with traditional 
subsidies and command-and-control regulations, both instruments have been 
confirmed to be more effective in reducing pollution (Ekins & Barker 2002; Shrum 
2007). By reviewing current studies on climate change policy, it is also extremely 
clear that market-based policies are far better than non-market regulations and 
mandates in reducing GHGS at the lowest cost (Shrum 2007).  
A tax and an ETS are different in their adjusting ways when costs change 
unexpectedly (Pizer 2002). A permits system adjusts by allowing the permit price to 
rise or fall while holding the emissions level constant. A tax system adjusts by 
allowing the level of total emissions to rise or fall while holding the emissions price 
constant. In perfect market conditions, tax and quantity controls are equivalent if 
correctly designed, and can produce the same price level and quantity of emissions 
(Ekins & Barker 2002; Pezzey 1992; Stavins 1997; Stern 2007; Weitzman 1974). 
But markets are imperfect, so different policy instruments will have varied efficiency 
and need to be chosen according to the specific purpose (Stern 2007). An emissions 
tax may not be the most effective approach as it does not engage all of the available 
methods for emissions control (Nielson 2010). If the tax revenues were not 
redistributed, carbon taxes may lead to higher cost to polluters than command-and-
control regulations (Keohane et al. 1997). Meanwhile, experience in the US has 
shown that emissions trading can reduce costs and achieve environmental goals at 
the same time, and it is applicable for GHG trading (Ellerman 2005).  
After examining all the instruments, Grubb (1990) concludes that the tradable 
emission permits system may be the most promising policy and it is efficient in 
abating global warming. Philibert and Reinaud (2004) support emissions trading 
because there is no local environmental effects of most GHGS, and lowering the cost  
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Table 2.4 Comparison of policy instruments 
Criteria Regulation Subsidies Emissions Taxes Emissions Trading 
Certainty over 
cost? 
No High High 
Low where no price 
limits are set. 
Medium with price 
limits. 
Transparency of 
costs (costs to 
whole economy 
easily and 
accurately 
identified) 
Very low 
High - where 
public accounts 
allow this, 
otherwise low 
High 
High. Emissions 
permit price is 
publicly determined 
through market 
process. 
Certainty over 
emissions 
None 
Depends on 
subsidy but 
generally high 
Very low to none 
High if no upper 
price limits apply. 
Low to medium If 
price limits apply 
and upper permit 
price is too low. 
Efficiently 
encourages 
least-cost 
emissions 
reduction across 
economy 
No No 
Yes, up to the 
level of the tax. 
Yes over short and 
long term as all 
participants able to 
enact lower cost 
emissions reductions 
methods first and 
then proceed to more 
costly methods. 
Ability to 
respond to new 
scientific, 
technical, 
economic or 
regulatory 
developments 
and information 
Low High Low High 
Ability to raise 
revenue 
No None Very High 
Low if large number 
of permits 
distributed free of 
charge. High if 
permits auctioned. 
Incentives for 
R&D in clean 
technology 
Yes and no. 
Technology 
standards 
encourage 
adoption of a 
particular 
technology but 
no incentive 
beyond that 
point 
High 
Yes, if tax is high 
enough, and not 
applied in a way 
that precludes any 
particular 
emissions 
reduction method 
Yes: as emissions 
cap tightens, 
incentive increases. 
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Criteria Regulation Subsidies Emissions Taxes Emissions Trading 
Harm to 
competitiveness 
Somewhat None 
Low, due to low 
level of existing 
taxes. High, if tax 
is high enough 
and alternative 
locations have no 
tax or other 
environmental 
controls. 
To date low, as 
existing schemes 
have not featured a 
high enough 
emissions permit 
price to warrant 
large-scale 
relocation or 
alternative 
investment in other 
countries. 
Practicable or 
political 
obstacles to 
implementation 
Yes, setting the 
level is difficult. 
Regulators do 
not have 
sufficient 
information to 
accurately set 
regulation in 
most instances. 
Low, policy is 
easily 
implemented 
Very low, policy 
design is simple 
and generally 
easy to 
implement. 
However setting 
optimal tax level 
difficult. 
High, as establishing 
a practicable permit 
allocation method 
and reasonable 
emissions cap is 
difficult. Scheme 
design has to be 
carefully thought out 
and this may be time 
consuming. 
Political 
feasibility (low 
share of 
regulatory 
burden falling 
on emitters) 
High as cost 
spread across all 
consumers of a 
particular 
product 
High, as costs 
to consumer 
and firm are 
reduced 
Very low. New 
taxes and changes 
to established 
taxes very 
unpopular. 
Medium, with tax 
switch on 
compensation.  
Low as burden falls 
on highest emitters 
who lobby for 
changes in scheme. 
New 
institutional 
requirements 
Minimal None Minimal 
Very high, but 
existing securities 
markets and 
regulation can be 
adopted to establish 
scheme. 
Fairness across 
income groups 
(limiting impact 
on low income 
groups) 
High as cost 
spread across all 
consumers of a 
particular 
product 
High. Such 
households are 
usually 
beneficiaries 
Very low. 
Regressive for 
low income 
households. 
Low, as increase in 
costs can be 
regressive to low 
income households. 
Data source: adopted from Nielson (2010, pp. 22-24) 
of emission reductions is very important. Moreover, global climate change will 
eventually need a global emissions trading system to achieve the least cost and 
facilitate global participation. Akhurst et al. (2003, p. 1) are convinced that: 
Trading should be a better way of achieving the world’s objectives than the suggested 
alternatives – command and control regulation which imposes the same standard on 
everyone, irrespective of the costs they face or taxation, which just raise the price to 
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everyone, irrespective of whether they have a cheap alternative or not. There are both 
blunt instruments, whereas emission trading is a precision tool. 
However, Akhurst et al. (2003) overlook one important factor in asserting that 
taxation ‘just raise the price to everyone’, without considering what one does with 
the taxation revenue.  
Carbon tax and emissions trading, as market-based instruments, are more efficient 
than other instruments in reducing carbon emissions. The emissions trading approach 
is acknowledged as potentially the most cost-effective one among the four main 
instruments. Considering the typical characteristic of climate change problems and 
the principal criteria of choosing a climate change policy, it is suggested that 
emissions trading is the best policy for reducing carbon emissions theoretically. But 
whether it is the best choice in the context of China at this stage needs to be 
examined and assessed carefully.  
2.7   Conclusion 
Due to the existence of ‘externalities’ and the nature of ‘global public good’, climate 
change can be seen as the greatest market failure. Therefore, government policy 
instruments are needed to address the climate change problem. Generally, four types 
of policy options have been considered for addressing environmental issues: 
command-and-control regulations; subsidies; taxes; and emissions trading.  
Command-and-control regulations have been used extensively to improve the 
environment, but economic incentive instruments have become more widely used. 
Empirical studies of command-and-control regulations have confirmed that they are 
generally far less cost effective than other economic instruments and have many 
negative economic impacts on some sensitive sectors, indicating they are not 
optimally effective policy in reducing carbon emissions.  
Pigovian subsidies are not favoured by economists generally as they go against the 
polluter pays principle. In practice, a large number of subsidies have been used for 
environmental purposes. Meanwhile, due to the rationale of supporting economic 
growth, fossil fuel-based subsidies are widespread, which inevitably contributes to 
the increase in carbon emissions and climate change. In order to achieve carbon 
reductions, subsidizing the alternatives (clean or less carbon-intensive energy 
47 
 
sources) along with removing the harmful fossil fuel subsidies should be employed 
simultaneously. However, due to the uncertainty on the emissions levels, they could 
not be used as the central policy for mitigating the carbon emissions. 
A carbon tax, as a market-based instrument, has been supported by some economists 
for reducing carbon emissions. It has been widely applied in practice as well, 
particularly in some European countries. Empirical studies show that although a 
carbon tax would negatively impact on the economy and distributions, the negative 
effects could be alleviated by using the tax revenue to subsidize households or offset 
other distortional taxes. Therefore, a carbon tax may be an acceptable policy 
instrument for achieving carbon reductions.  
Emissions trading is potentially the most effective and efficient policy in reducing 
carbon emissions. It is more cost effective and more certain about emissions levels, 
and more likely to link with other countries’ carbon reduction programs than other 
instruments. Neither a carbon tax nor carbon trading has been used in China to 
reduce carbon emissions to date. China also has very limited experiences in 
designing and implementing emissions trading programs for other pollutants. 
Whether an emissions trading program would be the most appropriate choice in 
China at this stage and whether it could help China achieve the carbon reductions 
target remain unknown and need to be explored with convincing evidence and 
rigorous analysis.  
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Chapter 3   Emissions control policies and 
practice in China   
3.1   Introduction 
Chapter 2 reviewed the main policy instruments for mitigating carbon emissions, 
including command-and-control regulations, subsidies, taxes and emissions trading. 
It was pointed out that command-and-control regulations are not optimally effective, 
and subsidies could not be used widely as a central policy, while carbon tax and 
emissions trading, as market-based instruments, could be both efficient and effective 
in reducing carbon emissions. Particularly, emissions trading it was argued, could be 
the most effective policy for addressing the climate change problem in terms of 
achieving targets.   
This chapter will review the context of China, providing comprehensive background 
information related to the climate change problem and emissions trading policy in 
China. Section 3.2 will present the energy consumption, carbon emissions and 
climate change situations in China. Section 3.3 will first introduce the objectives and 
principles of China in relation to the climate change issue, and then summarize the 
policies that China has employed and the relevant achievements in mitigating carbon 
emissions. Emissions trading practice in China, which is represented by the case of 
Taiyuan SO2 emissions trading program, will be discussed in Section 3.4. Section 
3.5 will compare the Chinese context with the western context concerning 
environmental policy to identify the necessary considerations in selecting policy 
instruments for China.  
3.2   The policy context 
3.2.1 China’s energy consumption and trend 
According to the BP Statistical Review of World Energy (2011), in 2010 China 
surpassed the US as the largest energy consumer in the world. China then consumed 
about 2432.2 million tonnes of oil equivalent (Mtoe), which accounted for 20.3% of 
global energy consumption and was 146.5 Mtoe more than that of the US. While the 
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EU countries experienced relatively small increases and even some decreases in 
energy consumption, consumption grew vigorously in China, especially after 2001. 
During 2010 energy consumption surged by 11.2% (BP Statistical Review of World 
Energy 2011). Figure 3.1 presents China’s energy consumptions from 1965 to 2010. 
It should be pointed out that per capita energy consumption in China was still only 
1.77 toe in 2010, much less than that of 7.45 toe in the US, 9.42 toe in Canada and 
4.9 toe in Russia (Li 2011). As the prospects of further economic growth remain 
strong in China, total energy consumption is projected to increase at an average 
annual rate of 3.1% between 2007 and 2035 (EIA 2011a).  
 
Data source: BP Statistical Review of World Energy (2011) 
EU: excludes Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania prior to 1985 and Slovenia prior to 1991. 
Figure 3.1 China’s energy consumption from 1965 to 2010 
Primary energy sources generally refers to coal, oil, natural gas, nuclear, and 
hydroelectricity and other renewables (BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2011). 
The first three kinds of energy are from fossil fuels that contribute to carbon 
emissions, with coal being the most polluting source of energy, while the last three 
kinds are clean energy
10
. As different types of energy play different roles in carbon 
emissions, and market mechanisms will have a different effect on each of them, it is 
necessary to have a good understanding of the energy consumption structures and 
patterns in China, each of which will be discussed below. 
 
                                                 
10
 Clean energy in this thesis refers to carbon-free energy.  
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Coal 
Coal use accounted for more than 70% of China’s total primary energy consumption 
in 2010 (Figure 3.2). China is both the largest consumer and producer of coal in the 
world (BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2011). In 2010 China consumed 
1713.5 Mtoe of coal, representing 48.2% of the world total and was responsible for 
about two-thirds of the increase in global consumption. Coal consumption has been 
on the rise in China over the last ten years, with an overall increase of 132.5% since 
2000. Coal extraction also rose significantly during this period and accounted for 
48.3% of the world total in 2010 (BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2011). 
There are 27 provinces in China that produce coal, with northern China, especially 
the Shanxi and Inner Mongolia provinces, containing most of China’s easily 
accessible coal and almost all of the large state-owned mines (EIA 2010a). Although 
the US Energy Information Administration (2010a; EIA) forecasts that the share of 
coal in China’s total energy consumption will fall to 47% by 2035 due to an increase 
in energy efficiency and a reduction in carbon intensity, coal will remain the leading 
source of energy in China. With the strong economic growth, it is expected that 
China’s coal consumption will increase by 1925.28 Mtoe in 2020 and 2832.48 Mtoe 
in 2035, with an average annual increase rate of 2.6% from 2007 to 2035 (EIA 
2011a).  
Oil 
China is currently the world’s second largest oil consumer, after the US. 
Consumption of oil was 9057 thousand barrels per day (bbl/d) in 2010, accounting 
for 10.6% of the world total and with an increase of 10.4% from 2009 (BP Statistical 
Review of World Energy 2011). The use of oil nearly doubled in China during 
2000–10. Oil is also the second largest energy source in China, accounting for 17.62% 
of the country’s total consumption (BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2011). In 
addition, China is highly reliant on oil imports. In 2009 China overtook Japan and 
became the second largest net oil importer in the world behind the US (EIA 2010a). 
It is projected that the liquid fuels consumption in China will rise to 10.6 million 
bbl/d in 2012 and 16.9 million bbl/d in 2035 (EIA 2011a, 2011b).  
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Natural gas 
Historically, natural gas has not been a major fuel in China, although both the 
amount of absolute consumption and its share in the country’s energy consumption 
are increasing. The use of natural gas in China increased from 24.5 billion cubic 
metres in 2000 to 109 billion cubic metres in 2010, accounting for 4.03% of the 
country’s total energy consumption (BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2011). 
Although most of the natural gas is consumed by industries (45% in 2007 according 
to the National Bureau of Statistics of China), the growth of consumption in recent 
years is due to the increasing demand from the power, utilities and residential sectors 
(EIA 2010a). Because of the relative environmental benefits of natural gas, China 
plans to boost the share of natural gas in total energy consumption to 10% by 2030 
to relieve high pollution from a high reliance on coal (EIA 2010a). According to the 
EIA (2011a), the consumption of natural gas will grow 5% per year on average from 
2007 to 2035 and will triple by 2035.  
Nuclear, hydroelectricity and other renewable sources  
Currently, China’s nuclear energy consumption is still very small, only accounting 
for 0.69% of the total energy consumption in 2010 (BP Statistical Review of World 
Energy 2011). But China is actively promoting nuclear power as a clean and efficient 
source of electricity generation and 70 GW of nuclear capacity has been planned to 
be added by 2020 (currently around 9 GW) (EIA 2010a). EIA forecasts that about 
598 000 GWh will be generated by 2035 in China, growing at an annual rate of 8.4% 
(EIA 2010a). 
In 2009 China generated 82% of its electricity from fossil fuel sources, particularly 
coal (EIA 2010a). This dominance is expected to continue (EIA 2010a). However, 
the Chinese Government did make efforts to promote renewable energy use such as 
electricity from large hydropower projects or windmills. The investment in 
renewable energy projects in China increased from around $120 billion to 
$160 billion between 2007 and 2010, making China the largest investor in such 
projects in the world in 2010 (EIA 2010a).   
China was the world’s largest producer of hydroelectric power in 2010. It generated 
163.1 Mtoe electricity from hydroelectric sources, representing 21% of its world 
total generation (BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2011). Hydroelectricity in 
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China is expected to increase with the development of projects such as the Three 
Gorges Dam, which is the largest hydroelectric dam in the world (EIA 2010a). The 
State Energy Bureau of China expects an increase in hydro capacity from around 
197 GW in 2009 to 380 GW by 2020 (EIA 2010a). Wind is the second leading 
renewable source for power generation, with China being the world’s fifth largest 
wind power producer, generating 25 Bkwh in 2009, growing by 100% from 2008 
(EIA 2010a). The National Development and Reform Commission of the People’s 
Republic of China (NDRC) aims to increase the wind capacity from 16 GW in 2010 
to 100 GW by 2020 (EIA 2010a).  
 
Data source: BP Statistical Review of World Energy (2011) 
Figure 3.2 Total energy consumption in China, by type (2010) 
Overall, China is the world’s largest energy consumer even though per capita energy 
consumption is still very small. Coal is the largest source, followed by oil and 
natural gas, while clean energy only accounts for a relatively small share and 
remains underdeveloped. Total energy consumption and the consumption of each 
type of energy are projected to increase in China in the next 25 years due to energy 
demands resulting from a fast developing economy. With the development of clean 
energy and China’s target for reducing pollutions and controlling carbon emissions, 
the share of coal in total energy will decrease but it will still be the dominant 
resource in China. The increasing use of fossil fuels will lead to further increases in 
carbon emissions.  
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3.2.2 Carbon emissions from China 
As a consequence of being the world’s largest energy consumer, China is also the 
world’s largest CO2 emitter. Statistics from the EIA show that about 7707 Mt of CO2 
emissions were emitted from the consumption of energy in China in 2009, 
accounting for a quarter of global energy-related CO2 emissions, about 2282.3 Mt 
more than that of the second largest emitter, the US (EIA 2010b). However, in 2009 
the per capita energy-related CO2 emission was 5.823 t in China, equivalent to only 
33% of the US and 1.3 times the world average (EIA 2010b). Nevertheless, Chinese 
carbon emissions have been growing strongly in the past decades, especially since 
2000, as the country built many new coal plants to power its economic growth 
(Figure 3.3). From 2000 to 2009 the total energy-related CO2 emissions in China 
almost tripled while emissions from the world only increased by 26.57%. 
Particularly, CO2 emissions rose 13.33% in 2009 compared with 2008 (EIA 2010b). 
Due to the energy structure features, coal is the largest source of CO2 emissions in 
China, followed by oil and natural gas (Figure 3.4) (EIA 2011a).  
 
Data source: EIA International Energy Statistic (2010b) 
Figure 3.3 Total energy-related CO2 emissions in China from 1980 to 2009 
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Data source: EIA’s International Energy Outlook 2010 (EIA 2011a) 
Figure 3.4 Energy-related carbon dioxide emissions in China (2005–35) 
EIA projects that CO2 emissions in China will increase by 2.7% per year from 2007 
to 2035, while the annual increase rate for the world average is 1.3%, indicating that 
China has strong economic growth and still will be heavily reliant on fossil fuels, 
especially coal (Figure 3.4) (EIA 2011a). More specifically, CO2 emissions from 
natural gas will increase fastest and from coal increase slowest, at annual rates of 5% 
and 2.6% respectively (EIA 2011a). In sum, CO2 emissions have increased rapidly in 
the past decades and will continue to increase strongly in the future. As scientific 
evidence has confirmed that CO2 emissions are the major cause of climate change 
(IPCC 2007b), the rapid increase in CO2 emissions in China will have important 
implications for global warming and climate change.   
3.2.3 Climate change in China  
Our planet has experienced noticeable changes over the past 100 years, China is no 
exception. The major observed evidence of climate change in China includes 
changes in temperature, precipitation, extreme climate/weather events, sea level and 
glaciers (NDRC 2007). For instance, the national average surface air temperature 
rose by 0.5–0.8  over the past 100 years, slightly higher than the world average 
(The People's Republic of China 2007). Extreme weather/climate events, such as 
drought in northern and northeastern China and flood in the middle and southeastern 
China, have occurred more frequently and severely over the last 50 years (The 
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People's Republic of China 2007). Meanwhile, the sea level rose at an average rate 
of 2.5 mm/year. Chinese scientists project that climate change in China will further 
intensify in the future (The People's Republic of China 2007). In particular, the 
annual average air temperature will increase by 1.3–2.1  by 2020 and 2.3–3.3  by 
2050, from the 2000 level.  
As a developing country, China is one of the countries most vulnerable to the 
adverse effects of climate change, mainly in the fields of agricultural and livestock 
industries, forestry and other natural ecosystems, water resources and coastal zones 
(Heggelund 2007; IPCC 2007a). Climate change has already caused negative effects 
in those fields in China. For example, because of drought and high temperature in 
some parts of the country, agricultural production has become more unstable and 
livestock breeding has been damaged severely (NDRC 2007). Future climate change 
will further increase the adverse impacts. The changes of water resource distribution 
over China will significantly intensify the imbalance between supply and demand of 
water resources in some areas such as Inner Mongolia in the next 50 to 100 years 
(Zhang & Wang 2007). In addition, climate change will also produce far-reaching 
impacts on society in many areas, causing huge losses to the Chinese economy 
(NDRC 2007). For instance, climate change may increase the chances of diseases 
occurring and spreading, with the ensuing dangers to human health.  
Therefore combating climate change is in the best interests of China. Actually, China 
has paid great attention to the climate change problem and has carried out many 
polices and measures to control carbon emissions and mitigate climate change, as 
demonstrated in the next section. 
3.3   The existing climate change policies in China 
3.3.1 Objectives of China to address climate change 
On 4 June 2007 the NDRC issued China’s National Climate Change Program, which 
is the first comprehensive climate change strategic plan in China (NDRC 2007). It 
was mandated under the UNFCCC and outlined the objectives, basic principles, key 
areas of actions, as well as policies and measures, to mitigate climate change by 
2010. 
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The NDRC states that  
the strategic goal of China to respond to climate change is to make significant 
achievements in controlling greenhouse gas emissions, to enhance the capability of 
continuous adaptation to climate change, to promote climate change related science, 
technology and R&D to a new level, to remarkably raise public awareness on climate 
change, and to further strengthen the institutions and mechanisms on climate change 
(NDRC 2007, p. 26).  
This strategic goal suggests that China wants to mitigate carbon emissions and 
address the climate change issue. Specifically, China has voluntarily committed to 
reduce carbon emissions per GDP by 40–45% by 2020, compared to its 2005 level at 
the Copenhagen Summit 2009 (Wen 2009). 
3.3.2 China’s policies to address climate change 
China has carried out many policies and measures, ranging from laws, regulations, 
subsidies, education, administration through to international cooperation to reduce 
carbon emissions and ultimately mitigate climate change (The State Council 
Information Office 2008; Zhang & Zheng 2007). Table 3.1 summarizes some 
selected policies and measures for addressing climate change in China.   
Laws and regulations 
China has introduced laws to address climate change. For example, the ‘Renewable 
Energy Law of the People’s Republic of China’ was adopted in February 2005 
(Sandall et al. 2007). In addition to setting duties and obligations, and policies and 
measures, this law commits the government to achieving a target that the share of 
renewable energy in total energy use will reach 16% by 2020 (Sandall et al. 2007). 
In August 2005 the State Council issued the ‘Notification on the Immediate 
Priorities for Building a Conservation-oriented Society and Several Opinions on 
Accelerating the Development of Circular Economy’. In August 2006 the State 
Council issued the ‘Decision to Strengthen Energy Conversation’ (NDRC 2007). All 
those documents serve as legal guarantees to ensure the capability of China in 
mitigating climate change. 
Command-and-control regulations, such as standards, mandates and so on, have been 
widely used in China to reduce carbon emissions. For instance, the NDRC set 
mandatory fuel efficiency standards for passenger cars and light-duty vehicles, 
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taking effect in 2005 and 2008 respectively (IEA 2010a). A national building energy 
standard was put into effect in August 2008: this requires reducing a building’s total 
operation load by 50% by 2010 based on a building’s energy consumption during the 
1980s (IEA 2010a). In early 2007 the NDRC issued orders to retire all small and 
inefficient plants in various industrial subsectors (IEA 2010a). Coal-fired power 
plants with less than 50 MW capacity and with a capacity between 50 and 100 MW 
that had been in operation for over 20 years were required to be closed by 2010 (IEA 
2010a). Thus about a total of 40 GW of small, inefficient coal-fired plants would 
have been retired by 2010 (IEA 2010a).   
Subsidies and financial mechanisms 
A series of subsidies and financial initiatives have been employed by the Chinese 
Government to promote sustainable development, including grants, preferential 
treatment, preferential tax, tax reduction or exemptions and so on (Sandall et al. 
2007). Preferential treatments, such as loan interest discounts, reduction of enterprise 
income tax, accelerated depreciation and so on, have been provided to encourage the 
use of energy-saving technology or for purchasing energy-saving equipment (Sandall 
et al. 2007). The preferential tax policy for renewable energy, which took effect in 
2003 and was expanded in 2007, stipulates that the income tax rate for foreign 
investment in either biogas or wind energy production is cut from 33% to 15%, and 
both producers and consumers of renewable energy benefit from preferential import 
rate for importing ‘green’ equipment (IEA 2010a). Subsidies, as well as tax 
reductions or exemptions of value-added tax (VAT) or import tax have been 
provided to the fuel ethanol producers since 2002 (IEA 2010a). In 2006 the subsidy 
was RMB¥1373/t of fuel ethanol produced. According to the ‘Reduced VAT for 
Renewable Energy policy’, VAT for wind power has been reduced from 17% to 8.5% 
since 2001 and for biogas has been cut to 13% since 2003 (IEA 2010a).  
Financing climate change research is also a form of indirect subsidy. A number of 
research projects have been implemented in China to provide a scientific support for 
developing a national climate change policy and favoring the negotiation of China 
under the UNFCC. These include a Study on Formation and Prediction Theory of 
Key Climate and Weather Disasters in China, and Carbon Balance Study in China’s 
Land and Offshore (NDRC 2007). According to the National Science and 
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Technology Plan for the 11
th
 Five-Year Plan period, more than RMB¥7 billion 
would have been spent on scientific research into energy conservation and emission 
reduction by the end of 2007 (The State Council Information Office 2008). In 
addition, a large number of national-level scientific research bases and observation 
network systems, such as the National Climate Monitoring Network, have been set 
up in an attempt to enhance the capability of the Chinese Government to deal with 
climate change issues (The State Council Information Office 2008). 
Education, training and public awareness 
China has intensified its efforts to promote education, training and public awareness 
concerning the environment and climate change in recent years. It has organized 
various basic knowledge lectures on climate change and provided climate change 
training courses for policymakers at central and provincial levels (NDRC 2007). 
Large-scale international conferences or seminars were conducted to raise the 
awareness of climate change. Since 1992 China has staged 18 sessions of the 
National Energy Conservation Publicity Week in succession (The State Council 
Information Office 2008). It has produced a large number of publications on climate 
change and established an official bilingual climate change website in Chinese and 
English (China Climate Change Info-Net, http://www.ccchina.gov.cn) to provide 
comprehensive information on climate change (NDRC 2007; The State Council 
Information Office 2008). Moreover, China is gradually integrating climate change 
knowledge into school education. For example, the knowledge of renewable energy 
has been put into the primary and high schools’ teaching material (The People's 
Republic of China 2004).  
Capacity building 
As early as 1990 the Chinese Government set up special institutions to deal with 
climate change (The State Council Information Office 2008). In 1998 the National 
Coordination Committee on Climate Change was established to provide guidance for 
governments on how to response to climate change (NDRC 2007). In 2007 the 
National Leading Group to Address Climate Change, led by the Chinese premier, 
was set up to further strengthen the leadership on climate change (The State Council 
Information Office 2008). This group is responsible for drawing up important 
strategies, policies and measures and coordinating the solving of major problems 
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related to climate change. Moreover, China has established an Experts Committee to 
make more scientific decisions on climate change (The State Council Information 
Office 2008). This committee has contributed greatly in supporting government 
decision making as well as promoting international cooperation and non-
governmental activities. In addition, the Chinese Government is establishing a 
regional administration system for coordinating the work in response to climate 
change and strengthening the institutional capacity of local governments at different 
levels (Sandall et al. 2007).   
Table 3.1 Policies and measures for addressing climate change in China 
Policy Name Type Target Status Year 
Brightness program  •Policy processes •Energy production In force 1996 
Reduced VAT for 
renewable energy  
•Financial •Energy production In force 
2001 
(expanded 
2003) 
Support for fuel ethanol 
production 
•Financial 
•Incentives/subsidies 
•Energy production 
•Transport 
In force 2002 
Preferential tax policies 
for renewable energy  
•Financial •Energy production In force 
2003 
(expansion 
2007) 
Australia–China bilateral 
cooperation on climate 
change (MOU)  
•Education and 
outreach 
•Policy processes 
•Voluntary 
agreement 
•Framework policy In force 2003 
Wind power concession 
program 
•Incentives/subsidies •Energy production In force 2003 
Medium and long-term 
plan of energy 
conservation: 10 energy 
conservation programs  
•Policy processes 
•Public investment 
•Regulatory 
instruments 
•Appliances 
•Buildings 
•Industry 
•Multi-sectoral 
policy 
•Transport 
In force 2004 
Vehicle fuel economy 
standards  
•Regulatory 
instruments 
•Transport In force 
2005 (and 
2008) 
Asia–Pacific Partnership 
for Clean Development 
and Climate  
  
In force 2005 
Renewable energy law  •Policy processes •Energy production In force 
2006 
(revised in 
2009) 
Vehicle excise tax rates  •Financial •Transport In force 
2006 
(amended 
2008) 
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Policy Name Type Target Status Year 
Efficiency upgrade for 
coal-burning industrial 
boilers and kilns  
•Policy processes 
•Regulatory 
instruments 
•Industry In force 2006 
Efficiency upgrade for 
electric motors  
•Education and 
outreach 
•Policy processes 
•R&D 
•Appliances In force 2006 
Eleventh Five-Year Plan  •Policy processes   In force 2006 
Energy efficient products 
for government 
procurement – publication 
of official listing  
•Public investment •Appliances In force 2006 
Energy intensity reduction 
target  
•Policy processes 
•Regulatory 
instruments 
•Framework policy 
•Multi-sectoral 
policy 
In force 2006 
Expansion of local 
cogeneration (CHP)  
•Public investment 
•Energy production 
•Industry 
In force 2006 
Fuel-switching and 
conservation to reduce 
petroleum use  
•Policy processes 
•Public investment 
•R&D 
•Multi-sectoral 
policy 
In force 2006 
Renewable energy 
development targets  
•Policy processes •Framework policy In force 2006 
Support for biogas 
projects 
•Policy processes 
 
In force 2006 
Top 1000 industrial 
energy conservation 
program 
•Voluntary 
agreement  
In force 2006 
Aluminium industry 
permitting standards  
•Regulatory 
instruments 
•Industry In force 2007 
Medium and long-term 
development plan for 
renewable energy  
•Policy processes •Energy production In force 2007 
National Climate Change 
Program 
•Policy processes •Framework policy In force 2007 
Retirement of inefficient 
plants  
•Regulatory 
instruments 
•Energy production 
•Industry 
In force 2007 
Efficient lightbulb 
subsidy program 
•Incentives/subsidies 
•Voluntary 
agreement 
•Appliances Planned 2008 
Hong Kong – tax 
incentives for 
environmentally friendly 
commercial vehicles  
•Financial •Transport In force 2008 
National building energy 
standard  
•Regulatory 
instruments 
•Buildings In force 2008 
   Data source: adopted from IEA (2010a) 
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International cooperation  
China has been actively engaging in both bilateral and multilateral cooperation on 
climate change, such as supporting the activities of the UNFCCC and Kyoto 
Protocol, joining in influential international organizations relevant to climate change, 
setting up dialogue on climate change with other countries or regions, cooperating in 
research on climate change with foreign governments and international organizations 
and research institutes, participating in technology transfer under the UNFCCC 
framework, and joining CDM programs and so on (Heggelund 2007; The State 
Council Information Office 2008). For example, China signed an agreement with the 
US on energy conservation and renewable energy cooperation, which has helped 
both countries exchange and cooperate in more than 10 projects in these two areas 
(The People's Republic of China 2004).    
Moreover, China has launched a national tree planting and afforestation campaign
11
 
as well as other ecology restoration and protection policies, such as pasture 
restoration and protection, to increase the capacity of forests in reducing GHGs. In 
addition, the government of China has made the family planning policy a basic 
national policy to control the growth rate of population, which could contribute to 
the control of carbon emissions in China indirectly.   
3.3.3 China’s achievements in mitigating climate change  
Some achievements have been made thanks to the policies and measures discussed 
above. Through strengthening energy conservation, enhancing energy efficiency, 
optimizing energy mix, improving ecological environment, enhancing adaptation 
capacity, developing research, raising public awareness and improving 
administrative capacity, carbon emissions in China have been reduced to some extent 
(Chandler et al. 2002; NDRC 2007). China has made some positive contributions to 
the mitigation of climate change.    
The energy intensity (energy consumption per million GDP at constant 2000 RMB) 
in China decreased from 268 tce in 1990 to 143 tce in 2005, declining at an average 
annual rate of 4.1%. It was calculated that a total of 800 Mtce energy was saved 
between 1991 and 2005 through adjusting economic structures and improving 
                                                 
11
 However, planting trees and afforestation require water, another resource terribly stretched in China. 
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energy efficiency, which is equivalent to a reduction of 1800 Mt of CO2 emissions 
according to the China’s 1994 emissions factor of 2.277 tCO2/tce (NDRC 2007).  
By 20 July 2008, 244 CDM projects from China had been registered with the United 
Nations, which were expected to save 113 Mt of CO2 emissions annually (The State 
Council Information Office 2008). As a result of the CDM projects, renewable 
energy has been effectively developed while energy intensity has been greatly 
enhanced in China (The State Council Information Office 2008). In 2010 the 
utilization of clean energy in China equaled 267.9 Mtce (including hydropower, 
nuclear energy and renewables), accounting for 7.9% of China’s total energy 
consumption in that year, equivalent to a saving of 610 Mt CO2 emissions
12
 (BP 
Statistical Review of World Energy 2011).  
There are other policies that have made indirect contributions to the mitigation of 
carbon emissions in China. More than 300 million births have been avoided by 2005 
since the family planning policy was carried out (Chandler et al. 2002). Based on the 
IEA’s statistic of per capita CO2 emissions, it is estimated that the avoided births 
contributed to about 1300 Mt of CO2 emission reduction in 2005 (NDRC 2007). 
According to the estimation of some experts, during the 1980 and 2005 period, 
afforestation contributed to a 2060 Mt CO2 saving, forest management resulted in 
1.62 Mt CO2 reduction, and avoided deforestation saved 430 Mt of CO2 emissions 
(NDRC 2007).  
As can be seen from the above, China has carried out various kinds of policies and 
measures and made efforts to control carbon emissions and address climate change. 
However, it is noticed that most of the major policies employed fall into the 
categories of command-and-control regulations (standards, mandates and enhancing 
energy efficiency) and subsidies (developing renewable energy), which was argued 
in Chapter 2 to have some limitations. Though some achievements have been made 
as a result of the existing climate change policies and measures, CO2 emissions are 
projected to continue to increase rapidly due to the strong economic growth and 
climate change will remain an issue in China. Apparently the existing climate change 
policies and measures in China are not enough to control carbon emissions and 
                                                 
12
 Calculation is based on the conversion coefficient between Mtoe and Mtce (1 Mtce = 0.697 Mtoe) 
and China’s 1994 emission factor of 2.277 tCO2/tce (NDRC 2007).  
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realize sustainable economic growth. In order to achieve the ambitious carbon 
reductions target committed to at the Copenhagen Summit 2009, more effective 
carbon policies are thus being called for.  
As the largest carbon emitter, China has been under great international pressure to 
take effective policies to substantially mitigate carbon emissions. Considering the 
increasing pressure from the rest of the world and in the interest of China itself, it is 
necessary for China to adopt a major national policy, such as a carbon tax or an ETS. 
As it has been argued in Chapter 2 that an emissions trading policy is most desirable 
for addressing the climate change problem theoretically, carbon emissions trading 
will now be discussed. Whether emissions trading could be implemented effectively 
in China is not known and so needs to be explored from the existing emissions 
trading practice. The Taiyuan SO2 emissions trading program introduced in 2003 
provides an opportunity to examine the research Q1:  
Is emissions trading a suitable policy for achieving carbon reductions in China?. 
3.4   Emissions trading practice in China  
3.4.1 Progress of emissions trading practice in China 
In China, emissions trading is an economic instrument introduced from foreign 
countries that has been developed over 20 years (Wang et al. 2009a). The 
development of emissions trading in China could be generally divided into three 
stages: the initial trial stage (1987–2000); the pilot exploratory stage (2001–06); and 
the pilot deepening stage (2007–). The important events of Chinese emissions 
trading practice during 1987 and 2005 are listed in Appendix 1. Appendix 2 presents 
the progress on emissions trading practice in China since 2006. 
China started emissions trading in the late 1980s. In 1987 the Minhang District, 
Shanghai carried out a compensated transfer of water pollutants emissions quotas 
between enterprises (Wang et al. 2009a). On 20 March 1988 the Chinese State 
Environmental Protection Administration (SEPA) promulgated and implemented 
‘Interim Measures for Water Pollutants Emissions Permits’, whereby control quotas 
for water pollution can be transferred between the discharge units in same region 
(Wang et al. 2009a). In 1991 the SEPA conducted air pollutant emissions permit 
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pilots in 16 cities and then implemented policy experiments in air pollutant 
emissions trading in 1994 in six cities
13
 (Yang et al. 2003). However, the trading 
during this pilot phase was not emission trading in the true sense as all of the ‘trades’ 
were organized by the government. In 1999 the SEPA and US EPA co-signed a 
cooperation file on ‘A Feasibility Study on Reducing SO2 Emissions through Market 
Mechanism in China’, exploring the feasibility of using SO2 emissions trading in 
China (Wang et al. 2002). This feasibility study discussed the theories, conditions, 
foundations and methods of emission trading, and identified the opportunities and 
barriers to implementing SO2 emissions trading in the Chinese power sector. Several 
international seminars and workshops were conducted for Chinese managers and 
researchers to better understand emissions trading. 
During the 10
th
 Five-Year Plan (2001–05) the environmental protection work in 
China shifted emphasis to total emissions control (TEC) and the SEPA proposed 
implementing emission permits system to achieve targets (Yan et al. 2009). In this 
context, several pilot projects were carried out from around 2001. For example, 
Taiyuan city established an SO2 emission trading program in 2001 to achieve their 
SO2 TEC target at least cost with financial support from the ADB and technical 
assistance from the US RFF and the CAEP (Yang et al. 2003). In 2002 the SEPA 
published a notice ‘Promoting the Projects of SO2 Total Emissions Control and 
Emission Trading Policy in China’ and extended the SO2 TEC and SO2 emissions 
trading pilots to seven provinces
14
 (Yang et al. 2003). In 2006 the Ministry of 
Finance and SEPA jointly carried out a survey of emissions trading in some 
provinces and discussed the possibility of implementing national SO2 emissions 
trading pilot in power sectors in China (Wang et al. 2009a). Meanwhile, water 
pollutants emissions trading pilots had also progressed even though the degree of 
progress was relatively slower than that of the air pollutants SO2 emissions trading 
(Wang et al. 2009a). In summary, emissions trading had been promoted in this stage 
but trading in the pilots was still organized by the government departments (Wang et 
al. 2009a) . 
During the pilot deepening stage, China significantly increased the emphasis on 
emissions trading and local governments have been actively involved in emissions 
                                                 
13
 Baotou, Kaiyuan, Liuzhou, Taiyuan, Pingdingshan and Guiyang. 
14
 The provinces were Tianjin, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Shanghai, Shanxi, Henan and Guangxi. 
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trading, resulting in more trading subjects and policy areas at the national, regional, 
river basin and local levels (Wang et al. 2009a). In addition, research cooperation on 
emissions trading has increased and a company that specializes in emissions trading 
emerged and is trying to create a platform for emissions trading jointly with active 
assistance from local government (Wang et al. 2009a). At the end of 2007 the third 
China–US strategic dialogue resulted in the cooperation project of implementing 
SO2 emissions trading in the power sectors. In 2007 Hubei Province approved the 
‘Major Pollutants Emissions Trading Methods in Hubei Province (Trial)’ and a 
platform for emissions trading was set up in Guanggu Property Exchange in Wuhan 
city, which was the first time emissions trading was in a property rights exchange 
market (Yan et al. 2009). On 5 August 2008 the Beijing Environment Exchange and 
the Shanghai Environment & Energy Exchange were established (Wang et al. 2009a). 
The transaction subjects not only include traditional pollutants such as SO2 and 
chemical oxygen demand (COD), but also involve GHGs and other products that can 
be quantified, indicated and standardized. In September 2008 the Tianjin Climate 
Exchange was established by the Tianjin Property Rights Exchange Center, the 
China Petroleum Asset Management Company and the Chicago Climate Exchange, 
with the transaction objectives covering all kinds of environmental equity products 
(Wang et al. 2009a).  
In summary, even though having been introduced into various sectors and areas, 
emission trading is still relatively new to China and most of the practices are still in 
the initial stages. The existing emissions trading practices are limited to water 
pollutants and SO2 emissions and no large-scale ETS has been implemented. SO2 
emissions trading, the only existing air pollutant emissions trading in China, with 
Taiyuan being the most representative area, is considered the most relevant 
experience that can be studied for future carbon emissions trading in China. More 
details about this program are provided in the next section. 
3.4.2 Case study of emissions trading – SO2 emission 
trading in Taiyuan city 
Acid rain and SO2 pollution in China are every severe, with Taiyuan city being one 
of the most polluted cities. In 2000 the SO2 emissions in Taiyuan city were 250 000 t 
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and the ambient SO2 concentrations were 0.2 mg/m
3
, three times China’s Class II 
standard of 0.06 mg/m
3
 (Wang et al. 2002; Yang et al. 2003). In an effort to improve 
urban air quality, Taiyuan city committed in the 10
th
 Five-Year Plan (2001–05) to 
limit SO2 emissions within 125 000 t by 2005, representing a 50% reduction from 
the 2000 level (Yang et al. 2003).  
In order to control SO2 emissions and to relieve the effects of acid rain, China has 
employed various control policies and measures since 1995, including identifying 
critical control zones
15
, limiting the extraction and use of high sulphur coal, 
promoting SO2 total emissions control, levying SO2 emission charges, requiring 
cities to comply with National Ambient Standards for SO2 concentrations, adjusting 
the composition of the power sector and encouraging desulphurisation (Yang et al. 
2003). However, due to the high reduction costs and in the light of the successful 
experience of the US Acid Rain Program, China began to explore the feasibility of 
using a market-based mechanism, specifically a cap-and-trade approach, to achieve 
SO2 reductions at the least cost (Yang et al. 2003). Taiyuan, one of the most 
representative areas of SO2 emissions, became the forerunner in the SO2 emissions 
trading practice in China.  
With the support from ADB, RFF and CAEP, Taiyuan initiated the SO2 emissions 
trading project in 2001(Yang et al. 2003). After one year of preparation, the Taiyuan 
municipal government promulgated the ‘Administrative Regulation for SO2 
Emissions Trading in Taiyuan City (Trial)’ (Appendix 3), which is the first local 
legal document for SO2 emission trading in China and came into effect on 1 January 
2003. Initially, 26 key enterprises were identified for participation in the program, 
whose emissions accounted for over 50% of the city’s total SO2 emissions in 2000 
(Wang et al. 2002). Thereafter, all the SO2 emitters in Taiyuan city were covered by 
the program. According to the administrative regulation, total emissions control 
limits of SO2 in Taiyuan city during every Five-Year Plan period were transferred 
into corresponding emission caps. Yearly permits in the Five-Year Plan period are 
allocated to the emissions enterprises for free, and are based on their historic 
emissions. Permits can be traded and stored, but cannot be used in advance. New 
enterprises in the current Five-Year Plan period are not given any permits until a new 
                                                 
15
 The government identified key acid rain control and SO2 pollution control zones known as the 
‘Two Control Zones’ on the basis of areas affected by acid rain and high SO2 concentrations in 1998.  
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round of allocations for the next Five-Year Plan, but they can obtain the permits by 
trading. CEM equipment, accompanied by other auxiliary methods, such as material 
balance, were used to estimate enterprises’ SO2 emissions (Wang et al. 2002). 
‘Emissions Tracking System’ and ‘Allowance Tracking System’ were also 
established to manage emissions data and to supervise permits transactions 
respectively. Penalties and legal liabilities were applied to enterprises for non-
compliance. The Taiyuan Environment Protection Bureau is the supervisor and 
management institution for the program. The initial policy framework for the 
Taiyuan SO2 emission trading program is outlined in Table 3.2.  
Table 3.2 The initial policy framework for the Taiyuan SO2 emission trading 
program 
Scope 
26 key pollution sources accounting for 50% of total SO2 
emissions 
Region Urban area (excluding suburban districts and counties) 
Total emission target TEC limits for the 10
th
 Five-Year Plan period –125 000 t 
Allocation method Historic emissions 
Legal basis 
‘Regulation on TEC in Taiyuan City’ and ‘Administrative 
Regulation for SO2 Emission Trading in Taiyuan City’ 
Trading situations 
Training, trading simulation and implementation beginning 1 
January 2003 
Monitoring and measurement CEMs, periodic source monitoring, and material balance 
Management Emission and allowance tracking systems 
Source: adopted from Cao et al. (2002) 
Unfortunately, most of the literature related to the SO2 emissions trading is only 
focused on the background and initial introduction of the programs around 2003, 
without exploring more recent developments and the operation of the SO2 emissions 
trading practice in China. Whether the actual performance of these SO2 emissions 
trading programs is consistent with the theoretical framework or the same as the 
initial anticipation remains unknown. The effectiveness of SO2 emissions trading in 
China needs to be examined and assessed by the criteria proposed in section 2.5.3, 
namely, emissions reductions, cost saving, innovation or investment in clean 
technology and no leakage.   
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3.5   A comparative perspective of the Chinese context  
3.5.1 The policy environment  
Sterner (2003) and Opschoor & Turner (1994) argue that a policy does not function 
in a vacuum, rather, it heavily depends on the overall policy environment in which it 
is applied. Therefore, it is necessary to know the context of China concerning carbon 
policy before implementing any carbon emissions trading instrument in China. This 
section reviews the Chinese context regarding carbon policy from five aspects: 
economy, market, public awareness, environmental administration and the 
relationship between government and enterprises.  
Since the introduction of market-based economic reforms in 1978, China has been 
the world’s fastest-growing major economy, with consistent real annual GDP growth 
rates of 9.8% between 1978 and 2007 (Hu 2008). In 2010 China surpassed Japan and 
became the world’s second largest economy after the US (U.S Department of State 
2011). China is also the world’s largest exporter and second largest importer. 
However, the per capita GDP in China was only US$4382 in 2010, less than 8% of 
that of the US and ranking 94
th
 in the world, indicating that China is still a low to 
middle-income country (International Monetary Fund 2011). The public welfare 
system in China, including education, health care and social security, falls far behind 
the world average (Fu 2010). In addition, China has very low per capita resources, a 
huge proportion of rural and poverty-stricken population, acute economic structural 
problems and is still low in the global industrial chain (Fu 2010). Even though China 
is the second largest economy in the world, it remains a developing country, so 
pressure for economic growth will continue. However, the introduction of a carbon 
trading system in China may impede economic growth.    
Building a well-functioning market economy was formally established as a national 
policy in the 14
th
 national conference of the Chinese Communist Party in October 
1992 and ratified by the 8
th
 National People’s Congress in March 1993 (Xie 1995). 
By 2005 the private sector accounted for as much as 70% of China’s GDP and 96% 
of retailing commodity prices were determined by the market (Engardio 2005; 
People's Daily Online 2005). However, the government still controls the prices in 
several service sectors, such as health care, education and transport (Scissors 2009). 
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Both the capital rate and the exchange rate are regulated by the People’s Bank of 
China. The government retains monopolies in several core sectors of the economy, 
such as power generation and distribution as well as aviation. According to the 2011 
Index of Economic Freedom (2011), China is ranked 135
th
 among 183 countries in 
the Index of Economic Freedom
16
 world rankings, with property rights being weakly 
protected, indicating that China’s market still has a long way to go to achieve full 
market economy status and property rights in China are limited. While emissions 
trading is based on the theory of property rights and the principle of the free market, 
China may lack the resources to implement an ETS.   
With the liberalization of Chinese politics and economy, environmental non-
government organizations (NGOs) began appearing in China (Ma & Ortolano 2000). 
The first Chinese environmental NGO emerged in 1994 and approximately 2000 
environmental NGOs had registered by the year of 2000 (Schwartz 2004). However, 
unlike the independent environmental NGOs in the western countries
17
, China’s 
environmental NGOs must be sanctioned by the government and have limited 
autonomy, operating in a highly controlled political space (Ma & Ortolano 2000; 
Schwartz 2004). In addition, China’s environmental NGOs are constrained by 
insufficient human capital, limited funding and skills, thereby their influence on 
developing and enforcing China’s environmental policy is limited (Schwartz 2004). 
For example, their activities are largely restricted to advancing government-approved 
agendas such as raising citizen awareness of environmental problems through 
education, initiating public clean-up green campaigns and attracting funds from 
foreign organizations that refuse to work directly with the Chinese Government. The 
current situation of environmental NGOs in China indicates that the public 
awareness of environmental issues is still quite low and NGOs could not help much 
in enforcing an emissions trading policy as an independent third party.    
                                                 
16
 Holmes et al. (2008) define the highest form of economic freedom as one that provides an absolute 
right of property ownership, fully realized freedoms of movement for labour, capital, and goods, and 
an absolute absence of coercion or constraint of economic liberty beyond the extent necessary for 
citizens to protect and maintain liberty itself. Ten components are employed to measure economic 
freedom: business freedom, investment freedom, trade freedom, financial freedom, fiscal freedom, 
property rights, government spending, freedom from corruption, monetary freedom and labour 
freedom (Index of Economic Freedom 2011). 
17
 ‘Western environmental NGOs include a vast array of organizations with a range of professional 
skills that address a broad spectrum of issues in an independent and sometimes confrontational 
manner’ (Schwartz 2004, p. 46).   
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SEPA is China’s national environment agency that helps draft environmental laws 
and regulations but plays a minor role in the daily implementation of environmental 
rules (Ma & Ortolano 2000). Most of the day-to-day implementation work is 
managed by Environmental Protection Bureaus (EPBs), which are part of local 
government and remain a unit in the administrative hierarchy under the leadership of 
SEPA (Ma & Ortolano 2000). Although decentralization, releasing power from the 
central government to local governments, is generally regarded as contributing to 
more effective and responsive government, this is not so in the case of environmental 
issues (Schwartz 2004). Because the budget and staffing of EPBs are controlled by 
the local government, the local government naturally has a greater impact on an 
EPB’s daily implementation than the next highest environmental agency in the 
hierarchy. But local governments tend to focus on short-term economic growth and 
neglect long-term environmental problems (Schwartz 2004). The dual leadership 
system of EPBs in China is illustrated in Figure 3.1. In contrast to the situation in 
China, the national environmental agency in the US, the EPA, is responsible for 
implementing national laws (Ma & Ortolano 2000). If the state environmental 
protection agencies are interested in doing the day-to-day implementation work, they 
must prove that they have the required capacity, such as necessary staff, monitoring 
capabilities and statutory authority and so on. The complex environment 
bureaucratic system in China may cause difficulties in administering an ETS.  
In contrast with most of other countries, the relationship between government and 
enterprises in China is different. China has a large number of state-owned enterprises 
or township and village enterprises (Ma & Ortolano 2000). The privatization reforms 
have seen the number of private enterprises increase, but many industrial enterprises 
are still owned by the state, town governments or village committees. While 
industrial enterprises are the main targets of environmental regulation in China, the 
participation of local governments in the ownership of these enterprises leads to 
special challenges for environmental agencies in administering the environmental 
behaviour of these enterprises (Ma & Ortolano 2000).  
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Note: Dashed lines refer to influence on local EPB 
Data source: adopted from Tao & Mah (2009) 
Figure 3.1 Dual leadership systems of local EPBs in China 
In summary, China is different from western countries in the situation of economic 
strength, market conditions, public awareness, environmental administration and the 
relationship between government and enterprises. It is, therefore, feared that 
developing countries may lack the resources or the ability needed to implement ideal 
market-based instruments (Sterner 2003).  
3.5.2 Necessary considerations for using carbon emissions 
trading policy in China 
Based on the analysis of current infrastructure and policies for SO2 control in China, 
Wang et al. (2002) identify four barriers that need to be considered before 
implementing SO2 emissions trading widely in China. First, the current emissions 
monitoring, verification and reporting are not adequate for supporting a cap-and-
trade program in China. Second, the current regulated electricity price makes the 
Chinese power industry, which is primarily a state-owned industry, difficult to 
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operate in a market-driven trading environment and, further, to adopt effective 
measures. Third, China is far from a market economy and lacks the market forces to 
support the use of emissions trading. Last but not least, China has no explicit legal 
and regulatory authority looking after the implementation of emissions trading. 
Similarly, Zhang (2004) proposes environmental, economic, technological, 
institutional and legal questions when assessing the feasibility of implementing SO2 
emissions trading in China: (1) Whether an emissions trading system is suitable for 
addressing the SO2 problem?; (2) Are there enough SO2 emissions sources with 
varied abatement costs?; (3) Is the emissions measurement accurate enough?; (4) Is 
the SO2 emissions trading system compatible with the existing pollution charge 
policy?; (5) Whether the market is free enough to implement emissions trading in 
China?; and (6) Whether the legal authority is adequate for implementing emissions 
trading in China?. Zhang  (2004) and Wang et al. (2002) share similar concerns 
about emissions trading in China, including emissions measurement, market 
conditions and legal authority.  
In terms of carbon emissions, it has been agreed that emissions trading is suitable for 
addressing the carbon emissions problem as there are enough carbon emissions 
sources with varied costs (Ellerman et al. 2003). China is the world’s largest CO2 
emitter, so there is no need to worry that carbon emissions sources are not enough or 
abatement costs are not varied in China. In addition, no pollution charge or other 
direct environment policy is currently levied on carbon emissions in China, so 
trading will be harmonious with existing carbon policy. However, the other 
questions proposed by Zhang (2004) and the barriers suggested by Wang et al. (2002) 
for SO2 emissions trading, including emissions measurement, market condition and 
legal authority, are applied to carbon emissions trading and need to be discussed and 
analysed before carbon emissions trading is introduced in China. 
3.5   Conclusion 
This chapter has reviewed the energy consumption, carbon emissions and the current 
policies on climate change in China. China is the world’s largest energy consumer 
and CO2 emitter. Climate change in China is noticeable and China has suffered from 
the adverse impacts of climate change. As energy consumption and CO2 emissions in 
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China are projected to increase continuously in the next 25 years, adverse impacts of 
climate change in China will be intensified. China is under increasing pressure both 
domestically and internationally to reduce carbon emissions. 
China has taken many policies and measures, such as regulations and subsidies, to 
mitigate carbon emissions. However, the existing policies and measures in terms of 
reducing carbon emissions in China are found not to be effective enough to realise 
the commitment made at the 2009 Copenhagen Conference. But the increasing 
pressure to control continuously growing CO2 emissions requires China to adopt a 
more comprehensive and effective carbon policy. Thus a market-based instrument, 
carbon emissions trading or carbon tax, is necessary to achieve the ambitious carbon 
reduction target at the least cost in China. 
Given the theoretical and cost advantages of emissions trading, the progress of 
emissions trading practice in China has been reviewed in this chapter. The best 
available data for carbon emissions trading in the context of China, SO2 emissions 
trading practice, represented by Taiyuan case, has been introduced. However, as no 
literature examines the outcomes of the existing SO2 emissions trading programs, 
whether the emissions trading programs have effectively helped China achieve SO2 
reductions remains unknown. 
Regarding the carbon policy environment, China is a developing country with a 
semi-free market and relatively low public awareness of the environment. In addition, 
the dual leadership systems of local EPBs and the dual roles of local governments 
may cause difficulties in the enforcement of an emissions trading policy. China may 
lack the resources or ability to implement carbon emissions trading. It is therefore 
necessary to learn the lessons from the existing SO2 emissions trading programs in 
China.  
The next chapter will explain the methodology to be used in examining the outcomes 
of the existing SO2 emissions trading programs in China. Findings and discussions 
will be presented as well, addressing research Q1: Is emissions trading a suitable 
policy for achieving carbon reductions in China?. 
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Chapter 4   Methodology    
4.1   Introduction 
The previous two chapters provided a review of the literature on which this research 
is based. The review revealed that in theory, an ETS is probably the best instrument 
to reduce carbon emissions, but whether it could be a suitable policy for China to 
achieve carbon reductions remains unknown, given that both the practice and 
empirical studies of emissions trading in China are limited. Research Q1 was thus 
formulated, ‘Is emissions trading a suitable policy for achieving carbon reductions 
in China?’ (Chapter 2, section 2.5.3).  
This chapter will provide an explanation and justification for the research 
methodology to be used in answering research Q1. It is organised as follows. The 
next section will present the overall research framework. Section 4.3 will discuss the 
case study approach for exploring the outcomes of emissions trading practice in 
China. The justification of using a case study approach, case study selection, 
methods of collecting data, data analysis and limitations of the case study approach 
will be included. Section 4.4 will explain the GHGs perspective interview used in 
this research to collect the experts’ view on using emissions trading to achieve 
carbon reduction in China. It will give the information on how the interviewees were 
selected and interviewed and how the interview data were analysed. The reliability 
and validity of the case study and GHGs perspective interview will be discussed in 
section 4.5. Section 4.6 will present the ethical considerations for this research and 
section 4.7 will conclude the chapter.   
4.2   Research framework 
This research evaluates the policy proposal in relation to achieving carbon reductions 
in China. The whole evaluation is conducted in three steps (Figure 4.1): 
1. Investigate the emissions trading practice in China by conducting a case 
study. Then compare the results from case study with the Theoretical 
Emissions Trading Response Model (Chapter 2, section 2.5.3) to identify the 
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gaps between the practice and the theory in the Chinese context to evaluate 
whether emissions trading is likely to be effective or not. 
2. Conduct the GHGS perspective interview to collect experts’ views about 
implementing a carbon trading system in China. Discuss the results from both 
case study and GHGS perspective interview to evaluate whether an ETS is 
suitable for China to achieve carbon reductions in the near future.  
Then either 
3. If an ETS is considered a suitable policy for reducing carbon emissions in 
China, a national carbon trading scheme would be proposed for China. The 
design features of an emission trading system that maximize carbon reductions 
in China will be discussed based on the experiences or lessons obtained from 
the literature, case study and GHGS perspective interview.   
or 
3. If an ETS is found not suitable for China to achieve carbon reductions at this 
stage, an alternative policy instrument, carbon tax, would be investigated. A 
Chinese carbon tax CGE model will be constructed to model the effectiveness 
of a carbon tax in reducing carbon emissions as well as subsequent impacts on 
China’s economy and energy consumption structure.  
This three-step research design can address the research questions. The research Q1 
(Is emissions trading a suitable policy for achieving carbon reductions in China?) is 
partly answered by conducting a case study and complemented by a GHGS 
perspective interview. If the answer to the research Q1 was positive, the research Q2 
(What design features of a carbon trading system would maximize emission 
reductions in China?) would be answered by the experiences or lessons gained from 
the literature, case study and GHGS perspective interview. Otherwise, the research 
Q3 (Is carbon tax a suitable policy for achieving carbon reductions in China?) 
would be answered by using a Chinese carbon tax CGE model. As research Q2 and 
Q3 are mutually exclusive questions that depend on the answer to research Q1, the 
methodology for research Q1 is described first in this chapter. The carbon tax CGE 
model methodology will be presented after analysing the case study and GHGS 
perspective interview data if the answer to the research Q1 is negative.  
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The selection of the appropriate method is based on determining the best way to 
address the research question. To answer the research Q1, a qualitative research 
approach is suggested for three reasons. First, the research question is primarily 
exploratory, in that little is known about the effectiveness of emissions trading 
instruments in China. Second, qualitative investigations are situation-oriented and 
can explore unexpected outcomes, which is quite appropriate in addressing the 
exploratory research questions (Stake 1995). Third, there is a lack of reliable 
quantitative data because there has been no real monitoring and evaluation of the 
trading schemes. However, the quantitative aspect is incorporated in this research 
design by including some ‘quantitative type’ questions through each semi-structured 
interview to assist the evaluation and interpretation of the results from the principal 
qualitative study. In summary, this research so far has used the principal research 
method of qualitative research, but with a little quantitative data considered. 
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Figure 4.1 Research framework
Case study:  Taiyuan SO2 
emissions trading 
program  
 
Policy suggestions 
 
Y 
Carbon emission 
trading is suitable in 
China or not? 
N 
Carbon tax is suitable 
in China or not? 
Is emission trading a 
suitable policy for 
achieving carbon 
reductions in China? 
Theoretical emissions 
trading response model  
GHGS perspective 
interview 
 
Ideas or suggestions on 
implementing carbon 
trading in China 
Emissions trading is 
likely to be effective or 
not in China 
A framework of carbon 
trading system in China 
 
What design 
features of a carbon 
trading system will 
maximize emission 
reductions in China? 
Achieving carbon 
reductions in the 
Chinese economy 
subject to 
maintaining 
sustainable economic 
development 
Experiences or lessons 
for carbon or other 
emissions trading 
programs in China  
Actual outcomes of SO2 
emissions trading in 
China 
  
A Chinese carbon tax 
CGE model  
 
The impacts of a carbon 
tax on Chinese economy 
Is carbon tax a 
suitable policy for 
achieving carbon 
reductions in China? 
Literature review 
78 
 
4.3   Case study 
4.3.1 Justification for using case study research  
‘A case study is an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon 
within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and 
context are not clearly evident’ (Yin 2009, p. 18). It is an intensive study of a single 
case for the purpose of shedding light on a population of cases (Gerring 2007). The 
researcher can benefit from flexibility in methods of data collection, particularly in 
the use of multiple sources of evidence (Stake 1995). The case study research 
method is preferred when research questions are ‘how’ or ‘why’, the researcher has 
little or no control on the events, or the phenomenon is contemporary within a real-
life context (Yin 2009). In addition, a case study is especially suitable for learning 
about a situation where there is little background (Leedy & Ormrod 2009).  
A case study method is adopted in this research for four primary reasons. First, 
emissions trading practice is a contemporary event in China and the researcher 
cannot manipulate the performance of the practice. Second, as noted earlier, there are 
few emissions trading practices in China and little literature has examined the 
implementation performance of these practices. Whether such emissions trading 
regimes actually work or not in China remains unanswered empirically. Third, a case 
study approach is considered one of the best ways of studying a policy (Purdon et al. 
2001). Fourth, the research question requires an extensive and in-depth description 
of emissions trading practices in China. By using the case study method, the 
researcher has the ability to directly observe emissions trading practices and could 
conduct interviews with the people involved in the practices.  
The case study in this research is a single case (Yin 2009), which is the SO2 
emissions trading program in Taiyuan city. The SO2 emissions trading program is 
the only air pollutant emissions trading practice in China and the method of linking 
early SO2 schemes into national carbon trading schemes has been justified earlier 
(Chapter 2, section 2.5.6). The reasons for selecting a single Taiyuan case will be 
presented in the next section. This case study is used to explore the effectiveness of 
emissions trading in the Chinese context, where experiences and lessons could be 
used to improve the existing emissions trading systems or designing a future carbon 
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trading system in China. From the case study, the following information will be 
collected: (1) the impacts of the SO2 emissions trading program on the participating 
companies; (2) the participants’ and regulators’ attitudes towards SO2 emissions 
trading; (3) the problems of the existing SO2 emissions trading program; and (4) 
suggestions for the future carbon emissions trading program, which could answer 
research Q1 (Is emissions trading a suitable policy for achieving carbon reductions 
in China?).  
4.3.2 Case study selection  
Case study research may be implemented through either a single case study or 
multiple case studies. Yin (2009) proposes that a single case study design is rational 
when the case represents (1) a critical case in testing an existing theory, (2) an 
extreme or unique case, (3) a representative or typical case, (4) a revelatory case or a 
(5) longitudinal case. A representative or typical case means that the case may 
represent a typical project among many different projects, from which the lessons 
learned are assumed to be informative about the experiences of the average situation 
(Yin 2009). Following Gerring (2007), a typical case approach is used for choosing 
the Taiyuan case in this research. As mentioned in literature review, seven regions 
have implemented SO2 emissions trading in China (Chapter 2, section 2.5.2). Due to 
the potential risk that a case may turn out not to be the case it was thought to be, 
careful investigation of all the potential cases to avoid misrepresentation is required 
(Yin 2009). 
Taiyuan city, the capital of Shanxi province, is a heavily industrialized area and one 
of the most polluted cities in China. Industry accounted for 43.7% of provincial GDP 
in 2009
18
, which was largely based on coal mining, coke production, iron and steel 
industries, construction cement, chemical manufacturing and ceramics. In 2008 the 
annual average SO2 concentration in Taiyuan is 0.073 mg/m
3
, 11.5% more than the 
People’s Republic of China’s Class II annual standard (0.06 mg/m3) (National 
Bureau of Statistics & Ministry of Environmental Protection 2009). 
Taiyuan has always been the forerunner in air pollutants total quantity control and 
emissions trading practice in China. In 1990 Taiyuan was selected as one of the 16 
                                                 
18
 Statistical information of Taiyuan website, http://www.tytj.gov.cn/tongjijuWW/news/index.jsp. 
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pilot cities to implement an air pollutants emission permits system by the SEPA 
(Yang et al. 2003). In 1994 Taiyuan and five other cities first carried out the air 
pollutants emissions trading pilots. Taiyuan published the ‘Administrative 
Regulation for Total Quantity Control of Air Pollutants Emissions in Taiyuan City’ 
in 1998, which is the first local regulation on total quantity control of emissions in 
China. The ‘Administrative Regulation for SO2 Emissions Trading in Taiyuan City 
(Trial)’ (Appendix 3) in 2002, representing the formal implementation of Taiyuan 
SO2 emissions trading program, is also the first local regulation of SO2 emissions 
trading in China. 
Given that Taiyuan city has always been a heavily industrialized area and one of the 
most polluted cities in China, and a forerunner in air pollutants total quantity control 
and emissions trading practice, it is considered the most representative area among 
the seven regions involved in emissions trading practice in China. The Taiyuan SO2 
emissions trading program, as the oldest and most comprehensive emissions trading 
program in China, is thus considered a typical practice and its experience could 
illustrate the emissions trading situation in China.  
4.3.3 Data collection for the case study  
Six sources of evidence are mostly used in case studies: documentation, archival 
records, interviews, direct observations, participant observation and physical 
artefacts (Yin 2009). The use of multiple sources of evidence allows an investigator 
to address a broad range of historical, attitudinal and behavioural issues, and to 
develop converging lines of inquiry, thus making the findings or conclusions more 
convincing and accurate (Yin 2009). In the case study of the Taiyuan SO2 emissions 
trading program, documentation and interviews were applied in the data collection. 
The data collection timeline period took place over three months from May to 
August 2010, which allowed for a comprehensive data collection to be carried out, in 
order to understand emissions trading in China. 
A protocol was developed for preparing to collect evidence for the case study. The 
instruments, procedures and general rules to be followed were contained in the 
protocol (Yin 2009). It is an effective way of increasing the reliability of the case 
study and guiding the investigator in collecting data (Yin 2009). To collect useful 
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data for the case study, the researcher was self-trained by learning related skills, 
especially interviewing skills. 
4.3.3.1 Documentation 
‘For case study, the most important function of a document is to corroborate and 
augment evidence from other sources’ (Yin 2009, p. 103). In addition, the documents 
can help researchers make reasonable inference (Yin 2009). This case study used a 
range of documents, including newspaper articles, administrative documents 
(proposals, progress reports and internal records), formal studies, community 
newsletter articles and so on. These documents are useful even though they are not 
always accurate and may be biased (Yin 2009).  
The researcher first collected relevant information from the local newspapers, 
including Taiyuan Daily and Taiyuan Commercial Daily, the professional 
newspapers such as China Environmental News and Environmental Protection in the 
Taiyuan Library, and from the official websites of government departments such as 
the official websites of the Taiyuan EPB and Statistical Information of Taiyuan. The 
researcher learned more about the Taiyuan SO2 emissions trading program from the 
documentation and then was able to select the target interviewees for this case study. 
The documentation collection went on throughout the data gathering period. 
4.3.3.2 Interviews 
An interview is one of the most essential sources for collecting data for a case study 
(Yin 2009). The first-hand data for this case study was obtained from interviews 
conducted with the managers responsible for SO2 trading affairs in the participating 
companies, and the relevant administrators from the Taiyuan EPB. As an elaborated 
in-depth response was required in the case study, only a small number of people 
were involved and most of the questions were ‘open’ (i.e., they required the 
interviewer’s insight and understanding) and the interviews adopted a semi-
structured face-to-face format (Gillham 2000).  
Selection of the interviewees 
The Taiyuan EPB is the administrative department of the SO2 emissions trading 
program in Taiyuan city. It was expected that administrators from this bureau, who 
had been in charge of the program, would have a comprehensive knowledge of the 
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SO2 emissions trading practice. Three departments in the bureau, including the 
previous Atmosphere Department, the Development & Supervision Department, and 
the Pollutants Total Quantity Control Department, have been responsible for the 
program since it was implemented. Therefore, three administrators were selected as 
interviewees, one each of these departments. The fourth administrator interviewee is 
from the Taiyuan Environmental Research & Design Institute, which is an affiliated 
organization of the Taiyuan EPB. He was chosen as he not only participated in the 
establishment of the program, but he also followed up its progress.  
According to the ‘Administrative Regulation for SO2 Emissions Trading in Taiyuan 
City (Trial)’, all the units emitting SO2 emissions in Taiyuan city are covered by the 
SO2 emissions trading program. The documentation collected from the official 
website of the Taiyuan EPB showed that 105 enterprises were covered by the 
Taiyuan SO2 emissions trading program in 2007, with a total of 62 365.3 t of SO2 
emissions permits. Based on the SO2 emissions permits allocated in 2007, the top 45 
emissions enterprises were selected as the target enterprises, and their emissions 
allowances accounted for more than 99% of the total for Taiyuan city in 2007. 
Therefore, the managers in charge of SO2 trading affairs from each of these 45 
enterprises respectively were considered for target interviewees. Table 4.1 
summarizes the selection of the interviewees for the case study
19
.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
19
 It should be noted that since the interviewees have an inherent interest in the emissions trading, 
their opinions can be biased. The author will try to verify the interview results from the real data.  
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Table 4.1 Selection and response of the interviewees 
Target 
Participants 
Groups 
Number 
Details 
Selection Reasoning 
Response 
Number Participants 
Source 
Number 
Administrators 
 
4 
Previous 
Atmosphere  
Department 
1 
The administrative  
departments have been 
in charge of the 
Taiyuan SO2 emissions 
trading program since 
it was implemented. 4 
Development & 
Supervision 
Department 
1 
Pollutants Total 
Quantity Control  
Department 
1 
Taiyuan EPB 
Environmental 
Research & 
Design Institute 
1 
Participated in the  
establishment of 
Taiyuan SO2 emissions 
trading program, and 
follows up its progress. 
Enterprise  
Managers 
45 
The enterprises 
covered by the 
Taiyuan SO2 
emissions trading  
program 
45 
The top 45 enterprises 
of SO2 emissions 
permits allocated in 
2007. 
20 
Total 49  49  24 
 
Interview questions  
The interview questions for the enterprise managers included three themes: the basic 
situation of the company, the Taiyuan SO2 emissions trading practice and the future 
carbon trading program (Table 4.2 and Appendix 4), while the administrators were 
only interviewed for the latter two themes (Table 4.3 and Appendix 5). Each theme 
was explored through several questions and sub-questions. Sub-questions differed 
slightly for the enterprise managers and administrators. It has been recommended by 
Yin (2009) that some case study interview questions be open-ended, allowing for the 
opportunity to ask respondents both facts and opinions about a specific event or 
matter. Most of the interview questions for this case study are open, though some 
provided guidance.   
A full understanding of the Taiyuan SO2 emissions trading practice is essential for 
this case study. Ideas on the future carbon trading could help in the discussion about 
using carbon trading policy or even building a national carbon trading scheme in 
China. Therefore, the overall structure of interviews was as follows. Initially, a 
number of background questions were asked, for example, each enterprise manager 
84 
 
was asked about the basic situation of their company. Subsequently, two main 
themes, the Taiyuan SO2 emissions trading practice and a future carbon trading 
program, were explored by asking six main questions. The interview questions 
investigating the first theme related to the performance of the Taiyuan SO2 emissions 
trading program, attitudes towards Taiyuan SO2 emissions trading and the problems 
of the existing Taiyuan SO2 emissions trading program. The second theme was 
investigated by asking questions about the attitudes towards carbon trading, the 
experiences or lessons learned from SO2 trading for carbon trading and the design 
features of a carbon trading scheme in China. 
Specifically, as mentioned in the literature review (Chapter 2, section 2.5.3), the 
performance of an emissions trading program is normally evaluated by considering 
emissions reductions, cost effectiveness, innovation and investment in clean 
technology and leakages. So the performance of the Taiyuan SO2 emissions trading 
program is examined from these aspects by asking four related sub-questions. 
Attitudes towards the program were explored through sub-questions about the 
effectiveness of the program, a comparison with command-and-control regulations 
and, only for administrators, the functioning of the emissions trading market.  
Table 4.2 Interview questions: enterprise managers 
Interview 
themes 
Primary questions Sub-question topics 
Basic situation 
of the company 
Brief introduction of the company   
Company’s experience on SO2 emissions 
trading 
 
The Taiyuan 
SO2 emissions 
trading practice 
The performance of the Taiyuan SO2 
emissions trading program  
 Emissions reductions 
 Emissions cost 
 Innovation and investment in 
clean energy 
 Investment outside Taiyuan 
(leakage) 
Attitudes towards the Taiyuan SO2 
emissions trading program 
 Effectiveness of the program 
 Comparison with command-
and-control regulations 
The problems of the existing Taiyuan 
SO2 emissions trading program 
 
Future carbon 
trading 
program 
Attitude to carbon trading  
 
Experiences or lessons from the Taiyuan 
SO2 emission trading practice that would 
be applicable for carbon trading 
How to design the key features of future 
carbon trading scheme in China 
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Table 4.3 Interview questions: administrators 
Interview 
themes 
Primary questions Sub-question topics 
The Taiyuan 
SO2 emissions 
trading practice 
The performance of the Taiyuan SO2 
emissions trading program  
 Emissions reductions 
 Emissions cost 
 Innovation and investment in 
clean energy 
 Investment outside Taiyuan 
(leakage) 
Attitudes towards the Taiyuan SO2 
emissions trading program 
 Effectiveness of the program 
 Comparison with command-
and-control regulations 
 Functioning of the emissions 
trading market 
The problems of the existing Taiyuan 
SO2 emissions trading program 
 
Future carbon 
trading 
program 
Attitude to carbon trading   
Experiences or lessons from the Taiyuan 
SO2 emission trading practice that would 
be applicable for carbon trading 
 Differences between SO2 
trading and carbon trading 
 Differences between Taiyuan 
and other regions in China 
How to design the key features of future 
carbon trading scheme in China 
 
 
Conducting interviews 
To involve the target interviewees in this research, the researcher first found the 
contacts of the 49 target interviewees from the official websites of relevant 
departments or enterprises and then contacted them via email or by phone to check 
their willingness to participate. The purpose of this research, its relevance to the 
interviewees and the benefits of participation were explained to the target 
interviewees through a Plain Language Statement (Appendix 7). For those interested 
interviewees, an email was then sent outlining the specific details of the research, 
including an outline of the interview questions. 
In the event, the four targeted administrators and 20 of the 45 enterprise managers 
agreed to be interviewed (Table 4.1). The 20 enterprises that responded account for 
more than 96% of the emissions permits allocated among the 45 target enterprises. It 
seems that large enterprises were more willing to participate in the research. The 
participating enterprises covered 11 industries, varying from firepower generation to 
beverage manufacturing and most of them were state-owned capitalized enterprises 
(Table 4.4). The SO2 emissions were relatively concentrated in a few industries, with 
firepower generators the major polluting sources. 
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The 24 interviewees were asked to sign consent sheets with information on the time, 
place, participants, form, and content of the interviews (Appendix 8). They were 
interviewed in Chinese as most of them were lacking the necessary English skills. 
All the interviews were conducted at the offices of the interviewees. This 
arrangement was convenient for the interviewees, and allowed them to be 
comfortable and relaxed in an environment they knew and understood. Each 
interview lasted for 40–60 minutes. The researcher conducted all the interviews 
personally to enhance data reliability. 
There is a debate about the desirability of recording interviews (Yin 2009). 
Recording certainly provides a more accurate reproduction of any information than 
any other methods, but it can make subjects uncomfortable (Yin 2009). Therefore, 
prior to the interviews the interviewees were asked whether recording was allowed. 
Notes were taken for the interviewees who declined to be recorded. A total of two 
interviews with administrators and seven interviews with enterprise managers were 
recorded with a digital voice recorder. During the interview sessions, the 
interviewees were asked to provide relevant unpublished and published documents 
that supported their answers to the interview questions.  
4.3.4 Analysing the case study evidence 
Data analysis of a case study has been defined by Yin (2003, p. 109) as ‘examining, 
categorizing, tabulating, testing and otherwise recombining both quantitative and 
qualitative evidence to address the initial propositions of a study’. The general 
analytical strategy of this case study was to rely on theoretical propositions (Yin 
2009), which helped to identify possible gaps between theory and practice in the 
Chinese context. Two specific techniques were used to analyse the evidence 
collected. First, pattern matching was used to compare an observed emissions trading 
practice with a theoretical one (Trochim 1989). Second, explanation building was 
employed to analyse the case data by building an explanation about the Taiyuan SO2 
emissions trading case (Yin 2009). The qualitative data of this case study were 
analysed in three steps as outlined by Miles and Huberman (1994): data reduction, 
data display and conclusion drawing, and verification. Data reduction was conducted 
by summarizing the responses from the interviewees along the major themes that 
emerged from the data. 
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‘Content analysis is a research technique for making replicable and valid inferences 
from texts (or other meaningful matter) to the contexts of theirs use’ (Krippendorff 
2004, p. 18). It was applied to analyse the interviews of this case study (Marshall & 
Rossman 1995). This examined how respondents viewed and understood certain 
issues (Trace 2001). The key substantive statements of the interviewees were 
identified and then put in categories according to the main interview questions, 
which were derived from the literature on emissions trading theory. No computer 
analysis was undertaken as the resulting data could be managed with direct analysis 
and categorisation. Verbal transcription was not employed in analysing the interview 
data because it is time consuming, provides a lot of disconnected statements and the 
researcher has to reconsider the value of the ‘redundant’ material (Gillham 2000).  
For each interview, a report was developed based on the interview questions. The 
summarized interview reports were sent to each interviewee to obtain feedback and 
to allow the interviewees to make any changes they deemed necessary. Finally, a 
case study database was developed, including case study notes made by the 
researcher after some interviews, case study documents, tabular materials and case 
study interviews. To ensure the confidentiality of the interviewees, all the 
interviewees were coded and all data were reported in a de-identified form (Lincoln 
& Guba 1985; Patton 2002). The 20 enterprises were coded according to the 
emissions permits allocation in 2007 from largest to smallest (i.e., EN1 to EN20). 
Similarly, the 20 enterprise managers were coded MA1 to MA20. Appendix 9 shows 
the profile of the coded enterprises and coded managers. The four administrators 
from the Taiyuan EPB were coded AD1 to AD4.  
4.3.5 Limitations of the case study research  
Some literature has outlined major concerns with the case research method (Parkhe 
1993; Yin 2009), including (1) a lack of rigor, (2) providing little basis for scientific 
generalization, (3) overlying complex theories, (4) investigator bias, (5) lack of self-
sufficiency and a potential to produce a well-founded theory that maximizes the 
research quality of validity and reliability at the same time, (6) gaining access to the 
organizations (i.e., organization access in this research required negotiating with 
enterprise managers and administrators) and (7) limitations in the geographical area 
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(i.e., this research was conducted in a regional area). These limitations of the case 
study method were taken into consideration in this research.  
Strong measures had been taken to build rigor into this case study at the research 
design, data collection, data analysis and composition stages (Table 4.6). Due to the 
limitations in the geographical area, the researcher was very cautious about 
generalizing conclusions from the Taiyuan case. In addition, the limitation of 
research quality criteria in terms of validity and reliability are addressed in section 
4.5.   
However, this case study research still had a few limitations: 
1. There was a limitation on the sample size: the relatively small number of 
interviewees. But the Taiyuan SO2 emissions trading program itself is a local 
program with limited companies and experienced people. Therefore, the 
sample size in this case study is considered sufficient to examine the outcomes 
of the practice.  
2. The selection of target enterprises based on the permits allocation data of 
2007. Some people may argue that the possible changes in 2008 and 2009 have 
not been considered. However, the 2007 permits allocation data were the latest 
data available from the documents when choosing the target enterprises. After 
conducting the interviews, it was found that the interviewed 20 participant 
enterprises were still in the top 45 places of permits allocation in 2009. 
3. Due to time restrictions, the interview time for some interviewees was short. 
Despite this, the researcher had asked all the interview questions and collected 
all the related information.  
4. Due to the limited record kept in the participating enterprises, the researcher 
obtained little quantitative data to support the qualitative information and had 
to rely on the interviewees’ recollections. Though the qualitative data is not as 
accurate as quantitative data, it is still reliable enough to make the evaluation.  
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4.4   GHGs perspective interview   
Another GHGS perspective interview was conducted in this research to collect 
experts’ views on the implementation of a carbon trading system in China. Given the 
small sample and all of the interview questions being ‘open’, this interview was a 
face-to-face semi-structured in-depth interview. Generally, an in-depth interview 
refers to an unstructured or semi-structured, direct, personal interview in which a 
single participant is probed by an interviewer to explore underlying motives, beliefs, 
attitudes and/or feelings about a topic (Malhotra & Birks 2007). 
4.4.1 Interviewee selection 
In regards to the sampling of the in-depth interviewees, judgmental sampling was 
considered to be the most appropriate technique for this GHGs perspective interview. 
It refers to a sampling technique in which interviewees are selected based on the 
judgement of the researcher (Malhotra & Birks 2007). In particular, certain 
individuals are selected because the researcher believes that they are suitable for 
addressing the issues (Patton 2002). Judgmental sampling was adopted in this 
research as it enabled the researcher to select the experts who were ‘eligible’ to 
discuss the carbon reductions and carbon trading issues in China. In this research, 
eligibility refers to the practical experts, theoretical experts in the emissions trading 
area and policymakers on carbon reductions issue.  
The Tianjin Emissions Exchange, the Shanghai Environment & Energy Exchange 
and the Beijing Environment Exchange are the largest and oldest emissions 
exchanges in China so far. It is believed that these emissions exchanges have 
abundant experience in carrying out the emissions trading practice in China. 
Managers from these three emissions exchanges were chosen as target interviewees 
because they were considered practical experts in emissions trading area in China. 
Their views on using carbon trading to reduce carbon emissions in China would be 
very insightful. Another three theoretical experts were selected based on the 
literature of emissions trading in China. They have published articles on emissions 
trading and are famous in this area. It is expected that their views on using emissions 
trading to achieve carbon reductions in China would be meaningful. Notably, one 
expert from the Environmental Planning Institute of the Chinese Research Academy 
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of Environmental Science, who is a pioneer in the research of environmental policy 
in China, also participated in designing the Taiyuan SO2 emissions trading program 
in 2002. 
In addition, policymakers were interviewed to collect the political views on the 
implementation of carbon trading policy in China. The NDRC and the Ministry of 
Environmental Protection of the People’s Republic of China are the two main 
departments in deciding environmental policy in China. Therefore, two policymakers 
from each of the two departments were selected as target interviewees. The selection 
of all the target expert interviewees is detailed in Table 4.4.  
Table 4.4 Experts selection and response 
Target 
Participants 
Groups 
Details 
Selection Basis 
Response 
Number Participants 
Source 
Number 
Practical experts 
Tianjin Emissions  
Exchanges 
1 
Extensive practical 
experience in carrying 
out emissions trading 
in China. 
1 
Shanghai Environment and  
Energy Exchanges 
1 1 
Beijing Environmental  
Exchanges 
1 1 
Theoretical 
experts 
Scholars on emissions  
trading 
3 
Well known scholars 
with publishing track 
record. 
2 
Policy-makers 
Resource Conservation 
and Environmental 
Protection Division of 
NDRC. 
1 
They have great 
influence on making 
environmental policy 
and can analyse the 
using of carbon trading 
policy in China from a 
political perspective. 
0 
Ministry of Environmental 
Protection of the People’s 
Republic of China 
1 1 
Total  8  6 
 
4.4.2 Interview questions 
The same interview questions were used for all three kinds of expert interviewees to 
make the answers relatively comparable. In order to answer the research Q1 (Is 
emissions trading a suitable policy for achieving carbon reductions in China?), the 
interview questions in this GHGs perspective interview were designed to elicit 
experts’ attitudes and ideas towards using an emissions trading instrument to achieve 
carbon reductions in China. Details of the overall interview structure are in 
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Appendix 6. First, three general questions were asked to collect the information 
about the interviewees. Then, three main themes were explored through three open 
questions on the attitudes towards using carbon trading in China, the necessary 
considerations of using carbon trading in China, and the desirable design features of 
a Chinese carbon trading scheme. In particular, based on the literature, the sub-
questions for investigating the second theme considered the market conditions, the 
level of economic development, the legal base and enforcement, and the differences 
between the EU and China. 
4.4.3 Data collection and data analysis  
The researcher used the same methods as in the case study interviews to contact the 
interviewees, to conduct the interviews, and to analyse and interpret the interview 
data. One theoretical expert was not available for an interview and one policymaker 
was not allowed to provide personal interviews. Three practical experts, two 
theoretical experts and one policymaker from the Ministry of Environmental 
Protection of the People’s Republic of China were interviewed (Table 4.5). An 
interview protocol was established to enable the researcher to follow a consistent 
inquiry process and a consistent analysis procedure for these six interviews. The six 
interviewees were also anonymous in the process (coded as EX1 to EX6).  
4.5   Reliability and validity in qualitative research  
Validity refers to the ‘correctness or credibility of a description, conclusion, 
explanation, interpretation, or other sort of account’ (Maxwell 2005, p. 116). 
Maxwell (2005) identifies two key threats to the validity of qualitative research: 
researcher bias and reactivity. Researcher bias is due to the subjectivity of the 
researcher and could be tested by examining the extent to which the researcher is 
open to contrary results (Yin 2009). Reactivity is similar to bias in that it is related to 
‘the influence of the researcher on the setting or individuals studied’ (Maxwell 2005, 
p. 118). The influence of the researcher in this qualitative study was impossible to 
eliminate, but the influence has been understood and used productively in the 
analysis of the study’s findings (Maxwell 2005). In addition, the researcher was 
sensitive and responsive to the contradictory evidence in the case study (Yin 2009).  
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In assessing the quality of research design, Yin (2009) proposes four criteria for 
researchers to consider: construct validity, internal validity, external validity and 
reliability. The four criteria have been commonly used in empirical social research, 
including case study research (Kidder et al. 1986; Yin 2009). The application of 
these criteria in the case study has been presented in Table 4.5, which shows how the 
four criteria were addressed to improve the rigor. 
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Table 4.5 Case study tactics for four design tests 
Tests Test explanation Case study tactics 
Phase of research in 
which tactic occurs 
Application within the Taiyuan study 
Construct 
validity 
Identifying  correct 
operational measures for the 
concepts being studied  
 Use multiple sources of 
evidence 
 Establish chain of evidence 
 Have key informants review 
draft case study report 
Data collection 
Data collection  
Composition  
 Both documents and interview were used in collecting case 
study evidence. 
 The summarized interview reports were sent to each 
interviewee to obtain feedback and to allow the 
interviewees to make any changes they deemed necessary. 
Internal 
validity 
(For exploratory studies) 
Indicating the inferences 
made on the basis of 
interview and documentary 
evidence are correct.  
 Do pattern matching 
 Do explanation building 
 Address rival explanations 
 Use logical models 
Data analysis 
Data analysis 
Data analysis 
Data analysis 
 Did pattern matching. The results of the case study were 
compared with the Theoretical Emissions Trading 
Response Model to identify the gaps between theory and 
practice in China. 
 Did explanation building. The reasons of inactive emissions 
trading market are explored and explained.  
External 
validity 
Defining the domain to 
which a study’s findings 
can be generalized.  
 Use theory in single-case 
studies 
 Use replication logic in 
multiple-case studies 
Research design 
Research design 
 A typical case approach was used for choosing the Taiyuan 
case. 
 The literature review on lessons from early schemes into 
national carbon trading scheme. 
Reliability  
Demonstrating that the 
operations of a study – such 
as the data collection 
procedures – can be 
repeated, with the same 
result. 
 Use case study protocol 
 Develop case study database 
Data collection 
Data collection  
 A case study protocol was developed before collecting 
evidence for case study.  
 Provided detailed descriptions of the participants, of the 
context in which the research was carried out. 
 At least some interview data that was mechanically 
recorded (audio). 
 During the interviews, the interviewees were asked to 
provide relevant documents to support their answers to the 
interview questions. 
 A case study database was developed, including case study 
notes made by the researcher after some interviews, case 
study documents, tabular materials and case study 
interviews. 
Source: developed from Yin (2009, p. 41)  
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4.6   Ethical considerations  
The principal ethical consideration in this research is the engagement of the 
interviewees. Ethics clearance to conduct this research was obtained from the 
University of Southern Queensland (USQ) prior to the data collection. The 
confirmation from the USQ Human Research Ethics Committee is in Appendix 10. 
This research obeyed the following ethical guidelines: 
1. The nature and purpose of this research project was explained to the 
interviewees clearly (Lincoln & Guba 1985); 
2. Participation was entirely voluntary. A sign-off consent form was obtained 
from the interviewees before conducting interviews (Lincoln & Guba 1985; 
Patton 2002); 
3. The interviewees could withdraw from the research at any time without any 
fear of consequences; 
4. The interviewees were coded and all data was reported in a de-identified 
form to ensure confidentiality (Lincoln & Guba 1985; Patton 2002); and 
5. The contact details of the researcher were given to the interviewees in case 
that they had further questions regarding the research (Lincoln & Guba 1985).  
4.7   Conclusion 
This chapter has provided the methodology used in answering research Q1 (Is 
emissions trading a suitable policy for achieving carbon reductions in China?). The 
research methods involved a case study and a GHGS perspective interview. Both of 
these approaches have been carefully justified and described. The next chapter will 
present the results and interpretations of the case study and the GHGS perspective 
interview. The findings will answer research Q1 and decide the next research 
question, either Q2 (What design features of a carbon trading system would 
maximize emission reductions in China?) or Q3 (Is carbon tax a suitable policy for 
achieving carbon reductions in China?). 
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Chapter 5   Analysis and discussion of the case 
study and interview results 
5.1   Introduction 
Chapter 4 described the overall research framework and explained the research 
methodologies used in this research, which included a case study for the Taiyuan 
SO2 emissions trading and expert interviews for the carbon emissions trading, to 
address research Q1 (Is emissions trading a suitable policy for achieving carbon 
reductions in China?). This chapter will first present the findings from the case study 
and the GHGs perspective interview, and then discuss the suitability of using 
emissions trading to achieve carbon reductions in China, the results of which will 
address research Q1 of this study.  
This chapter is structured as follows. Section 5.2 will present the outcomes of the 
Taiyuan SO2 emissions trading program, including its performance, participants’ 
attitudes and its limitations. The views on using an ETS to achieve carbon reductions 
in China will be summarized in section 5.3. Section 5.4 will discuss the findings 
from the case study and the GHGs perspective interview.  
5.2   Results for the case study  
This section provides a detailed picture of the Taiyuan SO2 emissions trading 
practice. Twenty managers and four administrators participated in the interviews. 
The presentation of the results of the interviews follows the sequence of the main 
interview questions asked: the performance of the Taiyuan SO2 emissions trading 
program, attitudes towards the Taiyuan SO2 emissions trading program, and the 
limitations of the existing Taiyuan SO2 emissions trading program. Specifically, the 
reasons behind the inactive SO2 emissions trading market in Taiyuan are further 
explored and presented. Some interview results are supported by data from the 
available documents. 
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5.2.1 The performance of the Taiyuan SO2 emissions 
trading program 
The performance of the Taiyuan SO2 emissions trading program are examined in 
relation to four impacts. They are the level of emissions, emissions cost, innovation 
or investment in clean technology and investment leakage, which have been justified 
in Chapter 2 and further explained in Chapter 4. The results are summarized in Table 
5.1, with ‘Yes’, ‘No’, ‘I do not know’ and ‘Refuse to answer’ being the interviewees’ 
overall answers to the question. As can be seen, both the managers and the 
administrators showed relatively consistent views on three of the four performance 
indicators but not on the emissions costs. Namely, most of the respondents agreed 
that the Taiyuan SO2 emissions trading program reduced emissions, promoted the 
innovation or investment in clean technology and did not lead to leakage outside 
Taiyuan city, but it did not obviously reduce the emissions costs. 
Table 5.1 The performance of the Taiyuan SO2 emissions trading program  
Questions Interviewees Yes No 
I do not 
know 
Refuse to 
answer 
Reduce emissions  20MA, 4AD 20MA, 4AD 0 0 0 
Reduce emissions cost 20MA, 4AD 3MA 
6MA (1 
raise), 1AD 
9MA, 3AD 2MA 
Innovation or investment 
in clean technology 
20MA, 4AD 18MA, 3AD 1MA 0MA, 1AD 1MA 
Direct and indirect 
investment out of Taiyuan 
city 
20MA, 4AD 2MA 15MA, 2AD 1MA, 2AD 2MA 
    AD: Administrators; MA: Managers 
    Reduce emissions cost: compared with previous command-and-control regulations 
All the interviewees agreed that there was a reduction in SO2 emissions after the SO2 
emissions trading program was implemented. AD2 said that ‘the SO2 emissions of 
Taiyuan city reduced by 8000 t and about 4500 t in 2008 and 2009 respectively, and 
the SO2 reductions were nearly 2000 t only in the first half year of 2010’. This point 
is supported by the data collected from the documents as well (Table 5.2). The total 
SO2 emissions in Taiyuan decreased steadily since the SO2 emissions trading 
program was introduced in 2003. The managers also indicated that they really 
reduced the SO2 emissions of their companies because of the caps imposed by the 
government, rather than the trading. 
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Table 5.2 Taiyuan SO2 emissions, 2001–09 
Year 
Total SO2 
Emissions (t) 
SO2 Emissions 
Reductions (t) 
Annual 
Concentration of 
SO2 (mg/m
3
) 
Number of Days the 
Air Quality Achieving 
or Better than Level 2
20
 
2001 – – 0.153 120 
2002 232181 – 0.129 153 
2003 234104 -1923 0.099 181 
2004 217912 16192 0.087 224 
2005 184503 33409 0.077 245 
2006 160303 24200 0.08 261 
2007 141399 18904 0.076 269 
2008 133387 8012 0.073 303 
2009 128787 4600 – 296 
Note: The annual concentration of SO2 for Taiyuan was 0.200mg/m
3
 in 2000. 
Data source: <China Environment Statistical Yearbook> from 2000 to 2009, and <Taiyuan Economic 
and Social Development Statistical Official Report> from 2001 to 2009. 
Most interviewees, 86% of the managers and 75% of the administrators, said that the 
SO2 emissions trading program helped the companies innovate or invest in clean 
technology. MA6 disclosed that his company spent around US$1.5 million on 
desulphurization equipment for reducing the SO2 emissions in 2009. AD3 said that 
‘the limited and decreasing permits year by year force the companies to adopt 
advanced desulfurization equipment to reduce emissions’. Interestingly, 12 managers 
mentioned that their companies invested in clean technology simply to comply with 
the caps to ‘ensure the company’s reputation’. They actually did not evaluate the 
emission costs of different compliance strategies when choosing the compliance 
method. MA17 revealed that his company controlled the SO2 emissions through 
improving the production process rather than employing new desulphurization 
technology.    
Also, most interviewees suggested that the SO2 emissions trading program did not 
lead to leakage. 75% of managers stated that their companies did not invest outside 
Taiyuan city because of the constraints from the SO2 emissions trading program and 
would not do this in the future either. But MA11 said that his company ‘transferred 
                                                 
20 According to the ‘Environment Air Quality Standards’: National Level 2 Standards (SO2 
0.060 mg/m
3
) and National Level 3 Standards (SO2 0.100 mg/m
3
). 
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part of the business to other cities where there were no strict caps on the SO2 
emissions’ and MA17 said that his company had the same intention. Those 
enterprises that had no intention of shifting investment were all large state-owned 
enterprises, which heavily relied on the raw materials in Taiyuan city or had to 
provide the necessary products, such as electricity, for the people living in Taiyuan 
city. The two with some intention of shifting investment were comparatively small 
companies engaged in concrete manufacturing and beverage manufacturing 
industries, which were considered more flexible in facing the challenges of the 
outside world. 
As to whether or not the SO2 emissions trading program achieved cost savings, the 
views varied a lot. Only three managers believed that the SO2 emissions trading 
program did decrease the emissions cost, while 29% of interviewees thought it did 
not and half the interviewees said that they were unsure about this. MA13 even 
argued that ‘the SO2 emissions trading program forces the company to adopt 
desulfurization equipment, which in turn increases the emissions cost of the 
company’ (Table 5.1). MA5, who was unsure about the changes of the emissions 
cost, explained:  
The average removal cost of per unit SO2, including equipment depreciation, 
maintenance and operation fees, is mainly related to the sulphur content of coal and the 
generating capacity size. The average removal cost of per unit SO2 is positively 
correlated with the sulphur content of coal and negatively correlated with the generating 
capacity size. So the SO2 emissions cost varies a lot even in the same company during 
different periods. Even though there is a reduction in the SO2 emissions cost, it cannot 
be simply attributed to the SO2 emissions trading program. 
In summary, SO2 emissions in Taiyuan city have been effectively reduced after the 
SO2 emissions trading program was implemented. In addition, the innovation or 
investment in clean technology has improved and little investment has been 
transferred out of Taiyuan city. But the answer was not clear as to whether the 
emissions cost had been reduced. Moreover, some innovation or investment in clean 
technology was simply motivated by the aim of compliance rather than being chosen 
as the most cost-effective compliance method. Little investment leakage may have 
been because many of the large businesses were necessarily tied to the city. 
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5.2.2 Attitudes towards the Taiyuan SO2 emissions trading 
program 
When the managers and administrators were asked about their overall attitudes 
towards the Taiyuan SO2 emissions trading program, including the effectiveness of 
the program in reducing SO2 emissions, a comparison with command-and-control 
regulations and the functioning of the SO2 emissions trading market, they expressed 
relatively similar opinions. The summarized results have been shown in Table 5.3. 
As for the effectiveness of the Taiyuan SO2 emissions trading program, both 
managers and administrators agreed that it was effective in reducing the SO2 
emissions. AD2 pointed out that ‘the SO2 emissions have been reduced significantly 
and the air quality has been improved greatly in Taiyuan city since the SO2 
emissions trading program was carried out’. This point can be supported by the data 
in Table 5.2. 
Table 5.3 The overall attitude towards Taiyuan SO2 emissions trading program  
Questions Interviewees Yes No 
I do not 
know 
Refuse to 
answer 
Is it effective in reducing 
the SO2 emissions? 
20MA, 4AD 20MA, 4AD 0 0 0 
Is it better than the 
previous command-and-
control regulations? 
20MA,4AD 9MA,4AD 6MA 2MA 3MA 
Does the SO2 trading 
market really exist? 
4AD 0 3AD 0 1AD 
AD: Administrators; MA: Managers 
54% of interviewees, including 45% of managers and all the administrators, believed 
that the SO2 trading program was better than the previous command-and-control 
regulations because it was much more effective in controlling and reducing the SO2 
emissions. In addition, AD3 revealed that:  
the SO2 emissions trading program saves the administration cost of mitigating SO2 
emissions. Unlike command-and-control regulations, it does not need the administrators 
to visit the companies from time to time to check their compliance.  
However, six managers expressed the opposite view. MA7 said that: 
even though I know the company should take the social responsibility to protect the 
environment and achieve sustainable development, I still oppose the SO2 emissions 
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trading program as it constrains the development and decreases the interest of the 
company.  
Only the four administrators were interviewed about the functioning of the SO2 
emissions trading market in Taiyuan. None of the administrators thought the Taiyuan 
SO2 trading market had developed properly so far. AD4 said that ‘the SO2 emissions 
trading market is very poor and it actually cannot be called a market’. AD2 gave the 
details of existing situation of the Taiyuan SO2 trading market: 
except for two simulant trades in December 2002 when the program was initially 
piloted, there had been only 19 transactions until July 2009, involving 807 t of 
emissions. And 18 of them happened between newly built enterprises or projects and 
the old enterprises. The other trading, which was also the first SO2 emissions trading 
case, took place between enterprises in 2003.   
In summary, it appears that the Taiyuan SO2 emissions trading program was 
effective in term of reducing SO2 emissions. Due to its effectiveness in reducing 
emissions and the capability of savings administration cost, most of the respondents 
believed the SO2 emissions trading program was better than the previous command-
and-control regulations. However, it is generally agreed that an operational SO2 
emissions trading market in Taiyuan had not been formed. 
5.2.3 Perceptions of the limitations of the Taiyuan SO2 
emissions trading program 
Twelve major limitations of the existing Taiyuan SO2 emissions trading program 
have been summarized from the interview data: the legal basis, character of the 
emissions trading system, allocation method, allocation policy, linkage policy, 
monitoring, tracking and management system, responsible department or person, 
trading information, administrative enforcement, administrative intervention and 
emissions trading market (Table 5.4).  
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Table 5.4 The limitations of the Taiyuan SO2 emissions trading program 
Interviewees Limitations of the Taiyuan SO2 emissions trading program 
AD2, AD4 The legal basis was not strong enough. 
AD2 
The design of the program was half an emissions trading system and 
half a fee system.  
MA3, MA12 The emissions allowances allocation method was unfair. 
MA1, MA3, MA8, MA15  The allocation policy was unpredictable.  
MA2 The linkage policy was unreasonable.  
AD4 The continuous online monitoring equipment was too limited. 
AD3 
There was no electronic SO2 emissions allowances tracking system 
and transactions management system.                   
AD4 There was no fixed department or person responsible for the program. 
MA1, MA2, MA7, MA14, 
MA18 
The information of SO2 emissions trading was not open and 
transparent. 
AD1 
The administrative department did not attach importance to the 
program. 
MA3 The administrative intervention in the program was too strong. 
AD1, AD2, AD3, AD4 The emissions trading market had not yet been formed. 
AD: Administrator; MA: Manager 
Both AD2 and AD4 argued that the legal basis of the Taiyuan SO2 emissions trading 
program was not strong enough. AD4 explained that:  
the program is established on the basis of ‘Administrative Regulation for SO2 
Emissions Trading in Taiyuan City’, which is a local administrative regulation 
published by the people’s government of Taiyuan city in 2002. While at the national 
level, there is no specific law or regulation for emissions trading. The most relevant 
laws are ‘The People’s Republic of China Environmental Protection Law’ and ‘The 
People’s Republic of China Air Pollution Control Act’. But both of them are too 
generous for regulating SO2 emissions trading in China.  
The weak legal basis of the Taiyuan SO2 trading program led to uncertainty and 
weak enforcement of the trading program.  
AD2 pointed out that ‘the design of the Taiyuan SO2 emissions trading program is 
half an emissions trading system and half a fee system’. There was a cap in the SO2 
emission trading system and the overall cap was going down year by year, but the 
implementation currently focused on the compensation for using the emission rights. 
The emissions permits were not provided for the emissions enterprises for free, nor 
were they sold by auction. In practice, the Taiyuan EPB charged the enterprises 
RMB¥0.2/kg on the actual SO2 emissions quarterly. AD2 further said that ‘this 
different design makes the enterprises’ managers and even some administrators 
misunderstand what a real emissions trading program should be like’.  
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MA12 said that ‘the emission allowances allocation method is unfair as it is based on 
the historical emissions data of the enterprises, ignoring other factors, such as 
production, fuel efficiency’. The most polluting enterprises received the most 
allowances. MA3 also expressed a similar view on this limitation. MA3 said that: 
the production in our company increased rapidly in recent years. But the yearly 
decreasing emissions permits, which are only based on the historical amount of 
emissions rather than considering the recent amount production, exert an increasing 
pressure on the company of surrendering enough emissions permits. I think this is 
unfair for our company. Actually, the SO2 emission factor in our company is much 
smaller than that in other companies. 
The total quantity allocation policy was criticized as too difficult to anticipate. Four 
managers said the outcomes from the total quantity allocation policy were 
unpredictable. MA15 explained that ‘even though the initial allocations cover five 
years, the allowable emissions may suddenly decrease as the emissions control from 
the higher levels of government gets stricter’. MA3 complained that:  
the introduction of new equipment is easier to say than do. It normally takes at least one 
year to make the plan, prepare the budget and choose the suppliers. However, the 
suddenly tightened emissions allowances could make us at a loss. According to one old 
Chinese saying, this is called a plan that cannot keep up with a change. 
MA8 said that insecure emissions permits made it difficult for them to make plans so 
they preferred to keep the extra emissions permits in hand rather than sell them in the 
trading market.  
The linkage policy was also criticized by MA2 as unreasonable. MA2 said that:  
a newly built enterprise or project, which emits SO2 emissions, must get the SO2 
emission allowances before being put into operation. But the current linkage policy for 
the newly built enterprises or projects is limited to buying allowances from the existing 
enterprises, without auctioning. They need to wait for the next Five-Year Plan to 
participate in the initial allowances allocation as the SO2 emission allowances are 
allocated in the first year of the Five-Year’s Plan.  
Meanwhile, the deficient trading information and the inactive trading market made it 
difficult for new enterprises or projects to get the allowances from the emissions 
trading market.   
AD4 argued that ‘the total amount of emissions may be underestimated in the 
Taiyuan SO2 emissions trading program’ as only a few large and key SO2 emitters 
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had installed the continuously online monitoring equipment due to the expense and 
its high maintenance cost. Most of the enterprises used materials balance calculations 
to measure their emissions and declared the emissions data on an annual basis (a 
self-reporting mechanism). AD4 further disclosed that ‘the emissions data may not 
be reliable as well’ because the continuous online monitoring equipment had not 
been checked since it was installed, and some might have been damaged and could 
not measure the emissions correctly.  
AD3 revealed that ‘there is no electronic SO2 emission allowances tracking system 
and transactions management system in the Taiyuan SO2 emissions trading program’. 
Both the information of emission allowances allocation and transactions were 
registered separately by the Taiyuan EPB. Thus the related trading information could 
not be provided in a timely and accurate way. 
AD4 pointed out that ‘no specified department or personnel from Taiyuan EPB is 
responsible for the Taiyuan SO2 emissions trading program’. Due to departmental 
and personnel changes, three departments (the previous Atmosphere Department, the 
Development & Supervision Department, and the Pollutants Total Quantity Control 
Department) and several administrators in the Taiyuan EPB had been in charge of 
the program since it was implemented in 2003. Many valuable original documents 
and data were lost due to the frequent work transitions from one person to another 
and from one department to another. 
Five managers mentioned that information on SO2 emissions trading was not open 
and transparent. M14 said that: 
it promises in the ‘Administrative Regulation for SO2 Emissions Trading in Taiyuan 
City’ that last year’s ‘Taiyuan SO2 emissions and emissions trading bulletin’ and other 
related information are made available to the public in March each year. But actually, 
only a little of the information is published discontinuously.  
MA7 complained that ‘except our own company, we do not know the SO2 emissions 
situation of other companies, such as how many permits they were allocated and do 
they have any extra permits for trading?’. It was argued by MA18 that the efficiency 
of markets would increase with the free flow of information. 
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It was also suggested that the administrative department did not attach importance to 
this program. AD1 said that: 
the SO2 emissions trading program was promoted by the ex-director of the Taiyuan 
EPB who thought highly of emissions trading. So it worked when he was in power, but 
this program was forgotten by the officers soon after a new director, who does not pay 
attention to this program, came into the office.  
AD1 further revealed that it was common in Chinese administrative departments that 
the officer intends to do the things his superiors like or pay attention to. And only the 
things that the leaders attach great importance would be done well.  
MA3 said that ‘the Taiyuan EPB plays too much administrative intervention in the 
transaction process’. Though few emissions trades had been done, almost all the 
trading cases were matched by the Taiyuan EPB and the trading price was also 
suggested by the EPB. MA3 believed that it was necessary for the administrative 
department to intervene at the beginning of the program but that it should find ‘a 
good balance between intervention and supervision’ and act as a supervisor and let 
the program work by itself gradually.  
As a few trades have taken place, the emissions trading market, as argued by all the 
administrators, has not yet developed properly. This finding was acknowledged in 
section 5.2.2. AD2 said that ‘emissions trading has faded out of people’s sight, 
people mention ‘emissions reduction task’ instead of ‘emissions trading’ when 
talking about sulphur dioxide’. As an emissions market is the most important part of 
a trading program, and could be used to evaluate the success of an emissions trading 
practice, the reasons why only a few trades have taken place so far were explored 
and listed below. 
5.2.4 Reasons behind the inactive Taiyuan SO2 emissions 
trading market 
Given the importance of an emissions trading market in an emissions trading 
program, the reasons behind the limited Taiyuan SO2 emissions trading market were 
further explored. As shown in Table 5.5, ten reasons have been identified. These can 
be classified in three categories: defective design, weak implementation and weak 
market structures.   
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Table 5.5 The reasons behind the poor Taiyuan SO2 emissions trading market 
Interviewees The reasons for a poor emissions trading market 
MA8 Insecure emissions rights Defective 
design MA2 Unreasonable linkage policy 
MA7, MA14 Asymmetric information 
Weak 
implementation AD1 
The government administrative department lacked the 
enthusiasm for regulating the emissions trading market. 
AD3 There is no emissions exchange. 
Weak market 
structures 
AD3, AD4, MA10 
Most enterprises did not fully understand emissions 
trading. 
MA9 
The alternative methods for complying with the caps 
were effective. 
AD2, MA16 
It was difficult to reach an agreement on the emissions 
trading price.  
AD2 There were not enough participants in the program. 
AD: Administrators; MA: Managers 
It was mentioned by some interviewees that some of the design and administrative 
implementation problems of the Taiyuan SO2 emissions trading program also led to 
the inactive SO2 emissions trading. The insecure emissions rights mentioned by MA8 
and the current unreasonable linkage policy criticized by MA2 made the enterprises 
reluctant to participate in the emissions trading market. Furthermore, both buyers 
and sellers were reluctant to trade because of asymmetric information. MA7 said that: 
buying the allowances from the market is really difficult because neither the enterprises 
that have surplus SO2 emissions allowances, nor the administrative department 
announces the allowances selling information publicly.  
However, MA14 disclosed that his enterprise failed to sell extra allowances in some 
years because no buyers could be found. MA12 further explained that ‘it is not worth 
spending too much time and effort in finding the buyers as the allowances revenue is 
relatively small to the enterprises’. In addition, according to AD1, the government 
administration lacked the enthusiasm for regulating the emissions trading market. 
AD3 thought the most important reason why there had been only a few trades so far 
was that there was no emissions exchange in Taiyuan city. AD3 said that it was not 
appropriate for the Taiyuan EPB, as the administrative department of the Taiyuan 
SO2 trading program, to be involved in trading activities. Besides, it lacked the 
enthusiasm to help promote trading. But ‘the trading would get much better if there 
was an emissions exchange in Taiyuan city’, which could act as an independent 
reliable third party, organizing the trading and releasing the allowances information. 
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Most enterprise managers still did not fully understand emissions trading. MA10 
said that he knew ‘there is an allowable emission amount for the enterprise every 
year and the enterprise has to control the emissions under this prohibitive amount 
strictly’, but he had ‘no idea about emissions trading’. At the same time, AD3 
complained that most of the large SO2 emission units were old state-owned 
enterprises, with a workforce of a high average age and lacking the necessary skills. 
Based on the requirements of the program, the RFF and the Taiyuan EPB jointly 
organized more than 20 SO2 emission trading training or seminars for 23 large and 
key SO2 emissions enterprises at the beginning and mid-term of the program, but 
only a few of these participants really understood what emission trading was. AD4 
also argued that ‘the enterprises do not know the benefits that they can obtain from 
emissions trading, and no emissions trading expert can be found in the Taiyuan EPB’.  
MA9 said that his enterprises considered ‘investing in the desulphurization 
equipment as the first choice when short of emission allowances, because it is much 
more convenient and the machine can work immediately’. As one of the methods for 
complying with the caps, the desulphurization technology was quite mature so that 
the enterprises prefer investing in desulphurization equipment rather than permits 
trading, ignoring the fact that trading might result in lower cost. 
AD2 disclosed that ‘some trading failed because the trading parties could not reach 
an agreement on the price’. MA16 said that ‘it is difficult to reach an agreement on 
the emissions trading price as there is no price for reference, neither recent trading 
nor guidance price’. They were afraid of suffering ‘losses’ and thus were cautious 
about trading. AD2 also emphasized the need of a guidance price for SO2 emissions 
allowance, but determining a guidance price turned out to be a very complex subject. 
AD2 called for the research in this area in China. 
Last but not least, AD2 argued that ‘there are not enough participants in the Taiyuan 
SO2 emissions trading program’. AD2 explained that the Taiyuan SO2 emissions 
trading program was a local emissions trading program with only about 10 key 
emission sources, so the participants of the emissions trading market were 
considered too limited, which also meant that it would be difficult to achieve cost 
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savings. AD2 further suggested that ‘the program would be much more successful if 
it were carried out at the provincial level or national level’. 
5.3   Prospects for carbon emissions trading 
5.3.1 Using emissions trading to achieve carbon 
reductions in China 
The 20 enterprise managers, four administrators and six experts were asked for their 
opinions on using emissions trading to achieve carbon reductions in China. Their 
overall attitude has been summarized and presented in Table 5.6. As can be seen, 
only 7% of interviewees supported using emissions trading to achieve carbon 
reductions in China, while the same percentage were strongly against it. Though 27% 
of interviewees showed a comparatively optimistic attitude toward carbon trading, 
17% of interviewees thought it was difficult to reduce carbon emissions through a 
carbon trading scheme and 43% of interviewees stated that it was hard to say or they 
had no idea about this question. 
Table 5.6 Opinions on using emissions trading to achieve carbon reduction in 
China 
Interviewees Against Difficult 
Do not know 
or unsure 
Possible Support 
20 managers  2 13 5  
4 administrators  2  1 1 
6 experts 2 2  1 1 
Rate 7% 17% 43% 27% 7% 
 
Most of the managers said that they did not know whether emissions trading could 
help achieve carbon reduction in China. MA10 said that: ‘I do not know much about 
emissions trading while carbon problem is a hot topic right now, so I cannot judge 
this question carelessly’. MA16 also argued that whether emissions trading could be 
successful in reducing carbon emissions was uncertain because the experiences of 
the Taiyuan SO2 emissions trading program were still too limited. Five managers 
thought it was possible for China to use carbon emissions trading. MA1 said that:  
‘there are no differences between CO2 and SO2 in nature. Referring that the SO2 
emissions trading has successfully controlled the SO2 emissions in Taiyuan, it is also 
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possible to reduce CO2 emissions by carbon emissions trading’. However, MA2 and 
MA3 showed relatively negative views on using carbon emissions trading. They 
suggested that it would be quite difficult to implement carbon emissions trading in 
China. MA2 said that: 
the Taiyuan SO2 emissions trading program still has many limitations and the overall 
situation of its practice is not very good. If based on the existing SO2 emissions trading 
practice, implementing carbon emissions trading in China would be quite difficult. 
Meanwhile, no manager strongly supported or strongly opposed using emissions 
trading to achieve carbon reductions in China.  
Considering the difficulties that the existing Taiyuan SO2 emissions trading practice 
faced, AD3 and AD4 were pessimistic about a future carbon emissions trading 
program. AD3 argued that some preconditions for carbon emissions trading, such as 
an advanced carbon emissions exchange, were not ready in China. AD4 said that: 
managing and monitoring carbon emissions is difficult as there are too many CO2 
emission sources and the pollutions are too distributed, which will bring more 
difficulties for carbon emissions trading than SO2 emissions trading. Not to mention, 
even in current Taiyuan SO2 emissions trading program, the continuous online 
monitoring equipment is very limited.  
But AD2 suggested that carbon emissions trading might be a good idea in China 
even though its implementation would be difficult at this stage. He explained that: 
some of the limitations of Taiyuan SO2 emissions trading program could be owing to 
the fact that the participants in the program are too limited. For a nationwide carbon 
emissions trading program, this dilemma can be solved as there are enough carbon 
emissions sources. So carbon emissions trading could be more successful than the 
existing Taiyuan SO2 emissions trading practice. However, some problems with 
existing emissions trading cannot be improved in the short term, such as a lack of 
national law in terms of emissions trading, so the implementation of carbon emissions 
trading in China is still difficult under current situation. 
AD1 strongly supported using emissions trading to achieve carbon reduction in 
China. AD1 argued that: 
it is no doubt that Taiyuan SO2 emissions trading program has successfully reduced the 
SO2 emissions in Taiyuan city, while for carbon emissions, achieving carbon reductions 
is the first task, so carbon emissions trading could be an effective instrument. 
Two experts, EX2 and EX5, opposed carbon emissions trading in China. EX2 listed 
two reasons to support his argument. First, the accumulated carbon emissions in the 
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atmosphere are mainly due to the industrialized countries in the process of 
industrialization, while per capita emissions in China is still relatively low. The 
UNFCCC states ‘common but different responsibilities’ instead of requiring China 
to commit to a carbon reduction target. Therefore, China does not need to make such 
a commitment to restrain itself. Second, China remains a developing country with 
achieving economic growth being the top task, while the CO2 emissions caps would 
have a conflicting effect on the pace of development. He said that: 
it is still too early for China to commit itself to reduce carbon emissions, adopting either 
carbon tax or carbon emissions trading. The introduction of either instrument in the 
near future will largely and negatively affect the energy sectors as well as the whole 
economy. Then China will never have the chance to catch up with the developed 
economics.  
Agreeing with EX2’s two reasons, EX5 was also worried that the special national 
conditions of politics and the markets in China made emissions trading not suitable 
for reducing carbon emissions. For example, some of the infrastructure for the free 
market as well as for emissions trading are not adequate for supporting a large-scale 
carbon emissions trading scheme in China.  
EX1 and EX4 thought that it was very difficult to employ carbon emissions trading 
in China. EX1 argued that many concerns needed to be addressed before a domestic 
carbon emissions trading scheme is introduced in China, including whether the 
carbon emissions trading scheme would weaken China’s economic growth and 
competitive advantage, whether it could be accepted by the enterprises, and how the 
carbon trading policy could be compatible with current environmental policies. EX4 
said that: 
even though the carbon emissions trading scheme is theoretically effective and efficient, 
it is not expected that China will adopt it to limit carbon emissions in the short term. 
This is because carbon emissions trading has only been implemented in a few 
developed countries with limited experience, and it requires a strict monitoring and 
stringent enforcement to ensure the compliance.  
However, EX6 argued that emissions trading might be a good policy option for 
China to achieve carbon reduction. He said that: 
the increasing CO2 emissions and current command-and-control carbon regulations in 
China put China under great pressure to take a market-based instrument to achieve 
carbon reductions at the least cost. As China has got some lessons from existing water 
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pollutants as well as SO2 emissions trading practice and also could learn experience 
from other successful emissions trading practices in western countries, carrying out a 
carbon emissions trading scheme in China could be possible. Carbon emissions trading 
may be a good policy option for solving China’s carbon problem. 
Furthermore, EX3 strongly supported the use of carbon emissions trading in China. 
He insisted that carbon emissions trading was becoming a worldwide trend, and that 
China had no reason to be out of step. Otherwise, China would lose a great 
opportunity to cooperate with other countries in mitigating carbon emissions and 
addressing the climate change problem. 
5.3.2 Necessary considerations for China for carbon 
emissions trading 
What are the necessary considerations for employing an emissions trading policy to 
mitigate carbon emissions in China? Four experts who were pessimistic about carbon 
emissions trading in China expressed views on this question. They suggested that the 
economic development level and market conditions in China as well as the legal base, 
enforcement and public acceptability of emissions trading need to be carefully 
assessed and discussed when considering carbon emissions trading policy in China 
(Table 5.7). 
Table 5.7 Necessary considerations for China when using carbon emissions 
trading 
Interviewees Necessary considerations for China when using carbon emissions trading  
EX1, EX2, EX5 Economic development level  
EX5 Market conditions  
EX1 Legal basis of emissions trading  
EX4 Enforcement of emissions trading  
EX1 Public acceptability of emissions trading  
 
EX2, EX5 and EX1 suggested that China’s economic development was the first 
consideration before carbon emissions trading could be implemented. EX2 argued 
that a mandatory carbon reduction cap was unfair and unfeasible for the rapidly 
developing China. China’s economy continues to grow at a high rate and the process 
of urbanization is accelerating, which essentially leads to increased CO2 emissions 
through the high demand for energy. The developed countries have already gone 
through the industrialization stage, so it is unfair to set the same standard for a 
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developing country like China. Setting a mandatory emissions reductions target 
before 2020 would be at the expense of China’s economic growth and urbanization. 
Thus as a low-income country and a low per capita discharger of CO2, China cannot 
reduce carbon emissions through restraining its economic development. EX5 said 
that: 
the climate change issue is different from the conventional air pollution problems in 
mitigation options and economics. For example, the technology for reducing SO2 is 
quite mature, but there is still no effective technology in mitigating CO2 emissions and 
the alternative options are every expensive. The mitigation of carbon emissions needs to 
be supported by a strong economic basis. But whether the economic basis in China is 
strong enough to support reducing carbon emissions by carbon emissions trading policy 
should be analysed in advance.  
In addition, EX1 suggested that how much a carbon emissions trading scheme would 
affect China’s economic growth and the enterprises’ competiveness should be 
accurately simulated and understood before any scheme was implemented. 
Complementary measures or policies should be considered to alleviate the negative 
impact of the carbon emissions trading.      
The market conditions in China was another factor suggested by EX5: 
all the emissions trading program must be based on the principle of the free market 
mechanism to ensure the possibility of trading between enterprises. Is the market free 
enough to implement carbon emissions trading in China? This question includes two 
meanings. First, whether or not the participants are private enterprises? Second, 
whether or not the emissions trading market is regulated by the administrative 
department? This is a very important consideration for China to carry out carbon 
emissions trading. 
EX1 argued that: 
China has never been a mature law-based society, and the enforcement is always 
disappointing. There are only some local regulations for local emissions trading 
practice. No emissions trading law at the country level has been established so far. The 
latest feedback from the emissions trading practice shows that the enforcement of 
emissions trading program is not good. So when considering using emissions trading to 
achieve carbon reductions, this is a problem that needs to be carefully examined.  
EX4 argued that the enforcement of the emissions trading program decided how far 
the emissions trading practice was from the original plan. Even a well-designed 
emissions trading program, if not effectively enforced, would be most likely to fail. 
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He was worried that ‘as emissions trading is not as mandatory as a tax, and lacks 
successful precedent in China, the enforcement ability is poor and needs to be 
improved before a comprehensive carbon emissions trading program is introduced’. 
In addition, EX1 suggested considering the public acceptability of carbon emissions 
trading in implementing this policy: 
though in the context of China, the enterprises get used to obey the orders from the 
government, but increasing the enterprises’ acceptability of the carbon emissions 
trading program could help the enterprises get more actively involved in developing 
low-carbon or non-carbon technology and so on. 
5.4    Discussion 
5.4.1 Comparing the Taiyuan SO2 emissions trading 
practice to the theoretical emissions trading response 
model 
Emissions trading can achieve both environmental and economic goals at the same 
time (Ellerman 2005). Emissions reductions have been effectively achieved in the 
Taiyuan SO2 emissions trading program while cost savings do not seem to have been 
realised, according to the respondents in the case study, as most of the savings are 
theoretically achieved by trading yet only a few trades happened. Thus the Taiyuan 
SO2 emissions trading program succeeded in realizing its environmental goal but 
may have failed to achieve its economic goal.  
Innovation or investment in clean technology has been promoted under the Taiyuan 
SO2 emissions trading program. However, the motivation for innovating and 
investing in clean technology was found merely to comply with the caps instead of 
resorting to the least expensive emission reduction method. Furthermore, though 
little direct or indirect investment was relocated after the Taiyuan SO2 emissions 
trading program was implemented, the lack of leakage was mainly due to other 
factors related to companies’ structures and customer locations rather than the policy 
itself.  
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According to the Theoretical Emissions Trading Response Model proposed by the 
emissions trading theory in Chapter 2, a successful emissions trading program would 
simultaneously reduce emissions, save costs, promote innovation and investment in 
clean technology, and would not lead to any leakage. Overall, the Taiyuan SO2 
emissions trading program seems not to be functioning anything like an ideal 
emissions trading model. The practice of the Taiyuan SO2 emissions trading in China 
is quite different from the ideal. 
5.4.2 Comparing the Taiyuan SO2 emissions trading 
practice to emissions trading practices in western 
countries 
Though the allowances trading market evolved slowly at the early stage of the US 
Acid Rain Program, the total amount of private trades was about 880 000 allowances 
in 17 transactions between May 1992 and October 1993, representing about 3% of 
all phase I (January 1995–December 1999) allowances (Rico 1995; Rose et al. 1993). 
Moreover, in 1993 the EPA offered 50 000 year 1995 ‘spot auction’ allowances and 
100 000 year 2000 ‘advance auction’ allowances (EPA 1993). In comparison, the 
performance of the early stage of the Taiyuan SO2 emissions trading market is poor. 
The major reasons for this can be first attributed to the flawed design and weak 
implementation of the program. Second, the participating enterprises’ managers and 
administrators do not fully understand emissions trading. Third, support measures 
for the trading market, such as emissions exchanges, were not established promptly. 
All these factors make the participants hesitant to engage in the trading, which 
results in an inactive emissions trading market.  
Taking the linkage policy as an example, the enterprises in the US Acid Rain 
Program also must acquire permits to enter the market, but they could buy the 
permits from either existing enterprises or the EPA, as a small number of additional 
permits are auctioned by the EPA annually (Schmalensee et al. 1998). Evidence from 
the US Acid Rain Program suggests that the early allowance auctions can be a 
market starter, helping to provide a price signal to the nascent market (Rico 1995). 
By evaluating the SO2 emissions trading in the US in 1998, Schmalensee et al. (1998) 
also argue that permit auctions in the US SO2 emissions trading program may have 
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facilitated both the price discovery process and the development of the permit 
trading market. However, the design of the Taiyuan SO2 emissions trading program 
did not make good use of auctioning to activate the emissions trading market.     
Just as the workers in the enterprises covered by the Taiyuan SO2 emissions trading 
program did not really understand emissions trading, the same problem appeared in 
the US Acid Rain Program. Before the US Acid Rain Program, most of the affected 
units expressed clearly that they did not understand the market and would not trade 
allowances with other companies (Rico 1995). But with the meetings and workshops 
offered by the EPA, a total of 613 transactions were made in the first year (1995) and 
this number increased to 4198 in 2003, indicating that more participants understand 
the emissions trading market and choose allowances trading as the compliance 
strategy (EPA 2003b). However, seven years after the introduction of the Taiyuan 
SO2 emissions trading program in 2003 the participating enterprises were still not 
knowledgeable enough about emissions trading. They still could not make the 
decisions necessary to fully utilise emissions trading and achieve the cost savings 
that this economic instrument could offer.  
No literature has been found that discusses the importance of an emissions exchange 
in emissions trading programs like the US Acid Rain Program or the EU ETS. One 
explanation is that the markets in the US and the EU are free and mature enough for 
implementing the economic-based instrument of emissions trading and this is taken 
for granted. The market information is more symmetrical so that the affected 
enterprises can agree on the transactions independently. Another possible reason is 
that the Chicago Emissions Exchange in the US and the European Climate Exchange 
in the EU have developed very quickly since their establishment in 2003 and 2004 
respectively, which promoted the development of the emissions trading markets. It 
has been confirmed by Mackenzie (2007) that allowances trading in the EU ETS can 
take place via brokers and on several organised exchanges, even in the form of 
carbon futures, by using the electronic trading platform, so a physical emissions 
exchange is comparatively not so important. However, China’s semi-free market 
situation makes an emissions exchange very significant to the Chinese emissions 
trading market. This may be the major reason for some interviewees proposing an 
emissions exchange for activating the emissions trading market. 
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5.4.3 Experience from the Taiyuan SO2 emissions trading 
program 
Even though the performance of the Taiyuan SO2 emissions trading program is 
disappointing, some lessons can be learned from it for other emissions trading 
programs (and even for future carbon trading) in China. Economic instruments do 
not achieve least cost automatically and a poorly designed economic instrument may 
cost as much as command-and-control (Hufschmidt et al. 1983). The Taiyuan SO2 
emissions trading practice shows that the design of an emissions trading program is 
the first step and special attention needs to be paid to the key elements of the 
program, including allowances allocation method, allocation policy, linkage policy 
and so on. The EU ETS experienced extreme price fluctuations from 2005 to 2007 
due to the politics of allocations, peaking at €31/t and sinking almost to zero, which 
is a carbon market failure (MacKenzie 2007). 
Furthermore, even a well-designed ETS may not guarantee success without powerful 
enforcement. Experience from the Taiyuan SO2 emissions trading practice suggests 
that the enforcement of an emissions trading program determines the performance of 
the program, so the enforcement should be swift, strict and strong. Because the 
institutional capacity of supervising is limited, the implementation of emissions 
trading may also have limitations. Experience in many countries has shown that local 
authorities and strong institutional support play important roles in the success of 
economic instruments (Huber et al. 1998). This is especially true for China as a 
developing country with a transitional economy which may adopt emissions trading 
with different institutional arrangements.  
In addition, when using emissions trading in China, an active emissions trading 
market is of great importance in achieving cost savings. The interviews suggest that 
an emissions exchange would be a good organization for promoting and assisting 
trading, and so an exchange should be established before an ETS is implemented. 
Seminars and training on emissions trading should be provided for the participants to 
make sure that they know how to make the abatement decisions on emissions 
reductions.  
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5.4.4 Key challenges for implementing carbon emissions 
trading in China 
In terms of the key challenges for implementing carbon emissions trading in China, 
the experts interviewed showed similar concerns about market conditions and legal 
authority as suggested in the literature. They questioned whether the Chinese market 
is free enough to carry out carbon emissions trading, and whether the legal authority 
is adequate enough to ensure the implementation of carbon emissions trading in 
China. Enforcement ability is another necessary consideration proposed by the 
experts for carbon emissions trading in China, which includes the emissions 
measurement mentioned by Zhang (2004) and Wang et al. (2002). In addition, the 
experts worried about whether the economic development level in China is strong 
enough to support a carbon emissions trading program. They also suggested that 
public acceptance of a carbon emissions trading program should be considered.   
Zhang (2004) considered that emissions trading system was feasible for addressing 
the Chinese SO2 pollution problem in spite of the fact that the Chinese market was 
not totally free and that Chinese society still lacked legal regulation. He believed that 
the market would be freer gradually and emissions trading practice would be 
guaranteed by the law in the near future. After several years’ practice of SO2 
emissions trading in China, however, the performance of the Taiyuan SO2 emissions 
trading program in this research shows that emissions trading still has a long way to 
go because the market is still not free enough to achieve trading and the legal 
authority is also not sufficient enough to ensure the smooth implementation of a 
emissions trading program in China.  
5.4.5 The feasibility of using emissions trading to achieve 
carbon reductions in China 
The difficulties of using carbon emissions trading in China identified by the 
interviewees have been discussed by other experts or researchers publicly. Jiang 
Kejun, a researcher from the Energy Research Institute of NDRC, argues that certain 
prerequisites of implementing carbon trading are not ready in China:, these include 
an effective management system, a mature legal system, a reliable information 
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disclosure system, and scientific measurement and monitoring (Wang & Jiao 2011). 
All of these conditions could not be built up quickly, so a carbon tax is easier to use 
currently. Xiong Yan, chairman of the Beijing Environment Exchange, points out 
that issues such as an ambiguous policy planning and a weak legal basis exist in 
China in terms of a carbon emissions trading system (Bo 2010). Though some 
carbon trades have taken place in China, they were sporadic and truly market-
oriented carbon trading has not happened. While carbon trading is mainly through 
the EU ETS, the US Chicago Climate Exchange, the Canada Montreal Climate 
Exchange and climate exchanges in Australia, the carbon trading market in 
developing countries is still in the preparatory stage (Xu 2011). It is projected that 
the carbon trading market in China would be very difficult to be as mature as that in 
western countries before 2030 when China reaches the peak of carbon emissions (Bo 
2010). So, the improvement of the carbon trading market in China still has a long 
way to go. Cao Jing, an assistant professor from Tsinghua University, also suggests 
that a market mechanism and related legal basis still need to be developed in China 
(Cai 2011). As China has no experience in setting up an effective carbon trading 
market, the learning and adaption process needs a considerably long time, thus it is 
more appropriate to design and implement a carbon tax in China.  
Though it is argued that CO2 is a global problem, and therefore will have more 
market participants, the abatement cost of CO2 is much more varied than that of SO2 
and, unlike the mature desulphurization technology, there has been no effective 
decarbonisation technology so far. Cost savings are more likely to be achieved in a 
carbon trading market and the affected enterprises would probably be more likely to 
choose carbon trading as the compliance strategy. Furthermore, the design of a 
carbon trading program could be initially ensured and the administrative 
implementation could be improved if done step by step. Considering that an 
emissions trading market is the most meaningful part of an emissions trading 
program, however, while the market situation in China is not free enough and the 
development of market liberalization is a long process, emissions trading may not be 
suitable for achieving carbon reduction targets in China in the short run. Therefore, a 
carbon tax might be a suitable alternative choice initially.  
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5.4.6 Comparing emissions trading and a carbon tax in the 
short term 
The previous discussion concludes that carbon emissions trading may not be suitable 
for China to achieve carbon reductions target in the short run. Instead, a carbon tax is 
suggested as a more suitable option. Many experts have publicly expressed their 
views on using carbon tax policy (Cui 2009). Wang Dehua, an assistant researcher in 
the Finance and Taxation Research Office of the Chinese Academic of Social 
Science, advises that the carbon tax is necessary in China as it can increase the fiscal 
revenue as well as correcting the behaviours of enterprises and residents in using 
resources. Liu Dexun, the deputy director of the Global Climate Change Institute at 
Tsinghua University, argues that a carbon tax could vigorously promote the 
development of renewable energy sources and nuclear energy. Liu Huan, the vice 
president of the Faculty of Taxation at the Central University of Finance and 
Economics, suggests that a carbon tax could optimize the energy structure and 
enhance people’s energy-saving awareness by raising the price of basic energy. The 
Research Institute for Fiscal Science of the Ministry of Finance in China suggests 
that a carbon tax is necessary for China to improve its environmental tax system 
(Research Institute for Fiscal Science 2009).  
Yu Jie, the director of a China policy and research project, Climate Group, suggests 
that a carbon tax is more suitable for the Chinese context until enterprises’ emission 
data could be monitored accurately (Bo 2010). Carbon trading has a higher 
requirement of the carbon emission data because enterprises have to know their 
historical as well as their future emissions. Furthermore, carbon emission permits are 
intangible goods. So the establishment of a perfect carbon trading market needs the 
market to be transparent and fair, and requires the support of a strong social credit 
system, which are all unachievable in the foreseeable future. In addition, enterprises 
affected by rising costs directly after a carbon tax is imposed would be simulated to 
apply energy-saving technologies and improve their industry.  
However, some experts argue that a carbon tax is not the optimal option for China. 
Huang Jiefu (2010), a professor from Beijing Normal University, argues that most 
regions or countries  such as the US, Japan, Korea and Taiwan plan to introduce 
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carbon emissions trading rather than a carbon tax. Although Australia intended to 
introduce a carbon emission trading scheme, it adopted a carbon tax. Except for the 
small European countries of Denmark and Finland, a carbon tax has not been applied 
on a large scale. Furthermore, how to decide the carbon tax rate is another difficulty 
because the development of regions and the quality of enterprises are seriously 
uneven in China. Compared with the price signal created by trading, the carbon tax 
rate lacks flexibility and could not be adjusted at any time. While ChangCe 
Thinktank (2010) argues that a carbon tax could alleviate some of the international 
pressure on China, it cannot get clear benefits from the international world as the 
developed countries may still criticize China and impose trade sanctions if the 
carbon tax rate is too low. As well, a carbon tax may impact negatively on income 
distribution in China because the proportion of energy expenditure in the low-
income population is greater than for the high-income population (ChangCe 
Thinktank 2010; Liang & Wei 2012).  
By comparing a carbon tax and a carbon emissions trading scheme from three 
aspects – theory basis, abatement costs and effects on emission reductions – Zeng 
(2009) concludes that the implementation cost of a carbon tax is relatively low, 
which makes it more likely to be adopted by the government at the initial stage of an 
emission reductions policy. Carbon trading’s advantageous effects on emission 
reductions and information cost, and its considerable potential on cross-border 
reductions (cooperation between developed and developing countries), means it is 
becoming the most important carbon reduction mechanism. Specific to China in the 
short term, Zeng (2009) proposes that China consider levying a carbon tax on some 
emission-extensive industries to promote technology transfer and structure 
adjustment while participating actively in the existing international carbon trading, 
and utilizing foreign funds and technologies to lower the carbon intensity in China. 
But in the long term China should strengthen the R&D of its carbon trading market 
as early as possible and launch pilots of permit trading at the appropriate time to 
promote the development of a domestic carbon trading market. Mei Dewen, general 
manager of the Beijing Environment Exchange, also thinks that China should first 
implement a carbon tax and then have both a carbon tax and carbon emissions 
trading schemes when the necessary conditions have been satisfied (Yan 2010).  
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Whether a carbon tax is a suitable policy for reducing carbon emissions in China is 
still a heated debate. Each side has their own sufficient and convincing reasons. 
Nevertheless, it could be noticed that most of the experts agree that a carbon tax is 
more suitable for the Chinese context at this stage while carbon trading is a future 
development. The findings from the case study of the Taiyuan SO2 emissions trading 
program and the expert interviews in this research also suggest that an ETS may not 
be appropriate for reducing carbon emissions in China yet. However, the feasibility 
of adopting a carbon tax policy in China needs to be further assessed. Thus the 
research Q3 is proposed: 
Is carbon tax a suitable policy for achieving carbon reductions in China?. 
5.5   Conclusion 
In summary, the introduction of the SO2 emissions trading program in Taiyuan city 
has effectively reduced the SO2 emissions, promoted innovation and investment in 
clean technology, and has not necessarily led to investment leakage. But the 
motivation of innovating and investing in clean technology is to comply with the 
caps and the absence of leakage is mainly due to factors important to the companies 
rather than to the policy itself. The interviews do not suggest any evidence that cost 
savings have been realized. Furthermore, it is argued that the Taiyuan SO2 emissions 
trading program is better than previous command-and-control regulations, even 
though it has many problems such as a true SO2 emissions trading market not being 
formed yet. Overall, it seems that the Taiyuan SO2 emissions trading program is not 
functioning like the Theoretical Emissions Trading Response Model proposed by the 
emissions trading theory. It cannot be judged as a successful scheme in terms of the 
four key criteria.  
Based on the findings from the Taiyuan SO2 emissions trading program, it appears 
that emissions trading may not be suitable for China to achieve ambitious carbon 
reduction targets at this stage. The interview information about using emissions 
trading to achieve carbon reduction in China supports this conclusion. This is 
because the prerequisites of emissions trading in China – market condition, legal 
authority, economic development level and so on – are not sufficient. Thus, some 
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researchers have suggested that a carbon tax might be more appropriate at this stage, 
with a carbon emission trading scheme in the longer term. However, whether a 
carbon tax will be effective for China needs to be further evaluated by an appropriate 
method.  
Even though the performance of the Taiyuan SO2 emissions trading program is 
disappointing, lessons on the design and the implementation of the program, and the 
operation of the emissions trading market can still be drawn from it. These have 
significant implications for other emissions trading programs, including a future 
carbon trading program in China. It is suggested that a workable emissions trading 
program should be well designed, effectively enforced and supported by relevant 
measures such as emissions exchanges.  
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Chapter 6   A carbon tax CGE model for China 
6.1   Introduction  
The findings from the case study and the interviews reported in Chapter 5 show that 
a carbon emissions trading scheme might not be suitable for China in the short term 
and that a carbon tax is probably more suitable for achieving any reduction target at 
this stage. According to the overall research design (Chapter 2, section 2.4), our 
research attention will therefore shift to the alternative economic instrument for 
emissions trading, which is the carbon tax. It has been argued by some researchers 
and shown by some practices that a carbon tax could be effective in reducing carbon 
emissions (Chapter 2, section 2.3). However, the environmental effectiveness of a 
carbon tax in China remains unknown due to a lack of knowledge and practice. 
Furthermore, debates on environmental policy often come to the issue as to whether 
or not the proposed policy will harm economic growth, and by how much (Wajsman 
1995). This is particularly important for China as a developing country which has 
economic growth as its top priority. Therefore, whether a carbon tax is a suitable 
policy for reducing carbon emissions in China (research Q3) needs to be assessed by 
evaluating its effectiveness in reducing carbon emissions and its subsequent impact 
on the economy.  
Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) models are argued to be the most 
appropriate approach for environmental policy analysis (Xie 1995; Zhang & Folmer 
1998). They have also been applied to simulate the impacts of a carbon tax in many 
countries (see section 6.2.3). In order to explore the suitability of introducing a 
carbon tax in China, this research will also use a CGE model to simulate the 
effectiveness of a carbon tax in reducing carbon emissions as well as subsequent 
impacts on China’s economy and energy structure. The ‘Chinese carbon tax CGE 
model’ can describe the new economy equilibrium of China after a carbon tax is 
imposed on the economic system. The modelling of CGE is crucial to the research 
purpose, but the construction of the database for the CGE model requires great effort 
because CGE models are always data hungry. In this chapter, a Chinese carbon tax 
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CGE model will be constructed and the data and solution for this model will be 
discussed.  
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 6.2 will briefly review the 
CGE modelling and present the reasons of employing a CGE model for evaluating 
the impacts of a carbon tax in China. In section 6.3 the Chinese carbon tax CGE 
model in this research will be described. The data for the CGE model will be given 
in section 6.4. Section 6.5 will discuss the software solutions for the CGE model.  
6.2   CGE Modelling 
6.2.1 Definition  
The CGE modelling, also known as applied general equilibrium modelling, 
originated from the General Equilibrium Theory of Walras (Zhou & Wang 2002). It 
has a clear structure of the micro-economy and linkages between macro and micro-
economic variables, thus it can describe the reactions among markets and simulate 
the direct or indirect impacts of a policy shock on the whole economy. The most 
common use of CGE models is to first calculate an initial equilibrium based on the 
benchmark data set (Wajsman 1995). Then, a new and ‘counterfactual’ equilibrium 
is calculated by changing some exogenous variables, usually a policy parameter such 
as a tax rate. So the impact of the policy change is revealed by a comparison of the 
two equilibria.  
There is no precise definition of a CGE model. Condon et al. (1987) describe it as a 
model which numerically specifies an economy where supply and demand for goods 
and factors are made equal by adjusting the prices and quantities on the basis of 
Walrasian general equilibrium theory. Bergman (2005) considers it as a model that 
aims to quantify the impacts of a specific policy on the equilibrium allocation of 
resources and relative prices of goods and factors. Böhringer et al. (2003) point out 
that the essence of CGE economics is to derive policy insights by combining the 
general equilibrium theory with a consistent data set (most commonly from the 
National Accounts). In addition, Böhringer et al. (2003) summarize five main steps 
involved in conducting a CGE analysis (Figure 6.1). Particularly, this research will 
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adopt these five main steps in constructing and using the Chinese carbon tax CGE 
model. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Adapted from Böhringer et al. (2003, p. 3) 
Figure 6.1 Steps in computable general equilibrium analysis 
6.2.2 Why the CGE approach?  
Apart from CGE models, other economic modelling approaches could also be 
applied in assessing the impacts of a carbon tax on carbon emissions reductions as 
well as the whole economy, such as the most well-known input-output and 
macroeconomic approaches. Several studies have discussed the relative strengths and 
weaknesses of different kinds of economic approaches and have shown the rationale 
for choosing the CGE approach for environmental policy analysis (Xie 1995; Zhang 
& Folmer 1998; Zhang & Nentjes 1998). 
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Zhang & Folmer (1998) assess six economic modelling approaches for estimating 
the cost of reducing carbon emissions (ad hoc, dynamic optimization, input-output, 
macroeconomic, CGE and hybrid), and highlight that CGE models are an 
appropriate tool for analyzing the economic effects of great changes in the demand 
and/or supply structure of an economy. Furthermore, Zhang and Nentjes (1998) 
argue that CGE models are preferred to input-output and macroeconomic models as 
they are based on solid microeconomic foundations while macroeconomic models 
pay more attention to time-series data. In addition, comparing to other modelling 
techniques, such as the input-output approach and linear programming, Xie (1995) 
summarizes four appealing features of  the CGE approach for analyzing 
environmental policy: endogenous price and market determined features, supply and 
demand equated on Walrasian general equilibrium theory, supply and demand 
functions derived from the behavior of profit-maximizing producers and utility-
maximizing consumers respectively, and non-linear technique and resources 
constraints.  
Based on the preceding discussion, the CGE approach is best capable of simulating 
the results of a policy change or an external shock, which in our case is a carbon tax. 
This research aims to quantify the impact of a carbon tax in China, including the 
effects on emissions reductions, the macro-economy, sectoral production and 
competiveness, and energy consumption structures. Because the energy sectors are 
the main sources of CO2 emissions, the model in this research emphasizes the energy 
sectors and their linkages to the rest of the economy. According to market theory, 
imposing a carbon tax on carbon energy will change the relative prices of goods. 
Carbon-free or low-carbon-containing goods and services become relatively cheaper 
than those of high carbon content. Such changes in the relative prices will lead to 
shifts away from high-carbon energy and carbon-intensive goods and services to 
low-carbon or carbon-free energy, goods and services. This will in turn have effects 
on the economic structure and on economic growth. Clearly, for analyzing such 
economy-wide effects, CGE models are most appropriate. 
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6.2.3 Carbon tax CGE model  
The CGE model was pioneered by Johansen (1960) and Harberger (1962) and has 
been widely used in analyzing environmental policy since the beginning of the 1990s 
(Bergman 2005). It has been applied around the world in analysing the economic 
effects of limiting CO2 emissions by means of a carbon tax . Examples are the works 
of Kemfert & Welsch (2000) for Germany, Wissema & Dellink (2007) for Ireland, 
Drouet et al. (2006) for Switzerland, Pempetzogloua & Karagiannib (2002) for 
Greece, Timilsina & Shrestha (2002) for Thailand, Al-Amin & Hamid (2009) for 
Malaysia, and Bruvoll & Larsen (2004) for Norway. Some researchers have also 
used a CGE model to simulate the impacts of a carbon tax in China (Garbaccio et al. 
1999; Lu et al. 2010; The Chinese Study Group of Climate Change 2000; Wang et al. 
2009b; Zheng & Fan 1999). Some selected literature on carbon tax CGE models is 
detailed in Table 6.1. 
However, most of the carbon tax CGE research in China focuses on estimating the 
degree of CO2 reductions, the impact on GDP or economic growth or the cushion 
effects of the complementary policies, and ignores the effects on energy structure. 
Zhang (1996) uses a time-recursive dynamic CGE model which emphasizes the 
relationships between economic activity, energy consumption and CO2 emissions to 
analyze the Chinese economy-energy-environment system interactions 
simultaneously at both sectoral and macroeconomic levels. But he does not separate 
the energy sector into carbon and carbon-free sectors in his model and does not 
specifically examine the impact of a carbon tax on energy consumption patterns, 
such as switching from carbon-based energy to clean energy.   
Compared with the existing carbon tax CGE models of the Chinese economy and 
environment, the Chinese carbon tax CGE model in this research provides three 
additional features. First, the electricity sector is divided into thermal power and 
clean energy according to the means of generating electricity, thereby attempting to 
simulate the impacts of a carbon tax on optimizing the energy structure more 
precisely. Second, the energy mix production function employs a constant elasticity 
of substitution (CES) function instead of the Cobb-Douglas function, which 
considers that the substitution elasticity between energy factors may not be equal to 
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one. Third, the energy factors are nested one by one, which both overcomes the 
limitation that every two energy factors have the same substitution elasticity and 
facilitates an investigation of the changes of energy consumption structure. 
Therefore, the CGE approach has been adopted in this research to meet the purpose 
of evaluating the impacts of a carbon tax in China, the results of which could answer 
research Q3 (Is carbon tax a suitable policy for reducing carbon emissions in 
China?). The impacts to be assessed not only include the effects on the CO2 
reductions, the economic growth and the sectoral production and competiveness as 
other works have done, but also will incorporate the effects on the energy 
consumption structure to fill the research gap in China. The next section will 
describe and explain the construction of the Chinese carbon tax CGE model.   
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Table 6.1 Some selected literature on the carbon tax CGE model. 
Literature 
Research 
region 
Research purpose Model type Main findings 
Kemfert & Welsch 
(2000) 
Germany 
Assess the economic effects of CO2 
emission limits for Germany by 
using econometrically estimated 
substitution elasticities between 
energy, capital and labour 
Dynamic multi-sector 
CGE model 
Compared with ‘standard’ substitution elasticities from the literature, it 
finds lower tax rates and tax revenues, and a more stable revenue/GDP 
ratio.  
Wissema & 
Dellink (2007) 
Ireland 
Quantify the impact of the 
implementation of carbon taxation 
to reduce CO2 in Ireland 
Energy-environment-AGE 
model 
A carbon tax of €10-15/ton of CO2 could reduce CO2 emissions in Ireland 
by 25.8% compared to 1998 levels.  
Welfare would fall a bit while production and consumption patterns would 
change more significantly. 
The carbon tax greatly simulates the use of renewable energy and reduces 
the use of peat and coal. 
Drouet et al. 
(2006) 
Switzerlan
d 
Evaluate the impacts of CO2 
constraints on the Swiss economy 
through a carbon tax 
Multi-sectoral, multi-
regional, dynamic-
recursive GEMINI-E3 
model 
A CO2 abatement of 20% by 2020 and 50% by 2050 compared to 1990 
levels could be achieved by US$468 and US$1440 respectively. 
The marginal abatement costs of CO2 emissions are relatively higher in 
Switzerland than in other developed countries.  
Pempetzogloua & 
Karagiannib 
(2002) 
Greece 
Investigate the potential effects of a 
carbon tax on the Greek economy 
Dynamic CGE model 
A carbon tax would decrease energy products demand and the total 
production of Greece, and it would affect competitiveness negatively. 
Energy intensive industries will probably be the most heavily and 
negatively affected industries. 
Timilsina & 
Shrestha (2002) 
Thailand 
Examine the economic and 
environmental impacts of a carbon 
tax in Thailand 
Static CGE model  
If total government revenue is kept neutral, a carbon tax with revenue 
redistributed to households through a lump-sum transfer would cause a 
larger welfare loss than when revenue is used to finance the cuts in pre-
existing distortionary factor tax rates.  
Al-Amin & Hamid 
(2009) 
Malaysia 
Simulate the economic impacts of a 
carbon tax policy in Malaysia 
Static CGE model  
The carbon tax policy could achieve reasonable environment targets without 
losing the investment and government revenue. 
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Literature 
Research 
region 
Research purpose Model type Main findings 
Bruvoll & Larsen 
(2004) 
Norway 
Evaluate the specific effect of 
carbon tax in Norway 
Static AGE model  
The carbon tax effect has been modest despite considerable taxes and price 
increases for some fuel-types. 
Due to extensive tax exemptions and relatively inelastic demand in the 
carbon taxation sectors, the carbon tax contributed to only 2% reductions in 
emissions. 
Zhang (1996) China 
Estimate the economic implications 
of carbon abatement for the 
Chinese economy 
Time-recursive dynamic 
CGE model 
Large carbon reductions can only be achieved by ever-larger carbon tax. 
If the carbon tax revenues were used to offset the indirect taxes, the 
negative impacts of carbon tax on GNP and welfare would be reduced. 
Garbaccio et al. 
(1999) 
China 
Examine the use of carbon taxes to 
reduce CO2 emissions in China 
Dynamic CGE model 
There is a potential of ‘double dividend’, a decrease in CO2 and a long run 
increase in GDP and consumption. 
Lu et al. (2010) China 
Explore the impact of carbon tax 
on Chinese economy and the 
cushion effects of the 
complementary policies 
Dynamic recursive CGE 
model 
The carbon tax policy can largely reduce the carbon emissions with a 
relatively small impact on the GDP. 
And the complementary policies used together with carbon tax will help to 
reduce the negative impacts of a carbon tax on economy. 
Wang et al. 
(2009b) 
China 
Simulate the impacts of carbon tax 
on Chinese economy, especially on 
energy saving and carbon 
reductions 
IPAC-SGM CGE model 
(Integrated policy analysis 
model for China-second 
generation model) 
A low-rate carbon tax will significantly reduce carbon emissions while 
having little impact on Chinse economy. 
Liang (2007) China 
Simulate the impacts of a carbon 
tax policy in China 
Recursive dynamic CGE 
model 
By relieving or subsidizing production sectors, the negative impact of 
carbon tax on the economy and on the energy- and trade-intensive sectors 
could be alleviated. 
The Chinese Study 
Group of Climate 
Change (2000) 
China 
Compute the impacts of carbon tax 
on the economy 
CGE model 
Low-intensity carbon tax policy will not significantly slow down economic 
growth. But it can effectively reduce the carbon emissions and the growth of 
energy consumption, and improve the energy consumption structure. 
Zheng & Fan 
(1999) 
China 
Assess the impacts of limiting CO2 
emissions on Chinese economy by 
a means of carbon tax  
A static CGE model 
The cost of mitigating CO2 emissions by carbon tax depends on the 
emissions reduction target, the reaction time of carbon tax and other 
complementary policies, such as whether other taxes are reduced.  
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6.3   Chinese carbon tax CGE model 
On the basis of the research purpose, a static, multi-sectoral, open economy carbon 
tax CGE model of the Chinese economy has been developed. It uses data from 2007 
and covers eleven economic sectors. Dynamic CGE models are argued to have more 
advantages than general static CGE models: they not only tell the researcher what 
the new long-run equilibrium is and what the impact of the policy changes is (as 
static CGE models do), but they also indicate how long the economy will take to get 
the new equilibrium (Wajsman 1995). But a static CGE model is believed to be 
enough for analysing the shock of a carbon tax on an economy in this research. This 
research focuses on the impact of levying a carbon tax rather than how it is achieved. 
In other words, this research does not care about the transit from one equilibrium to 
another, so there is not much difference between dynamic and static CGE models. 
Moreover, a dynamic CGE model needs much more data to support it, which may 
use more estimated data when resolving the model and in turn reduces the reliability 
of the model results. In addition, the researcher has limited time and resources.  
The carbon tax CGE model in this research considers four agents: households, 
enterprises, government and foreign countries. The three basic types of production 
factors involved are labour, capital and energy, while energy is further divided into 
coal, oil, natural gas, thermal power and clean energy. The first four kinds of energy 
are considered as carbon energy and clean energy is the carbon-free energy. The 
economic system is grouped into eleven sectors on the basis of the standard 42 
sectors used in China’s 2007 Input-output (I/O) table (see Table 6.2 for the sector 
classification). Sectors 1–6 are associated with the production of goods and services, 
while Sectors 7–11 relate to the supply and distribution of energy. The model is 
made up of eight modules: production, price, income, expenditure, saving and 
investment, trade, environment and market equilibrium. 
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Table 6.2 Classification of producing sectors in the CGE model based on the 
2007 input-output table 
Sectors in Chinese carbon tax CGE model 42-Sector in I/O table 
1. Agriculture 01 
2. Heavy industry 04, 05, 12–22 
3. Light industry  06-10 
4. Transport and communications 27, 28 
5. Construction 26 
6. Services 24, 25, 29–42 
7. Coal 02 
8. Oil  03a, 11 
9. Natural gas 03b 
10. Thermal power 23c 
11. Clean energy (hydropower, nuclear power, 
wind power) 
23
d
 
a & b: The natural gas sector is part of the oil sector. It is separated from the oil sector using the 
China Statistical Yearbook 2008. 
c & d: The clean energy sector is part of the electricity sector. It is separated from the electricity 
sector using the Electricity Balance Table in the China Statistical Yearbook 2008. According to the 
way of generating electricity, the electricity sector could be divided into thermal power, hydropower, 
nuclear power and wind power. The last three kinds of electricity are classified in the clean energy 
sector in this research.  
It is assumed that the market is made up of numerous producers with the same 
pursuance and the goal for each producer is profit maximization in production. All 
households are consumers and are maximizing their consumption utility. The market 
is perfectly competitive and both producers and consumers are price takers. The 
capital stock in each sector can flow among sectors in every single year. The labour 
force is fully employed and is capable of floating freely from one sector to another. 
As a ‘small country’21, China is assumed to take international prices.  
The set of all the activity sectors is I, and the set of all the commodity sectors is J. 
Each activity sector is assumed to produce one commodity. In describing the 
equations, the endogenous variables are written in upper-case Latin letters without a 
bar, whereas the exogenous variables are denoted by upper-case Latin letters with a 
bar and the parameters are indicated by lower-case Latin letters or lower-case Greek 
letters. The meaning of a symbol is explained on the first use. Table 6.3 gives a 
                                                 
21
 ‘Small country’ assumption: for a modelled country or region, there are imports from outside of the 
economic system. For all its imports, the assumed share of the modelled economy in the world trade 
is so small that it faces an infinitely elastic supply curve at the prevailing world price (Lu et al. 2009). 
Though China may have influence on the price of some products, this assumption is necessary as it 
makes the modelling job easier.  
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summary of all the equations of this Chinese carbon tax CGE model. Moreover, 
Table 6.4 lists all the variables and parameters involved in this model. 
6.3.1 Production 
All sectors are assumed to operate at constant returns to scale. In each sector the 
gross output is produced using capital, labour, five energy inputs and intermediate 
inputs, with the substitution taking place across energy inputs, capital and labour. 
But there is no substitution between intermediate inputs and other inputs (e.g., labour, 
capital and energy) and among intermediate inputs. The production functions in the 
model take the CES functional form, except the composition function of non-energy 
intermediate inputs that takes the Leontief functional form.  
The nesting hierarchy of the CGE model is depicted in Figure 6.2. Starting from the 
bottom, the production function is characterized by CES aggregations of oil, natural 
gas, coal, thermal power and clean energy one-by-one to form an energy mix. 
Capital and energy are combined to form a capital-energy mix. Then, the capital-
energy mix and labour are combined to form a labour-capital-energy mix. Finally, all 
the non-energy intermediate inputs along with labour-capital-energy mix generate 
the total outputs. These nested production functions and their corresponding input 
ratio functions can be expressed as follows: 
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Figure 6.2 Nesting structure of production in the CGE model 
        
    
      
  
 
      
      
  
 
 
 
  
 
      
where 
      - Input of NG-oil mix in sector i 
     - Input of natural gas in sector i 
    - Input of oil in sector i 
  
  - Transforming coefficient in the NG-oil mix function of sector i 
  
  - Share of natural gas in the NG-oil mix function of sector i 
  
  - Substitution parameter between natural gas and oil in sector i. In addition,   
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    - Price of energy type j, j equals to 7,8,9,10,11. So     indicates the price of oil 
and     denotes the price of natural gas 
       
    
       
  
 
      
      
  
 
 
 
  
 
      
where 
     - Input of fossil energy mix in sector i 
    - Input of coal in sector i 
  
  - Transforming coefficient in the fossil energy mix function of sector i 
  
  - Share of NG-oil mix in the fossil energy mix function of sector i 
  
  - Substitution parameter between NG-oil mix and coal in sector i 
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      - Price of NG-oil mix in sector i 
    - Price of coal 
       
    
      
  
 
      
       
  
 
 
 
  
 
      
where 
     - Input of electricity mix in sector i 
     - Input of thermal power in sector i 
     - Input of clean energy in sector i 
  
  - Transforming coefficient in the electricity function of sector i 
  
  - Share of thermal power in the electricity function of sector i 
  
  - Substitution parameter between thermal power and clean energy in sector i 
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     - Price of thermal power  
     - Price of clean energy 
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     - Input of energy mix in sector i 
  
  - Transforming coefficient in the energy mix function of sector i 
  
  - Share of fossil energy in the energy mix function of sector i 
  
 - Substitution parameter between fossil energy and electricity in sector i 
    
    
  
  
 
    
  
    
     
 
 
    
 
     
where 
     - Price of electricity mix in sector i 
     - Price of fossil energy mix in sector i 
        
    
      
  
 
      
       
  
 
 
 
  
 
      
where 
      - Input of capital-energy mix in sector i 
     - Input of capital in sector i 
  
  - Transforming coefficient in the capital-energy mix function of sector i 
  
   - Share of capital in the capital-energy mix function of sector i 
  
  - Substitution parameter between capital and energy in sector i 
    
    
  
  
 
    
  
    
          
 
 
    
 
     
where 
     - Price of energy mix in sector i 
   - Price of capital (the rental rate) 
   - Value-added tax rate for capital 
         
    
      
  
 
      
        
  
 
 
 
  
 
      
where 
       - Input of labour-capital-energy mix in sector i 
     - Input of labour in sector i 
  
 - Transforming coefficient in the labour-capital-energy mix function of sector i 
  
  - Share of labour in the labour-capital-energy mix function of sector i 
  
 - Substitution parameter between labour and capital-energy mix in sector i 
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where 
   - Price of labour (wage rate) 
      - Price of capital-energy mix in sector i 
   - Value-added tax rate for labour 
    ∑      
 
   
              
where 
    - Aggregate output in sector i  
       - Intermediate input of commodity j in sector i 
                         
where 
      - The intermediate input of j for each unit of output in sector i 
6.3.2 Price 
The price module describes all the price functions in the model: the prices of energy 
types, NG-oil mix, fossil energy, electricity, energy mix, capital-energy mix and 
labor-capital-energy mix, the aggregate producer price, the imports and exports price, 
the composite price and sale price of commodity. The introduction of a carbon tax on 
energy would in turn increase the price of energy. Assume that the producers transfer 
all the carbon tax to the corresponding energy. So after levying a carbon tax, the new 
price of the energy includes the relative carbon tax. This process could be written as 
    (       )                     
where 
      - ad valorem carbon tax rate of energy type j. It is converted from a given 
carbon tax rate. See the environment module for more details.  
Price of NG-oil mix: 
                                  
Price of fossil energy: 
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Price of electricity: 
                                   
Price of energy mix: 
                                   
Price of capital-energy mix: 
                                          
Price of labor-capital-energy mix 
                                              
where 
       - Price of labour-capital-energy mix in sector i 
         ∑(       )
 
   
                     
where 
    - Aggregate producer price in sector i 
    - Sale price of commodity j in domestic market 
According to the ‘small-country’ assumption, Chinese takes the world market prices 
of imports and exports (     and     ). The world market prices are in US dollars, 
then the exchange rate represents the price of a dollar in terms of the Chinese 
currency (RMB¥). 
         (     )           
where 
    - Domestic price of imports of commodity j (in RMB¥) 
    - Exchange rate between US$ and RMB¥ 
     - World price of imports of commodity j (in US$) 
    - Import tariff rate of commodity j  
In order to encourage exports, the export tariff rates for commodities are normally 
zero. Thus the domestic prices of exports can be written as 
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where 
     - Domestic price of exports in sector i (in RMB¥)) 
     - World price of exports in sector i (in US$) 
The producer price in sector i can be written as weighted average of  
                                  
where 
     - Domestic price for commodity produced in sector i 
     - Total domestic demand for commodity produced in sector i 
     -  Exports in sector i  
The sale price for commodity j in the domestic market,    , is the price paid by the 
domestic demanders. It is specified as  
                               
where 
    - Total demand of commodity j in domestic market 
     - Demand price for commodity j produced and sold domestically 
     - Total domestic demand for domestic commodity j 
    - Imports of commodity j 
As it is assumed that one activity sector only produces one commodity, the price and 
quantity of activity and commodity that is produced and sold domestically are the 
same. The relationship can be described as 
     ∑       
 
      
     ∑       
 
      
where 
        - Elements of unit matrix 
6.3.3 Incomes 
The income module includes four parts: household, enterprise (pre-tax) and 
government incomes and gross domestic production (GDP). Total household income 
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is generated from four sources: labor income; distributed capital income from 
enterprises; transfers from enterprises; and transfers from the government. In the 
context of carbon tax, a part of the carbon tax revenues may be redistributed to 
households for compensating the loss they suffered from the carbon tax. Thus the 
household income function can be written as 
                                                       
where 
   - Household income 
    - Labour supply 
    - Capital supply 
   - Total carbon revenue 
       - Share of total capital income for households 
          - Transfer payment from government to households 
       - Ratio of the carbon tax revenue redistributed to households 
The enterprise pre-tax income includes capital income distributed to enterprises and 
transfer payment from the government to the enterprises, and excludes transfer 
payment from the enterprises to the households. 
                                            
where 
     - Enterprise pre-tax income  
          - Transfer payment from government to enterprises 
          - Transfer payment from enterprises to households 
The revenues collected by the government include value-added tax on labour and 
capital, individual income tax, enterprise income tax, tariffs, and net foreign 
borrowing. With a carbon tax, there would be additional government revenue. The 
government revenue can thus be expressed as 
   ∑                       
   
                  
 ∑              
   
     (        )                
where 
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   - Government income 
    - Individual income tax rate 
      - Enterprise income tax rate 
          - Net foreign borrowing  
The total economic level in China is measured by real GDP, calculated in the 
expenditure method: GDP = household consumption + government purchase + 
investment + net exports (exports - imports). Thus the real GDP function can be 
written as  
    ∑(      ̅̅ ̅̅       ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  ̅     )
   
 ∑    
   
 
where 
    - Real gross domestic production of China                                     
    - Household consumption of commodity j (in quantity) 
  ̅̅ ̅̅   - Government purchase of commodity j (in quantity) 
    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  ̅ - The quantity investment of commodity j 
Nominal GDP can be expressed as  
    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅      ∑    (        ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  ̅     )
   
 ∑         
   
 ∑        
   
 ∑             
   
    
where 
    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ - Price index of GDP, it is chosen as the basic price in this model, so     ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ = 
1. 
6.3.4 Expenditure 
The expenditure module determines the demands for goods and services by 
households and the government. Household disposable income is the household 
income minus individual income tax. Household expenditure is determined by the 
disposable income and marginal propensity to consume (MPC). The utility function 
for households employs the Cob-Douglas function, thus the households’ expenditure 
for commodity j can be expressed as 
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where 
      - Share parameter of household expenditure on commodity j  
    - Marginal propensity to consume  
Government expenditure consists of the purchase for commodities and government 
transfers to households and enterprises. The quantity of government purchase of each 
commodity is set exogenously. The government expenditure can be written as  
   ∑      ̅̅ ̅̅  
   
                      
where 
   - Government expenditure (in money) 
6.3.5 Saving and investment 
The saving functions describe the formation of household saving, enterprise saving 
and government saving. Household saving is a function of marginal propensity to 
save (MPS) and household disposable income.  
                         
where 
     - Household saving 
Enterprise saving equals the enterprise pre-tax income minus the enterprise income 
tax. 
                      
where 
       - Enterprise saving 
Government saving is a function of government income and government expenditure. 
           
where 
GSAV - Government saving 
The quantity of investment is determined outside the model (Chang 2010).   
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     ∑        ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  ̅
     
   
     - Total investment (in money) 
6.3.6 Trade 
Constant elasticity of transformation (CET) function is used to allocate domestic 
products between domestic consumption and exports (Chang 2010; Zhang 1996).  
      
    
      
  
 
      
       
  
 
 
 
  
 
      
where 
  
  - Transforming coefficient in the CET function of sector i 
  
  - Share parameter in the CET function of sector i 
  
  - Substitution parameter between domestic consumption and exports in sector i 
    
    
   
  
 
    
  
    
    
 
 
    
 
      
The relationship between imported products and domestic supply is described by the 
Armington assumption (1969), as they are not completely the same and are partly 
substitutable. 
      
 
   
  
    
  
 
      
  
    
  
 
 
 
 
 
      
where 
  
 
 - Transforming coefficient in the Armington function of commodity j 
  
  
- Share parameter in the Armington function of commodity j 
  
 
 - Substitution parameter between domestic supply and imports of commodity j  
    
   
    
  
 
    
  
   
    
 
 
   
 
 
      
 6.3.7 The environment 
The carbon tax is an excise tax, which is expressed as a fixed amount of Chinese 
currency per tonne of carbon emissions. Therefore the fuel-specific tax rates differ 
considerably between different types of fossil energy due to different carbon 
contents. In this research, it is assumed that the carbon tax is applied to the 
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production of three kinds of fossil energy
22
 – coal, oil and natural gas. Moreover, the 
carbon tax is levied on domestically used fossil energy. Thus exported fossil energy 
is exempt from carbon tax while imported fossil energy is included in a carbon tax. 
The carbon emissions from each fossil energy sector are estimated by the 
intermediate consumption and final household consumption of this energy. The 
equations of carbon emissions from the coal, oil and natural gas sectors can be 
expressed respectively as follows 
23
 (Zheng & Fan 1999). 
     ∑   
   
   ̅̅ ̅̅           
     ∑   
   
   ̅̅ ̅̅           
     ∑    
   
   ̅̅ ̅̅           
where 
    - Carbon emissions of energy type j 
  ̅̅ ̅̅   - Household consumption of energy type j (in quantity) 
    - Carbon emissions coefficient of energy type j, tC/t for coal and oil, and tC/m
3 
for natural gas  
   - Conversion coefficient of energy type j (considering burning ratio and inefficient 
loss)  
Revenue generated from the carbon tax for each fossil energy sector can be 
estimated as  
                          
                                                 
22
 There are two bases of levying a carbon tax: consumption and production. If the carbon tax was 
based on the consumption of energy, there would be a double taxation. For example, the transport 
sector emits CO2 because of using petrol, and then a carbon tax could be imposed based on the carbon 
content of petrol. But if oil, the input for producing petrol, was taxed then double taxation occurs. 
Thus we should only tax direct burning fossil energy. However, this makes it difficult for carbon tax 
collection as we need to classify the fossil energy either as final goods or as intermediate inputs. The 
input-output table is not detailed enough for adopting this kind of carbon tax. Compared to a 
consumption-based carbon tax, the production-based carbon tax is much easier to handle. In this 
research, we tax all the carbon content of the fossil energy, but not all the carbon content will go into 
the air in the form of CO2. For example, when oil is used to produce plastic, the carbon in the plastic 
does not form into CO2. However, one point that should be noted is that if all the fossil energy is burnt, 
the final result of both tax approaches is the same (Zheng & Fan 1999). 
23
 In order to keep the expression of the model consistent, the equations of carbon emissions from the 
thermal power and clean energy sectors should be given as well. However, as the carbon tax does not 
cover the carbon emissions from thermal power and clean energy, the emissions from these sectors 
are considered zero and the relative equations are omitted.  
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where 
    - Carbon revenue of energy type j 
   - Carbon tax rate, expressed as a fixed amount of Chinese currency per tonne of 
carbon 
Carbon tax is exogenous to the model. Based on the given level of a carbon tax, an 
ad valorem carbon tax rate of each energy type is calculated as follows: 
      
   
                 
                
6.3.8 Market equilibrium 
The market equilibrium module consists of product market, labor market, capital 
market and foreign saving equilibria and the equilibrium in the saving and 
investment market. This model adopts the ‘neoclassical’ closure, which means that 
all the prices are perfectly elastic and are decided by the model. Factors such as 
capital are fully used and the labour force is in full employment. Savings are 
transferred into investment. The model employing these closure conditions is also 
called a ‘saving-driven’ model (Chang 2010). 
Product market equilibrium implies that the supply of commodity j in a domestic 
market must equal the total domestic demand for commodity j. Specifically, the total 
domestic demand for commodity j includes intermediate input, household 
consumption, government purchase and investment of commodity j. 
    ∑      
   
       ̅̅ ̅̅       ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  ̅        
With the assumption of full employment, the labour market clears when the total 
labour demand equals the total available labour force. As it is assumed that the 
capital is fully used, the capital market clears when total capital demand is equal to 
the total available capital stock. 
       ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ 
∑    
   
    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ 
where 
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   ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ - Total available labour force 
       ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  
∑    
   
    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  
where 
   ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  - Total available capital stock 
Foreign savings refers to the difference between total value outflow (e.g., imports of 
goods and services) from the country and the total value inflow (e.g., exports and 
transfers from the rest of the world) to the country. As foreign savings are set 
exogenously, the equilibrating variable for this equation is the exchange rate (EXR). 
Through movements in EXR that affect import and export prices, equilibrium can be 
achieved. This foreign savings equilibrium equation can be expressed as    
    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅  ∑         
   
∑         
   
               
where 
    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ - Savings in foreign country (in US$) 
Equilibrium in the saving and investment market implies that the aggregate 
investment is equal to the total saving. The total saving consists of household, 
enterprise and government savings and savings in foreign countries. As this equation 
is mathematically unnecessary, a virtual variable, VBIS, is added. If the model is 
correct, the value of VBIS should be zero or close to zero. 
                              ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅       
Table 6.3 The Chinese carbon tax CGE model (summary) 
Equations   
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Thermal power/clean energy 
input ratio 
(7)         
    
     
 
  
 
      
      
 
  
 
 
 
  
 
      Energy mix function 
(8)  
    
    
  
  
 
    
  
    
     
 
 
    
 
     
Fossil energy/electricity input 
ratio 
(9)           
    
     
 
  
 
      
      
 
  
 
 
 
  
 
      Capital-energy mix function 
(10)  
    
    
  
  
 
    
  
    
         
 
 
    
 
     Capital/energy input ratio 
(11)           
    
     
 
  
 
      
       
 
  
 
 
 
  
 
      
Labour-capital-energy mix 
function 
(12)  
    
     
    
  
 
    
  
     
        
 
 
    
 
     
Labour/capital-energy input 
ratio 
(13)                           Intermediate input function 
(14)      ∑       
 
                 Aggregate output function 
  
Prices   
(15)                                  Price of energy type j 
(16)                                    Price of NG-oil mix 
(17)                                     Price of fossil energy mix 
(18)                                     Price of electricity mix 
(19)                                     Price of energy mix 
(20)                                        
    
Price of capital-energy mix 
(21)                                     
           
Price of labour-capital-energy 
mix 
(22)           ∑             
 
                      
  
Aggregate producer price 
(23)           (     )           Price of imports 
(24)                     Price of exports 
(25)                                   Composite price in sector i 
(26)                                 Sale price of commodity j 
(27)       ∑               Quantity conversion 
(28)       ∑               Price conversion 
  
Income   
(29)                                    
                    
Household income 
(30)                        ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅                       Enterprise income 
(31)     ∑                                   
           ∑                       (        )  
                 
Government income 
(32)      ∑ (      ̅̅ ̅̅        ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  ̅     )    ∑         Real GDP 
(33)      ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅      ∑     (        ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  ̅     )    
∑              ∑            ∑             
        
Nominal GDP 
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Expenditure   
(34)                                    Household consumption 
(35)     ∑       ̅̅ ̅̅                          Government expenditure 
  
Investment and capital formation   
(36)                          Household saving 
(37)                        Enterprise saving 
(38)             Government saving 
(39)       ∑         ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  ̅      Total investment 
  
Trade   
(40)        
    
     
 
  
 
      
      
 
  
 
 
 
  
 
      CET function 
(41)  
    
    
   
  
 
    
  
    
    
 
 
    
 
      Export/domestic demand ratio 
(42)        
 
   
  
   
 
 
 
 
      
  
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
      Armington function 
(43 )  
    
   
    
  
 
   
 
  
   
    
 
 
   
 
 
      Import/domestic supply ratio 
  
Environment   
(44)      ∑          ̅̅ ̅̅           Carbon emissions of coal sector 
(45)      ∑          ̅̅ ̅̅           Carbon emissions of oil sector  
(46)      ∑           ̅̅ ̅̅           
Carbon emissions of natural gas 
sector  
(47)                            Carbon revenue of energy type j 
(48)        
   
                
                
Ad valorem tax rate of energy 
type j 
  
Market equilibrium   
(49)      ∑                 ̅̅ ̅̅       ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  ̅      Commodity equilibrium 
(50)         ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ Full employment assumption  
(51)  ∑            ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅  Labour market equilibrium  
(52)         ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  Capital fully used assumption 
(53)  ∑            ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  Capital market equilibrium  
(54)      ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅  ∑             ∑                        
    
Foreign saving equilibrium 
(55)                                ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅       Saving-investment equilibrium 
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Table 6.4 List of variables and parameters  
Endogenous variables: 
    Price of energy type j 
     Input of natural gas in sector i 
    Input of oil in sector i 
      Input of NG-oil mix in sector i 
      Price of NG-oil mix in sector i 
    Input of coal in sector i 
     Price of fossil energy mix in sector i 
     Input of fossil energy mix in sector i 
     Input of thermal power in sector i 
     Input of clean energy in sector i 
     Input of electricity mix in sector i 
     Price of electricity mix in sector i 
     Input of energy mix in sector i 
     Price of energy mix in sector i 
     Input of capital in sector i 
   Price of capital (the rental rate) 
      Input of capital-energy mix in sector i 
      Price of capital-energy mix in sector i 
     Input of labour in sector i 
   Price of labour (wage rate) 
       Input of labour-capital-energy mix in sector i 
       Price of labour-capital-energy mix in sector i 
    Aggregate output in sector i  
    Aggregate producer price in sector i 
     Total domestic demand for commodity produced in sector i 
     Domestic price for commodity produced in sector i 
     Exports in sector i 
     Domestic price of exports in sector i (in RMB¥) 
    Total demand of commodity j in domestic market 
    Sale price of commodity j in domestic market 
     Total domestic demand for domestic commodity j 
     Demand price for commodity j produced and sold domestically 
    Imports of commodity j 
    Domestic price of imports of commodity j (in RMB¥) 
   Household income 
QLS Labour supply 
QKS Capital supply 
     Enterprise pre-tax income 
   Government income 
    Real gross domestic production of China                                     
    Household consumption of commodity j (in quantity) 
    Exchange rate 
   Government expenditure (in money) 
     Household saving 
       Enterprise saving 
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     Government saving 
     Total investment (in money) 
    Carbon emissions of energy type j 
    Carbon revenue of energy type j 
      Ad valorem tax rate of energy type j 
       Intermediate input of commodity j in sector i 
VBIS Visual variable 
Exogenous variables: 
  ̅̅ ̅̅   Government purchase of commodity j (in quantity) 
    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  ̅ The quantity investment of commodity j 
    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ Saving in foreign country (in US$) 
  ̅̅ ̅̅   Household consumption of energy type j (in quantity) 
   ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ Total available labour force 
   ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  Total available capital stock 
    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ Price index of GDP 
Parameters: 
  
  Substitution parameter between natural gas and oil in sector i 
  
  Substitution parameter between NG-oil mix and coal in sector i 
  
  Substitution parameter between thermal power and clean energy in sector i 
  
  Substitution parameter between fossil energy and electricity in sector i 
  
  Substitution parameter between capital and energy in sector i 
  
  Substitution parameter between labour and capital-energy mix in sector i 
 
 
  
Substitution parameter between domestic consumption and exports in 
sector i 
 
 
 
 
Substitution parameter between domestic supply and imports of 
commodity j 
  
  Transforming coefficient in the NG-oil mix function of sector i 
  
  Transforming coefficient in the fossil energy mix function of sector i 
  
  Transforming coefficient in the electricity function of sector i 
  
  Transforming coefficient in the energy mix function of sector i 
  
  Transforming coefficient in the capital-energy mix function for sector i 
  
  
Transforming coefficient in the labour-capital-energy mix function for 
sector i 
  
  Transforming coefficient in the CET function of sector i 
  
 
 Transforming coefficient in the Armington function of commodity j 
  
   Share of natural gas in the NG-oil mix function of sector i 
  
   Share of NG-oil mix in the fossil energy mix function of sector i 
  
   Share of thermal power in the electricity function of sector i 
  
   Share of fossil energy in the energy mix function of sector i 
  
  
 Share of capital in the capital-energy mix function of sector i 
  
  
 Share of labour in the labour-capital-energy mix function of sector i 
  
  
 Share parameter in the CET function of sector i 
  
  
 Share parameter in the Armington function of commodity j 
    The intermediate input of commodity j for each unit of output in sector i 
        Elements of unit matrix 
     World price of imports of commodity j (in US$) 
     World price of exports in sector i (in US$) 
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       Ratio of the carbon tax revenues redistributed to household                                     
    Carbon emissions coefficient of energy type j 
 
 
 Conversion coefficient of energy type j 
   Carbon tax rate 
   Capital value-added tax rate 
   Labour value-added tax rate 
    Individual income tax rate  
      Enterprise income tax rate  
    Import tariff rate of commodity j 
       Share of total capital income for household 
      Share parameter of household expenditure on commodity j 
          Transfer payment from government to households 
          Transfer payment from government to enterprises 
          Transfer payment from enterprises to households 
          Net foreign borrowing 
    Marginal propensity to consume 
6.4   Data for the CGE model 
6.4.1 Theory and structure of the social accounting matrix  
A social accounting matrix (SAM) is the matrix expressive form of the System of 
National Accounts
24
 (Duan 2004; SNA). It is a square matrix consisting of a series of 
accounts for various agents, capturing disaggregated economic activities and their 
interactions in an economy (Xie 1995). Keuning (1994, p. 22) defines SAM as ‘the 
presentation of a sequence of accounts in a matrix that elaborates the 
interrelationships between economic flows (and stocks), by adopting in each account 
the most relevant statistical unit and classification of these units’. The major data 
source for SAM is the I/O table. It is the cornerstone of the CGE model. 
Each row and column in a SAM represents income and expenditure accounts 
respectively which must balance with each other. The matrix implies costs (including 
distributed earnings) exhaust revenues for producers, expenditures (including taxes 
and savings) are equal to incomes in the model, and demand equals supply of each 
commodity (Robinson et al. 1990). Table 6.5 provides a representative SAM 
framework. It consists of nine accounts: activities, commodities, labour, capital, 
                                                 
24
 The United Union SNA formulates four expression approaches for the national accounting: graphic 
approach, balance report approach, account balance sheet and matrix approach. The first two methods 
are the initial form, and the account balance sheet is the basic form while the matrix balance sheet is 
the advanced form of accounting (Duan 2004). 
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household, enterprise, government, saving-investment and foreign countries. As can 
be seen, a SAM not only includes standard I/O parts (i.e., the relationship between 
activities and commodities), but also contains information about two factors of 
production (labour and capital), four institutions (household, enterprise, government 
and foreign countries) and so on. The equilibrium conditions covered in this 
representative SAM are: 
Total production by activity = total input of that activity; 
Total domestic demand for each commodity = total domestic supply of that 
commodity; 
Labour factor income = labour factor expenditure; 
Capital factor income = capital factor expenditure; 
Total household income = total household expenditure; 
Enterprise income = enterprise expenditure; 
Government income = government expenditure; 
Total saving = total investment; 
Foreign income = foreign expenditure. 
Roberts (1994) argues that the main usefulness of the SAM approach is to bring 
together the accounts of various economic agents to examine their behaviour in a 
consistent framework. In this research, the core role of a SAM is to provide a 
balanced, closed and consistent data set for parameters calibration in a CGE model. 
Furthermore, the SAM in a CGE model can be used to analyse the economic 
structure. SAM not only provides a full picture of the whole economy at the macro 
level, but it also reflects the internal structure of the economy at the divided level. In 
addition, SAM is employed in doing comparison analysis of the model results. 
Considering SAM as the benchmark equilibrium, the results analysis of most of  
CGE models is to evaluate the impacts level by comparing the divergence of SAM in 
different scenarios (Duan 2004). 
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Table 6.5 A representative social accounting matrix 
 
1  
Activities 
2 
Commodities 
3  
Labour 
4  
Capital 
5  
Household 
6  
Enterprise 
7 
Government 
8 
Saving- 
investment 
9 
Foreign 
countries 
10  
Total 
1 
Activities 
 
Domestic 
supply 
      Exports 
Total 
production 
2 
Commodities 
Intermediate 
input 
   
Household 
consumption 
 
Government 
purchase 
Fixed investment 
and changes in 
stock 
 Total demand 
3 
Labour 
Labour  
value-added 
        
Labour factor 
income 
4 
Capital 
Capital  
value-added 
        
Capital factor 
income 
5 
Household 
  
Labour 
income 
Capital 
income 
 
Enterprise 
transfers to 
labour 
Government 
transfers to 
household 
  
Total 
household 
income 
6 
Enterprise 
   
Capital 
income 
  
Government 
transfers to 
enterprise 
  
Enterprise 
income 
7 
Government 
Indirect tax Tariff   
Personal 
income tax 
Enterprise 
income tax 
  
Net foreign 
borrowing 
Government 
income 
8 
Saving-
investment 
    
Household 
saving 
Enterprise 
Saving 
Government 
saving 
 
Net foreign 
saving 
Total saving 
9 
Foreign 
countries 
 Imports        
Foreign 
exchange 
expenditure 
10 
Total 
Total input Total supply 
Labour 
factor 
expenditure 
Capital 
factor 
expenditure 
Total 
household 
expenditure 
Enterprise 
expenditure 
Government 
expenditure 
Total investment 
Foreign 
exchange 
income 
 
153 
 
6.4.2 Construction of the social accounting matrix  
Normally, there are three steps in constructing the SAM (Duan 2004). The first step 
is to construct a sector-assembled macro SAM, which provides a consistent macro 
economy framework. Then, according to the research purpose, the assembled sector 
is divided into several sectors to form a divided SAM. During the division process, 
the value of the unit in the macro SAM controls the value in the split vectors. Finally, 
if the accounts in the divided SAM are unbalanced, some assumptions or treatment 
technology, such as RAS, Maximun Cross Entrophy (MCE) etc., need to be 
employed to make them balance.  
SAM starts with an I/O table. Based on the latest published ‘Input-output Table of 
China in 2007’ (http://www.iochina.org.cn/Download/xgxz.html) and completed by 
the China Statistical Yearbook 2008, a macro SAM of China in 2007 is constructed 
(Table 6.6). The meaning and data source for each unit of the macro SAM are further 
explained in Appendix 11. The macro SAM presented in Table 6.6 is a balanced 
SAM. As there is not too much difference between the row sum and the column sum 
in the original SAM and the author knows the comparative reliability of each data, 
the China 2007 SAM in this research is balanced by hand. This method also has been 
justified by Chang (2010).  
Then, the activities and commodities accounts in the macro SAM are separated into 
eleven sectors to form a divided SAM (see Table 6.2 for sectors classification). Most 
of the data required for the divided SAM are obtained from the ‘Input-output Table 
of China in 2007’. Meanwhile, the value of each unit in the macro SAM is 
considered as the sum of the spilt vectors and used to control the balance of the 
divided SAM. The final equilibrium of the divided SAM is adjusted manually as 
well.  
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Table 6.6 China social accounting matrix in 2007 
  
1  
Activity  
2 
Commodity  
3  
Labour  
4  
Capital  
5 
Household  
6 
Enterprise  
7 
Government  
8  
Saving-
investment  
9  
Foreign 
countries  
10  
Total  
1  
Activity   
712697.18 
      
106161.78 818858.96 
2 
Commodity  
552815.15 
   
96552.62 
 
35190.92 110919.42 
 
795478.11 
3  
Labour 
110047.30 
        
110047.30 
4  
Capital  
117477.79 
        
117477.79 
5  
Household    
110047.30 8979.60 
 
39641.20 9095.50 
  
167763.60 
6  
Enterprise     
108498.19 
  
882.90 
  
109381.09 
7 
Government  
38518.72 1426.66 
  
13997.58 8779.25 
  
3466.68 66188.90 
8  
Saving-
investment  
    
57213.40 60960.64 21019.58 
 
-28274.20 110919.42 
9  
Foreign 
countries  
 
81354.26 
       
81354.26 
10  
Total  
818858.96 795478.11 110047.30 117477.79 167763.60 109381.09 66188.90 110919.42 81354.26 
 
Note: Unit = 1×10
8
 RMB¥ 
Data source: constructed by the author                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
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6.4.3 Parameters and exogenous variables  
In addition to the data obtained from the SAM, parameters of the model need to be 
estimated. The econometric and calibration approaches are two alternative parameter 
estimation methods (Xie 1995). The econometric approach estimates the parameters 
of CGE models by using time series data in statistical methods (Jorgenson 1984). 
The calibration approach determines parameter values by using the equilibrium 
conditions of the model and the benchmark year equilibrium data set (Zhang 1996). 
Due to factors such as insufficient data, computing resources constraints and so on, 
the econometric approach has not been used regularly by CGE model builders 
(Adams & Higgs 1990). Mansur & Whalley (1984) compare these two approaches 
thoroughly and conclude that the calibration approach is simpler, much less 
demanding of data and easier to use than the econometric approach. In practice, 
using single-observation data for parameters specification is very common in CGE 
modelling (Roberts 1994).  
Therefore, due to the lack of time series data in China, a calibration approach is 
applied in this research to estimate some parameters. The parameters that need to be 
calibrated by the divided SAM include the share parameters and transform 
coefficients in all the CES production functions, CET function and Armington 
function, I/O coefficient, tax rates, share parameters of the income and expenditure, 
transfer payments, import and export prices and MPC. In addition, some exogenous 
variables such as foreign savings, total available labour force, total available capital 
stock etc. are also defined as parameters in the Generalized Algebraic Modeling 
System (GAMS)
25
 and need to be calibrated before the model is used for simulation.  
Moreover, parameters whose values cannot be calibrated by the SAM are then 
obtained from a search of the literature or set arbitrarily following Adams & Higgs 
(1990). Some parameters, including the substitution parameters in all the CES 
production functions, CET function and Armington function, carbon emissions 
coefficient and conversion efficient of energy types, are set exogenously based on 
the literature. In particular, the carbon tax rate and ratio of carbon tax revenue 
redistributed to households are set by the researcher according to the different policy 
                                                 
25
 This is one kind of software for solving CGE models. It will be discussed in section 6.5.  
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scenarios. Appendix 12 lists the data source for all the parameters in the Chinese 
carbon tax CGE model. The value of the exogenous parameters is given in Appendix 
13. Particularly, since ‘clean energy’ is defined as electricity produced from 
renewable sources, including hydropower, nuclear power and wind power, 
substitution with thermal power is only limited due to a lack of capacity in the 
renewable industry. It is assumed that the capacity of renewable industry can be 
increased and, therefore, the elasticity between clean energy and thermal power is set 
fairly high at 10 following Wissema & Dellink (2007). 
6.5   The CGE model software solution 
Developments in computing technology have increasingly provided more efficient 
computer software for solving CGE models. For example, the non-linear GAMS 
developed by the World Bank, the General Equilibrium Modelling Package 
(GEMPACK) developed at Monash University in Australia (Harrison & Pearson 
1996) and the Mathematical Programming System for General Equilibrium (MPSGE) 
(Rutherford 1987). Furthermore, it is suggested that MATLAB (Zhang et al. 2002), 
Eviews (Essama-Nssah 2004) and even Excel (Peng 2009) could also provide 
solutions for CGE models. The carbon tax CGE model in this research is solved with 
the widely distributed programming package GAMS. 
Two steps are included in the solution process (Zhang 1996). The first step is to 
write the computer codes in GAMS programming language. The code starts by 
declaring and defining the sets, parameters and benchmark variables used, and 
assigning tables, some parameters and initial values for benchmark variables, then 
calibrating relative parameters, followed by declaring and defining all the variables 
and equations, and mathematically describing all the equations. The code ends with 
the bounds and initial values of the variables, model statement and output-generating 
statements. This phase of the process is independent of the solution algorithm. The 
second step is to use the MCP (Mixed Complementary Problem) solver Miles, which 
was developed by Thomas Rutherford to solve the model numerically (GAMS 
Development Corporation 2010). This solver of non-linear complementarity 
problems and non-linear systems of equations suits the CGE model in this research.  
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Due to the reliance on exogenous elasticity values and a single base-year observation, 
the parameters estimated above inevitably have errors or contain uncertainty. So, 
sensitivity analyses on key elasticities, including the substitution elasticises between 
energy types, and substitution elasticities in CET and Armington functions of energy 
sectors, are conducted to test the robustness of the simulation results to the changes 
in parameters. The CGE model passes the tests of efficiency and consistency, and 
generates reasonable results, so it can be used for effective simulation. 
6.6   Conclusion 
The methodology used to explore the suitability of using a carbon tax to reduce 
carbon emissions in China (research Q3) has been provided in this chapter. A CGE 
model has a clear structure of the micro-economy and linkages between 
macroeconomic and microeconomic variables. Thus it is the most appropriate 
approach to simulate the economy-wide effects of a carbon tax in China. Apart from 
justifying the use of a CGE approach and a review of the existing carbon tax CGE 
models, this chapter provided the assumptions, equations and data to be used in the 
CGE model constructed. The Chinese carbon tax CGE model allows us to simulate 
the impact of a carbon tax in China in a general equilibrium manner, including the 
environmental effect, macroeconomic impacts, sectoral effects and energy 
consumption structure effects, thereby addressing research Q3 (Is carbon tax a 
suitable policy for reducing carbon emissions in China?). The next chapter will 
present the simulation results.   
 
  
158 
 
Chapter 7   CGE model results and analysis  
7.1   Introduction 
In this chapter the static multi-sectoral carbon tax CGE model of the Chinese 
economy, which has been described and calibrated in Chapter 6, will be used to 
simulate the impact of a carbon tax in China under different carbon tax rates, 
including the environmental, macroeconomic, sectoral and energy consumption 
structure effects. Meanwhile, the cushion effects of the complementary policy (i.e., 
subsidizing households accompanying the carbon tax) will be assessed. Thereby the 
consequences of using a carbon tax policy in China can be explored, and the findings 
will address research Q3 (Is carbon tax a suitable policy for reducing carbon 
emissions in China?). 
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 7.2 will describe the 
simulation scenarios to be used in this Chinese carbon tax CGE model and explain 
the fuel-specific tax rates. The main simulation results of the CGE model will be 
presented in the next four sections. Sections 7.3 to 7.6 will illustrate the 
environmental, macroeconomic, sectoral and energy consumption structure effects, 
respectively, of a carbon tax in China in two comparative scenarios with different 
carbon tax rates. A comparison with similar studies, a discussion of the suitability of 
using a carbon tax in China and some policy implications for implementing a carbon 
tax in China will be presented in section 7.7.  
7.2   Simulation scenarios and fuel-specific tax rates  
The impact of a carbon tax is illustrated by a comparison of situations with and 
without a carbon tax. The baseline scenario, the normal Chinese economy system in 
the absence of a carbon tax, will be constructed first. Thereafter, two scenarios, an 
independent carbon tax scenario and a carbon tax recycling scenario, will be 
computed to assess the impact of a carbon tax in China. As a carbon tax is assumed 
to be the only shock to the economic system, the ‘independent carbon tax scenario’ 
is defined as all carbon tax revenue becoming government fiscal revenue. The 
‘carbon recycling scenario’ means that all the revenue from a carbon tax is recycled 
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to households as a subsidy to consumers, and the fiscal revenue of government is 
neutral. In section 6.2.3 it was argued that recycling would lower the net adverse 
effects of a carbon tax on the economy. So the tax recycling scenario in this research 
allows us to investigate the cushion effects of the complementary policy (i.e., lump-
sum transfers to households) in China.  
Six schemes are considered for the independent carbon tax scenarios listed in Table 
7.1. Based on the price of certified emission reductions in the CDM market, which is 
currently around €13 (US$16.5) (Point Carbon 2011), the six schemes are designed 
on the basis of the following carbon tax rates: RMB¥50 (US$7.9), RMB¥100 
(US$15.9), RMB¥150 (US$23.9), RMB¥200 (US$31.8), RMB¥250 (US$39.7) and 
RMB¥300 (US$47.7) per tonne of carbon. Since the trend of the effects of carbon 
tax recycling can be sufficiently observed in two schemes, only RMB¥100/tC and 
RMB¥200/tC are simulated for the recycling scenario.  
Table 7.1 Scenarios for CGE model simulation 
Scenarios Explanation 
Baseline China’s economic system operates without carbon tax. 
Independent carbon tax 
scenario 
The revenue from a carbon tax is used as government fiscal revenue. 
Six schemes are considered according to different carbon tax levels per 
tonne of carbon: RMB¥50, RMB¥100, RMB¥150, RMB¥200, 
RMB¥250 and RMB¥300. 
Carbon tax recycling 
scenario 
All the revenue from a carbon tax is redistributed to households as a 
subsidy, and the government fiscal revenue keeps neutral. The carbon 
tax is levied at RMB¥100/tC and RMB¥200/tC. 
 
As the carbon tax is levied on the CO2 emissions of the three kinds of fossil energy, 
Table 7.2 converts the carbon taxes into fuel-specific ad valorem tax rates. It can be 
seen that fuel-specific tax rates differ among different types of fossil energy although 
at the same carbon tax rate. According to the function mentioned in section 6.3.7, the 
fuel-specific tax rate depends on the carbon content, price and domestic demand of 
fuel in the absence of carbon tax. As a result, the ad valorem tax rate for coal is the 
highest, natural gas is the second and oil comes the third. Since it is assumed in this 
model that the producers intend to fully pass the impact of the carbon price on to the 
consumers, these fuel-specific tax rates in turn increase the price of coal, natural gas 
and oil at the same rate respectively, which then lead to the changes in various 
factors of the whole economy system.   
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Table 7.2 Carbon taxes and fuel-specific tax rates  
Carbon tax RMB¥/tC 0  50 100  150 200  250  300 
Coal-specific tax rate (%) 0 25.287 50.574 75.862 101.149 126.436 151.723 
Oil-specific tax rate (%) 0 1.546 3.091 4.637 6.183 7.729 9.274 
Natural gas-specific tax rate (%) 0 3.440 6.879 10.319 13.758 17.198 20.638 
7.3   The environmental effect of carbon tax in China 
The environmental effect of the carbon tax is the key variable. According to the 
economic theory, a carbon tax would increase the price of fossil energy, which leads 
to a decrease in carbon-based energy consumption and, consequently, to a decline in 
related production and, therefore, to reductions in CO2 emissions. To what extent a 
carbon tax can reduce CO2 emissions in China needs to be estimated by some 
quantitative analysis, which in this research is the CGE model. This section will 
present the simulation results of environmental effects with different carbon tax rates 
in China under the independent carbon tax scenario and carbon tax recycling 
scenario, respectively.    
7.3.1 The independent carbon tax scenario 
The results in Table 7.3 show that only a small carbon tax rate of RMB¥50/tC could 
reduce the total CO2 emissions by 6.301%. Carbon tax rates of RMB¥100/tC, 
RMB¥150/tC, RMB¥200/tC and RMB¥250/tC could result in a reduction of CO2 
emissions of 10.981%, 14.640%, 17.609% and 20.083% respectively. More than a 
22% decrease of CO2 emissions could be achieved by a carbon tax of RMB¥300/tC. 
As the carbon tax gets higher, the total CO2 emissions decrease, but at a decreasing 
rate, indicating that the marginal effect of the tax in mitigating CO2 emissions is 
getting smaller. For example, 6.301% CO2 emissions reductions could be achieved 
by a carbon tax of RMB¥50/tC, but increasing the carbon tax by another RMB¥50 
can only further reduce the CO2 emissions by 4.680%. This finding can be more 
directly observed from Figure 7.1. It appears that the curves for all the sectoral CO2 
emissions and total CO2 emissions are quadratic, which implies that the marginal 
environmental effect of the tax is diminishing. This is because even though a carbon 
tax would impel people to change their behaviors, as the tax getting infinate high, the 
consumption of fossil energy thus the total CO2 emissions could not be zero.   
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Table 7.3 Percentage changes of carbon emissions in the independent carbon 
tax scenario compared with the baseline scenario under different carbon tax 
rates 
Carbon tax RMB¥/tC 0  50  100  150  200  250  300  
CO2 emissions from coal sector (%) 0 -7.942 -13.831 -18.427 -22.148 -25.241 -27.868 
CO2 emissions from oil sector (%) 0 0.629 1.146 1.578 1.944 2.254 2.519 
CO2 emissions from natural gas    
sector (%) 
0 -2.951 -5.747 -8.386 -10.874 -13.218 -15.428 
Total CO2 emissions (%) 0 -6.301 -10.981 -14.640 -17.609 -20.083 -22.189 
 
 
Figure 7.1 Percentage changes of carbon emissions in the independent carbon 
tax scenario compared with the baseline scenario under different 
carbon tax rates 
Moreover, of the three fossil energy sectors, coal contributes to the largest CO2 
reductions and natural gas comes second, while oil has increased CO2 emissions. 
This is due to the varied fuel-specific tax rates and different substitution elasticities 
between energy types. As mentioned in section 6.4.3, natural gas and oil are 
alternatives (substitution elasticity equals 2) and the fuel-specific tax rate of natural 
gas is greater than that for oil. So, after a carbon tax is imposed the natural gas 
becomes relatively more expensive than oil. Producers then would partly switch 
from natural gas to oil, which leads to a decrease in the total consumption of natural 
gas and an increase in the total consumption of oil. Thereafter, the total production of 
natural gas would be negatively affected and the oil production positively affected. 
As a consequence, CO2 emissions from natural gas decrease and increase from the 
oil sector. Coal is the substitute for the NG-oil energy mix (substitution elasticity 
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equals 0.5). The relatively large increase in the coal price, due to the high coal-
specific tax rate, reduces the consumption of coal and meanwhile leads to the switch 
to other forms of energy. It is, therefore, not surprising that the CO2 emissions from 
the coal sector decrease significantly.  
7.3.2 The carbon tax recycling scenario 
In the carbon tax recycling scenario the changes of sectoral CO2 emissions and of 
total CO2 emissions are similar to those in the independent carbon tax scenario. The 
CO2 emissions from the coal and natural gas sectors decrease, while those from the 
oil sector increase slightly. The reason is the same as that for the independent carbon 
tax scenario (section 7.3.1). However, in the recycling scenario the amounts of CO2 
emissions from the three sectors are slightly larger than that in the independent 
carbon tax scenario. As can be seen from Table 7.4, at the carbon tax rate of 
RMB¥100/tC, the CO2 emissions drop by 12.774% and 5.200% in the coal and 
natural gas sectors respectively, less than the value of 13.831% in coal and 5.747% 
in natural gas under the independent carbon tax scenario. Moreover, the increase of 
CO2 emissions in oil sector is 1.150%, which is larger than that of 1.146% for the 
independent carbon tax scenario. These results imply that the environmental effect of 
the carbon tax would be weakened by redistributing all the carbon tax revenue to 
households.  
Table 7.4 Comparison of the percentage changes of carbon emissions in the 
independent carbon tax scenario and carbon tax recycling scenario 
 
BAU 
Independent 
carbon tax 
scenario 
Carbon tax 
recycling 
scenario 
Independent 
carbon tax 
scenario 
Carbon tax 
recycling 
scenario 
Carbon tax RMB¥/tC 0  100  100  200 200 
CO2 emissions from coal 
sector (%) 
0 -13.831 -12.774 -22.148 -20.746 
CO2 emissions from oil 
sector (%) 
0 1.146 1.150 1.944 1.985 
CO2 emissions from 
natural gas sector (%) 
0 -5.747 -5.200 -10.874 -9.896 
Total CO2 emissions (%) 0 -10.981 -10.141 -17.609 -16.490 
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7.4   The macroeconomic impacts of carbon tax in China 
The impacts of a carbon tax on the Chinese macro-economy in both the independent 
carbon tax scenario and the carbon tax recycling scenario are computed on fifteen 
macroeconomic variables (Tables 7.5 and 7.6). They are all real variables as the 
carbon tax is the only shock to the economy and the change of price is due to the tax 
rather than any other factors. Some of the variables are estimated from quantities, i.e. 
GDP, household consumption, total consumption, import, export, total demand and 
total supply, while some variables are estimated in values, i.e. household income, 
enterprise income, government income, government expenditure, household saving, 
enterprise saving, government saving and investment. However since the prices are 
assumed to be constant (section 6.4.3, SAM calibration), percentage change in 
quantity will be the same as percentage change in value. The following illustrates the 
major results of the two scenarios respectively. 
7.4.1 The independent carbon tax scenario 
Table 7.5 presents the percentage changes of the fifteen macroeconomic variables in 
the independent carbon tax scenario compared with the baseline scenario under six 
different carbon tax rates.  
Table 7.5 Percentage changes of macroeconomic variables in the independent 
carbon tax scenario compared with the baseline scenario under different tax 
rates. 
Carbon tax RMB¥/tC 0  50  100  150  200  250  300  
GDP (%) 0 -0.320 -0.613 -0.884 -1.137 -1.374 -1.599 
Household income (%) 0 -0.450 -0.866 -1.257 -1.625 -1.974 -2.307 
Enterprise income (%) 0 -0.599 -1.179 -1.747 -2.307 -2.860 -3.410 
Government income (%) 0 4.520 8.597 12.376 15.940 19.340 22.611 
Household consumption (%) 0 -0.880 -1.684 -2.429 -3.124 -3.777 -4.394 
Government expenditure (%) 0 0.233 0.454 0.664 0.867 1.063 1.253 
Total consumption (%) 0 -0.645 -1.235 -1.780 -2.289 -2.768 -3.221 
Household saving (%) 0 -0.450 -0.866 -1.257 -1.625 -1.974 -2.307 
Enterprise saving (%) 0 -0.599 -1.179 -1.747 -2.307 -2.860 -3.410 
Government saving (%) 0 13.734 26.098 37.544 48.330 58.616 68.509 
Investment (%) 0 0.831 1.601 2.321 3.001 3.645 4.258 
Import (%) 0 0.252 0.468 0.656 0.821 0.968 1.099 
Export (%) 0 -0.194 -0.360 -0.505 -0.633 -0.746 -0.847 
Total demand (%) 0 -0.209 -0.404 -0.587 -0.762 -0.928 -1.087 
Total supply (production) (%) 0 -0.204 -0.395 -0.575 -0.746 -0.910 -1.067 
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The results show that the imposition of a carbon tax would lead to GDP loss. With 
carbon tax rates of RMB¥50/tC, RMB¥100/tC, RMB¥150/tC, RMB¥200/tC, 
RMB¥250/tC and RMB¥300/tC, the real GDP decreases by 0.320%, 0.613%, 
0.884%, 1.137%, 1.374% and 1.599% respectively. The GDP losses are relatively 
modest compared with the large CO2 emissions reductions. For example, a carbon 
tax rate of RMB¥50/tC results in 0.320% GDP loss, but the CO2 emissions can be 
reduced by 6.312%. Moreover, the percentage change in GDP in every RMB¥50 
carbon tax rate gets smaller as the carbon tax rate increases. This implies that the 
marginal effect of the tax on GDP is decreasing.  
It can be seen from Table 7.5 that the impact of the carbon tax on enterprise income 
and saving, household income and saving are all negative. Given the assumption of 
an elastic capital rate, the capital rate decreases after the carbon tax is imposed, 
thereby decreasing total profit and further reduces enterprise income and enterprise 
saving. Simultaneously, the decrease in total profit lowers the profit distributed from 
enterprises to households. In addition, the decreased wage rate for labour leads to a 
decline in household income. As two of the most important components of 
household income contract, the total household income decreases. As a result, total 
household saving shrinks under a given individual tax rate and MPC. 
The carbon tax increases government income, expenditure and saving. Specifically, 
the simulation results show that for a carbon tax of RMB¥50/tC and RMB¥300/tC, 
government income increases by 4.520% and 22.611% from the baseline 
respectively. This is because all the carbon tax revenue is assigned to the 
government’s general revenue under the independent carbon tax scenario. The 
quantity of government consumption is determined exogenously in this model. 
Although the government expenditure increases due to the increase in prices, the 
government income increases more, which leads to the increase in government 
saving. 
The carbon tax has a positive impact on total investment. It increases by 0.831% and 
4.258% at a rate of RMB¥50/tC and RMB¥300/tC respectively. As the quantity of 
investment in each sector is set exogenously, the rise in total investment value can be 
explained by the increased prices of products caused by the tax. According to the 
‘saving-driven’ closure principle in this model, total investment is transformed 
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endogenously from total saving, which includes household, enterprise, government 
and foreign savings. While the foreign saving is fixed in the model, the increased 
total investment indicates that the increase in government saving is large enough to 
completely offset the reductions of household and enterprise savings.  
Since the government consumption is considered exogenous, as mentioned earlier, 
the different carbon tax rates influence total consumption through their impact on 
household consumption. Household consumption is mainly decided by household 
disposable income and the level of consumer prices. Moreover, it is positively 
correlated with the former, while negatively correlated with the latter. As the 
household disposable income decreases and the consumer price increases, household 
consumption is reduced. Consequently, the total consumption decreases, at 0.645% 
and 3.221% for a carbon tax rate of RMB¥50/tC and RMB¥300/tC respectively.     
It can be seen from the results that the impact of different carbon tax rates on total 
imports are all positive, while on total exports they are all negative. The possible 
reason is that the supply prices of products, especially the carbon-intensive products, 
increase greatly after the imposition of the carbon tax. Though the carbon tax also 
covers the imported coal, oil and natural gas, other imported commodities are 
exempted from the domestic carbon tax. Overall, the imported commodities become 
more competitive, so total imports increase and total exports decrease. At a carbon 
tax rate of RMB¥50/tC, total imports increase by 0.252% while total exports decline 
by 0.194%. 
Since imposing a carbon tax increases the price of energy factors directly, the 
production sectors may reduce the input of energy, thereby a decline in the 
production sector may be observed and the total supply decreases. Total demand 
decreases as well due to reductions in intermediate input and household consumption. 
As shown in Table 7.5, the impacts of a carbon tax on total demand and total supply 
are relatively large. When the tax rate is RMB¥300/tC, total demand and total supply 
decrease by 1.087% and 1.067% respectively. 
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Figure 7.2 Changes in the main macroeconomic variables after carbon tax 
Moreover, for every RMB¥50 increment in the carbon tax rate, it is found that the 
effects on all macroeconomic variables are lessening. Figure 7.2 presents the 
changes of main macroeconomic variables after the carbon tax is imposed. The 
curves for all main macroeconomic variables are not strictly linear. Instead, they are 
most likely quadratic, which imply that the marginal impacts of every RMB¥50 tax 
increase on the macro economy are diminishing. In other words, the macro economy 
tends to contract at a decreasing rate as the tax becomes higher.  
 
Figure 7.3 Contribution to the total absolute GDP loss 
Finally, the contributions to the total absolute GDP loss are analysed and presented 
in Figure 7.3. As can be seen from the figure, among the four components of GDP, 
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investment, government expenditure, household consumption and net exports 
(exports minus imports), the decreases in household consumption and net exports 
lead to a decrease in GDP. This implies that a carbon tax negatively affects GDP 
mainly through the adverse impacts on household consumption and net exports. The 
reduction of household consumption contributes more than half of the decrease in 
GDP, and the contribution rate is rising as the carbon tax increases. This shows the 
importance of the complementary policy of subsidizing households, which deserves 
careful consideration when designing the carbon tax program.   
7.4.2 The carbon tax recycling scenario 
Table 7.6 shows the changes in the fifteen macroeconomic variables at carbon tax 
rates of RMB¥100/tC and RMB200¥200/tC under the carbon tax recycling scenario. 
Table 7.6 Comparison of the changes of macroeconomic variables in the 
independent carbon tax scenario and the carbon tax recycling scenario  
 
BAU 
Independent 
carbon tax 
scenario 
Carbon tax 
recycling 
scenario 
Independent 
carbon tax 
scenario 
Carbon tax 
recycling 
scenario 
Carbon tax RMB¥/tC 0  100  100  200  200  
GDP (%) 0 -0.613 -0.556 -1.137 -1.038 
Household income (%) 0 -0.866 0.482 -1.625 1.480 
Enterprise income (%) 0 -1.179 -1.179 -2.307 -2.307 
Government income (%) 0 8.597 7.809 15.940 14.536 
Household consumption (%) 0 -1.684 0.248 -3.124 0.493 
Government expenditure (%) 0 0.454 0.454 0.867 0.867 
Total consumption (%) 0 -1.235 0.181 -2.289 0.357 
Household saving (%) 0 -0.866 0.482 -1.625 1.480 
Enterprise saving (%) 0 -1.179 -1.179 -2.307 -2.307 
Government saving (%) 0 26.098 8.895 48.330 17.312 
Investment (%) 0 1.601 1.601 3.001 3.001 
Import (%) 0 0.468 0.497 0.821 0.857 
Export (%) 0 -0.360 -0.329 -0.633 -0.584 
Total demand (%) 0 -0.404 -0.366 -0.762 -0.693 
Total supply (production) (%) 0 -0.395 -0.357 -0.746 -0.678 
 
For the most important macroeconomic variable, GDP, it can be seen from Table 7.6 
that the reduction is 0.556% and 1.038% at the carbon tax rate of RMB¥100/tC and 
RMB¥200/tC respectively. They are less than in the independent carbon tax scenario 
at the same rates. Nevertheless, the differences are not very large, only 0.057% and 
0.099% at the rates of RMB¥100/tC and RMB¥200/tC respectively. This implies that 
recycling all the carbon tax revenue to households could reduce the adverse impact 
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of a carbon tax on GDP, even though the effect is relatively small. Moreover, for 
GDP, the effect of redistributing carbon tax to household is getting larger as the 
carbon tax rate increases.    
The results show that household income, consumption and saving are positively 
affected by a carbon tax under carbon tax recycling scenario, in contrast to that in the 
independent carbon tax scenario. Household income increases by 0.482% at a carbon 
tax rate of RMB¥100/tC and by 1.480% at a carbon tax rate of RMB¥200/tC. This is 
because all the carbon tax revenue is redistributed to the households and becomes 
part of the household income. Therefore, when the income tax rate and MPC are 
unchanged, household consumption increases and household saving raises the same 
rate as household income. Clearly, these results indicate that the negative impact of a 
carbon tax on households can be totally offset by the lump-sum transfer to 
households and the transfer even could make the households better off with the 
carbon tax.  
Government income still increases from the baseline but the growth rate is less than 
that in the independent carbon tax scenario because all the carbon tax revenue is 
redistributed to households. Due to the same price level and exogenous government 
consumption, government expenditure in both scenarios increases at the same rate. 
With the same level of government expenditure, government saving also increases 
but less than in the independent carbon tax scenario. As can be seen from Table 7.6, 
enterprise income, saving and total investment also change at the same rate in both 
scenarios because of the unchanged price level. As a result of the increased 
household consumption, total consumption rises by 0.181% and 0.357% at the 
carbon tax rate of RMB¥100/tC and RMB¥200/tC respectively. 
The impact of carbon tax on total imports and exports are similar to those in the 
independent carbon tax scenario. But with the carbon tax being transferred to 
households, which stimulates total consumption, the increase of total imports from 
the baseline is larger than in the independent carbon tax scenario, while the decrease 
of total exports from the baseline is less. For example, at a carbon tax rate of 
RMB¥100/tC total imports rise by 0.468% and 0.497% and total exports decline by 
0.360% and 0.329% for the independent carbon tax scenario and carbon tax 
recycling scenario respectively.   
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Total demand and total supply are also observed to have declined less than in the 
independent carbon tax scenario, even though they have still decreased from the 
baseline. At a carbon tax rate of RMB¥100/tC, total demand decreases by 0.366%, 
less than the 0.404% in the independent scenario. Total supply declines by 0.357%, 
compared with 0.395% in the independent scenario. These changes can also be 
attributed to the stimulated total consumption. Moreover, the results show that the 
difference between the independent scenario and the recycling scenario is larger at a 
carbon tax rate of RMB¥200/tC than at a rate of RMB¥100/tC.  
Based on the observations from the fifteen macroeconomic variables, it can be 
concluded that subsidizing households could help to stimulate consumption and thus 
reduce the negative impacts of carbon tax on the whole economy, even though the 
effects are not very large. Furthermore, the cushion effects of subsidizing households 
are more obvious when the carbon tax is rising. This finding has an important policy 
implication, as it suggests that when the carbon tax gets higher, it becomes more 
worthwhile to subsidize households to reduce the adverse effects of the carbon tax.  
7.5   The sectoral effects of carbon tax in China 
The effects of the carbon tax will be different among sectors. After a carbon tax is 
imposed, people want to know which sectors suffer significantly and which sectors 
benefit from it. Section 7.5.1 presents the simulation results for these questions under 
the independent carbon tax scenario at different carbon tax rates. Section 7.5.2 shows 
the sectoral effects of a carbon tax under the carbon recycling scenario, with a 
comparison with the effects in the independent carbon tax scenario at carbon tax 
rates of RMB¥100/tC and RMB¥200/tC respectively.   
7.5.1 The independent carbon tax scenario 
Table 7.7 shows the impact of a carbon tax on prices of commodities in different 
sectors under the independent carbon tax scenario at different tax rates. As can be 
seen, prices of all the commodities increase by various degrees. At a same level of 
carbon tax, the largest increase in sale price happens in the coal sector. The price of 
coal rises by 25.287% at a carbon tax rate of RMB¥50/tC, and increases by as much 
as 151.723% at a rate of RMB300/tC. In contrast, the price of clean energy increases 
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the least, only 0.131% and 0.976% at a rate of RMB¥50/tC and RMB¥300/tC 
respectively. These differing sectoral effects of prices can be explained as follows. 
As a result of the imposition of a carbon tax, the price of the target commodities, 
including coal, oil and natural gas, will be affected directly. Since other commodities 
use these three targeted commodities as inputs in their production, a carbon tax also 
affects the price of other commodities indirectly through a general equilibrium effect. 
Thus the sector that uses more target commodities as inputs would experience larger 
increases in prices. For instance, as the thermal power sector utilizes large amounts 
of fossil energy (e.g., coal) for producing electricity, the increase of the price in the 
thermal power sector is the second largest. Moreover, it is observed from Table 7.7 
that the prices of commodities increase at decreasing rates as the carbon tax becomes 
higher, indicating that the marginal impact of the tax on prices of commodities is 
diminishing. 
Table 7.7 Changes of the sale prices for products in different sectors under the 
independent carbon tax scenario  
Carbon tax 
RMB¥/tC 
0 50 100  150  200  250  300  
Agriculture (%) 0 0.221 0.426 0.616 0.796 0.967 1.130 
Heavy industry (%) 0 1.139 2.196 3.175 4.100 4.974 5.806 
Light industry (%) 0 0.245 0.473 0.685 0.887 1.078 1.261 
Transport and 
communication (%) 
0 0.608 1.200 1.773 2.336 2.889 3.433 
Construction (%) 0 0.746 1.440 2.086 2.699 3.280 3.835 
Services (%) 0 0.289 0.564 0.823 1.073 1.314 1.547 
Coal (%) 0 25.287 50.574 75.862 101.149 126.436 151.723 
Oil (%) 0 1.546 3.091 4.637 6.183 7.729 9.274 
Natural gas (%) 0 3.440 6.879 10.319 13.758 17.198 20.638 
Thermal power (%) 0 4.776 9.314 13.621 17.791 21.832 25.765 
Clean energy (%) 0 0.131 0.321 0.498 0.666 0.825 0.976 
 
Theoretically, the carbon tax exerts a further negative impact on the sectoral 
production through the sectoral price effect. The sector with the larger price change 
declines more in production approximately. In response to the largest price change, 
the coal sector is expected to be the most severely affected sector in terms of 
production under a carbon tax. This is confirmed in Table 7.8 which shows that 
production from the coal sector falls by 12.108% at RMB¥50/tC and by 44.718% at 
RMB¥300/tC. Natural gas and thermal power are the sectors with the second largest 
decreases in output, while the production in agriculture and light industry only 
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decreases slightly. However, as can be seen from Table 7.8, not all the industries are 
affected negatively by a carbon tax. The oil and clean energy sectors experience 
increases in production, even though their prices rise after the imposition of a carbon 
tax. This can be explained by the substitution effects in the production process. Oil is 
an alternative for natural gas and clean energy is an alternative for thermal power. 
They become relatively cheaper after a carbon tax is imposed. Thus producers 
substitute oil and clean energy for natural gas and thermal power respectively. The 
consumption of oil and clean energy increases, and stimulates the production of oil 
and clean energy. In addition, the increase of production in clean energy is very 
surprising and is most likely because the absolute production of clean energy is small 
at the baseline.  
Table 7.8 Changes of production in different sectors under the independent 
carbon tax scenario 
Carbon tax 
RMB¥/tC 
0 50  100  150  200  250  300 
Agriculture (%) 0 -0.028 -0.054 -0.079 -0.103 -0.126 -0.148 
Heavy industry (%) 0 -1.423 -1.813 -2.178 -2.521 -2.846 -3.154 
Light industry (%) 0 -0.118 -0.207 -0.273 -0.318 -0.347 -0.370 
Transport and 
communication (%) 
0 -0.326 -0.531 -0.683 -0.786 -0.841 -0.876 
Construction (%) 0 -0.620 -1.129 -1.549 -1.895 -2.077 -2.406 
Services (%) 0 -0.138 -0.228 -0.295 -0.341 -0.371 -0.395 
Coal (%)  0 -12.108 -21.527 -29.234 -35.403 -40.526 -44.718 
Oil (%) 0 2.712 5.171 7.43 9.529 11.496 13.324 
Natural gas (%) 0 -7.066 -13.265 -18.812 -23.848 -28.479 -32.757 
Thermal power (%) 0 -8.058 -15.32 -22.216 -27.325 -31.574 -35.431 
Clean energy (%) 0 27.196 63.358 97.497 130.619 162.728 194.829 
 
Household consumption changes differently among different sectors (Table 7.9). 
Under a carbon tax, household consumption decreases for all products, but especially 
for carbon-intensive products. The percentage decrease of household consumption 
for thermal power is the largest. As the carbon tax rate increases from RMB¥50/tC to 
RMB¥300/tC, the decrease in consumption of thermal power rises from 4.987% to 
more than 22%. The second largest decline is the consumption for coal and the third 
is the consumption for natural gas. Then follow oil, heavy industry, construction, 
transport and communication, services, light industry, agriculture and clean energy.  
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Table 7.9 Percentage changes of household consumption for different sectors in 
the independent carbon tax scenario under different tax rates 
Carbon tax 
RMB¥/tC 
0  50  100  150 200  250 300  
Agriculture (%) 0 -0.229 -0.443 -0.645 -0.836 -1.017 -1.191 
Heavy industry (%) 0 -1.571 -2.993 -4.295 -5.499 -6.619 -7.668 
Light industry (%) 0 -0.693 -1.332 -1.929 -2.489 -3.019 -3.523 
Transport and 
communication (%) 
0 -1.051 -2.04 -2.977 -3.87 -4.727 -5.55 
Construction (%) 0 -1.186 -2.271 -3.275 -4.21 -5.088 -5.915 
Services (%) 0 -0.737 -1.421 -2.063 -2.669 -3.245 -3.795 
Coal (%)  0 -3.219 -6.051 -8.583 -10.873 -12.963 -14.886 
Oil (%) 0 -2.237 -4.274 -6.152 -7.899 -9.533 -11.071 
Natural gas (%) 0 -2.678 -4.705 -6.605 -8.356 -10.004 -11.545 
Thermal power (%) 0 -4.987 -9.298 -13.094 -16.483 -19.54 -22.321 
Clean energy (%) 0 -0.137 -0.321 -0.491 -0.651 -0.804 -0.953 
 
The imports and exports also change differently across different sectors (Tables 7.10 
and 7.11). The imports in all sectors increase after a tax is imposed. As the tax rises, 
the imports in all sectors increase as well, though the rates of increase are declining. 
Not surprisingly, the carbon-intensive sectors of coal, thermal power, natural gas and 
oil are still the most seriously affected sectors. As can be seen from Table 7.10, the 
imports of coal, thermal power, natural gas and oil increase by as much as 9.805%, 
6.737%, 5.158% and 2.206% at a carbon tax of RMB¥300/tC. The exports decrease 
in all the other sectors, except in the services sector. At carbon tax rates of 
RMB¥50/tC and RMB¥300/tC, the export in services sector increases by 1.219% 
and 4.895% respectively. This implies that the services sector becomes more 
competitive in the international market. The exports in the coal, thermal power, 
natural gas and oil sectors decrease significantly. The exports in other carbon-
intensive sectors such as heavy industry, construction, and transport and 
communication decrease greatly as well. The changes of exports in agriculture and 
light industry are relatively small. In addition, the changes of both imports and 
exports in the clean energy sector are zero. This is because the imports and exports in 
this sector are assumed to be zero at the baseline.   
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Table 7.10 Changes of imports for sectors in the independent carbon tax 
scenario under different tax rates 
Carbon tax 
RMB¥/tC 
0 50 100  150  200  250  300  
Agriculture (%) 0 0.031 0.043 0.053 0.060 0.065 0.067 
Heavy industry (%) 0 0.257 0.511 0.760 0.994 1.216 1.428 
Light industry (%) 0 0.126 0.241 0.345 0.443 0.532 0.619 
Transport and 
communication (%) 
0 0.162 0.412 0.551 0.682 0.768 0.847 
Construction (%) 0 0.170 0.332 0.746 0.779 1.128 1.392 
Services (%) 0 0.066 0.144 0.213 0.269 0.316 0.356 
Coal (%)  0 1.981 3.785 5.448 6.994 8.441 9.805 
Oil (%) 0 0.495 0.925 1.303 1.638 1.937 2.206 
Natural gas (%) 0 0.977 1.892 2.760 3.589 4.387 5.158 
Thermal power (%) 0 1.350 2.587 3.731 4.798 5.797 6.737 
Clean energy (%) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Table 7.11 Changes of exports for sectors in the independent carbon tax 
scenario under different tax rates 
Carbon tax 
RMB¥/tC 
0  50  100  150  200  250  300  
Agriculture (%) 0 -0.019 -0.034 -0.046 -0.055 -0.062 -0.067 
Heavy industry (%) 0 -0.375 -0.745 -1.032 -1.219 -1.351 -1.433 
Light industry (%) 0 -0.084 -0.112 -0.135 -0.154 -0.171 -0.332 
Transport and 
communication (%) 
0 -0.289 -0.431 -0.539 -0.612 -0.661 -0.685 
Construction (%) 0 -0.104 -0.237 -0.342 -0.433 -0.513 -0.585 
Services (%) 0 1.219 2.238 3.092 3.808 4.404 4.895 
Coal (%)  0 -4.939 -9.745 -14.464 -19.127 -23.756 -28.366 
Oil (%) 0 -1.325 -2.544 -3.679 -4.746 -5.757 -6.719 
Natural gas (%) 0 -2.296 -4.339 -6.179 -7.848 -9.372 -10.771 
Thermal power (%) 0 -3.457 -6.578 -9.425 -12.042 -14.46 -16.708 
Clean energy (%) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
In summary, the simulation results show that the carbon-intensive sectors would 
suffer most seriously from a carbon tax, while low-carbon or non-carbon sectors may 
benefit from it.  
7.5.2 The carbon tax recycling scenario 
The sectoral changes of production, household consumption, imports and exports 
under the carbon recycling scenario are shown in Tables 7.12 to 7.15 respectively. 
Compared with the results at the same carbon tax rate in the independent carbon tax 
scenario, production, household consumption, imports and exports increase in all the 
sectors, especially household consumption. After a carbon tax is imposed, all 
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sectoral household consumption decreases greatly from the baseline, but they 
increase significantly from the baseline once the carbon tax revenue is redistributed 
to households. Moreover, it is noted that the positive effects of a recycling carbon tax 
become more obvious as a carbon tax increases. In addition, it seems that the carbon-
intensive sectors benefit more from recycling the carbon tax revenue to households. 
For instance, household consumption for thermal power increases by 9.751% from 
the independent scenario to the recycling scenario at the tax rate of RMB¥100/tC.  
Table 7.12 Comparison of the changes of production for different sectors in the 
independent carbon tax scenario and carbon tax recycling scenario  
 
BAU 
Independent 
carbon tax 
scenario 
Carbon tax 
recycling 
scenario 
Independent 
carbon tax 
scenario 
Carbon tax 
recycling 
scenario 
 Carbon tax RMB¥/tC 0  100  100  200 200  
 Agriculture (%) 0 -0.054 -0.035 -0.103 -0.067 
 Heavy industry (%) 0 -1.813 -1.749 -2.521 -2.051 
 Light industry (%) 0 -0.207 -0.199 -0.318 -0.264 
 Transport and communication (%) 0 -0.531 -0.502 -0.786 -0.622 
 Construction (%) 0 -1.129 -1.049 -1.895 -1.594 
 Services (%) 0 -0.228 -0.203 -0.341 -0.326 
 Coal (%) 0 -21.527 -19.198 -35.403 -30.31 
 Oil (%) 0 5.171 5.69 9.529 10.871 
 Natural gas (%) 0 -13.265 -11.28 -23.848 -20.489 
 Thermal power (%) 0 -15.32 -14.208 -27.325 -22.189 
 Clean energy (%) 0 63.358 65.832 130.619 135.572 
Table 7.13 Comparison of the changes of household consumption for different 
sectors in the independent carbon tax scenario and carbon tax recycling 
scenario 
 
BAU 
Independent 
carbon tax 
scenario 
Carbon tax 
recycling 
scenario 
Independent 
carbon tax 
scenario 
Carbon tax 
recycling 
scenario 
 Carbon tax RMB¥/tC 0 100  100  200  200  
 Agriculture (%) 0 -0.443 0.074 -0.836 0.144 
 Heavy industry (%) 0 -2.993 0.225 -5.499 0.348 
 Light industry (%) 0 -1.332 0.123 -2.489 0.237 
 Transport and communication (%) 0 -2.04 0.170 -3.87 0.261 
 Construction (%) 0 -2.271 0.182 -4.21 0.291 
 Services (%) 0 -1.421 0.144 -2.669 0.250 
 Coal (%) 0 -6.051 0.414 -10.873 0.631 
 Oil (%) 0 -4.274 0.321 -7.899 0.453 
 Natural gas (%) 0 -4.705 0.354 -8.356 0.572 
 Thermal power (%) 0 -9.298 0.453 -16.483 0.821 
 Clean energy (%) 0 -0.321 0.056 -0.651 0.084 
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Table 7.14 Comparison of the changes of imports in the independent carbon tax 
scenario and carbon tax recycling scenario 
 
BAU 
Independent 
carbon tax 
scenario 
Carbon tax 
recycling 
scenario 
Independent 
carbon tax 
scenario 
Carbon tax 
recycling 
scenario 
 Carbon tax RMB¥/tC 0  100  100  200  200 
 Agriculture (%) 0 0.043 0.075 0.060 0.103 
 Heavy industry (%) 0 0.511 0.644 0.994 1.257 
 Light industry (%) 0 0.241 0.278 0.443 0.514 
 Transport and communication (%) 0 0.412 0.479 0.682 0.790 
 Construction (%) 0 0.332 0.338 0.779 0.788 
 Services (%) 0 0.144 0.168 0.269 0.311 
 Coal (%) 0 3.785 3.837 6.994 7.088 
 Oil (%) 0 0.925 0.973 1.638 1.729 
 Natural gas (%) 0 1.892 1.96 3.589 3.718 
 Thermal power (%) 0 2.587 2.715 4.798 5.038 
 Clean energy (%) 0 0 0 0 0 
Table 7.15 Comparison of the changes of exports in the independent carbon tax 
scenario and carbon tax recycling scenario 
 
BAU 
Independent 
carbon tax 
scenario 
Carbon tax 
recycling 
scenario 
Independent 
carbon tax 
scenario 
Carbon tax 
recycling 
scenario 
 Carbon tax RMB¥/tC 0  100  100  200  200  
 Agriculture (%) 0 -0.034 -0.028 -0.055 -0.044 
 Heavy industry (%) 0 -0.745 -0.714 -1.219 -0.719 
 Light industry (%) 0 -0.112 -0.107 -0.154 -0.145 
 Transport and communication (%) 0 -0.431 -0.416 -0.612 -0.586 
 Construction (%) 0 -0.237 -0.209 -0.433 -0.381 
 Services (%) 0 2.238 3.848 3.808 6.537 
 Coal (%) 0 -9.745 -7.245 -19.127 -14.697 
 Oil (%) 0 -2.544 -1.792 -4.746 -3.267 
 Natural gas (%) 0 -4.339 -3.522 -7.848 -6.305 
 Thermal power (%) 0 -6.578 -5.307 -12.042 -9.521 
 Clean energy (%) 0 0 0 0 0 
 
In summary, the negative impacts of a carbon tax on the sectors could be relieved to 
some extent by transferring the carbon tax revenue to households, even though the 
relief is relatively small. In addition, carbon tax recycling has a greater impact on the 
carbon-intensive sectors, especially at a higher carbon tax rate.  
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7.6   The impacts of carbon tax on energy consumption 
structure in China 
According to the market mechanism, imposing a carbon tax on carbon energy will 
change the relative prices of commodities. Carbon-free or low-carbon-containing 
commodities and services become cheaper than those of high-carbon content. Such 
changes in the relative prices will lead to a shift away from high-carbon energy, and 
carbon-intensive commodities and services to carbon-free energy or low-carbon 
commodities and services. This will consequently change the energy consumption 
structure. Therefore, how a carbon tax could help improve the energy consumption 
structure in China is explored in this section, under both the independent carbon tax 
scenario and the carbon tax recycling scenario. 
7.6.1 The independent carbon tax scenario 
Tables 7.16 and 7.17 show the changes of input factors in different sectors under an 
independent carbon tax scenario at the carbon tax rates of RMB¥100/tC and 
RMB¥200/tC respectively. As can be observed, the changes of input factors are in 
different directions and at varied rates across sectors. The use of coal, natural gas and 
thermal power as input factors of production decreases in all sectors, while the use of 
clean energy increases among all sectors. Meanwhile, the utilization of the other 
three kinds of input factors (oil, capital and labour) rises in some sectors but declines 
in others. For oil, the different directional changes can be explained by the 
substitution effects between oil and natural gas and the production reduction effects 
in sectors. After the imposition of a carbon tax, sectors tend to use more oil as a 
substitute for natural gas in production. However, sectors release some oil due to the 
decreases in production. Therefore, if the substitution effect is large enough to offset 
the production reduction effect, the use of oil as an input factor increases in a sector; 
otherwise it decreases in that sector. For capital and labour, given that the total 
amounts of capital and labour available to the economy are fixed but are allowed to 
flow from one sector to another, the released capital and labour from some sectors 
have to be absorbed by other sectors.  
It is worth noting that the carbon-intensive sectors are more likely to use low-carbon 
factors to substitute high-carbon factors, and capital or labour to substitute carbon 
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Table 7.16 Changes of input factors for sectors in the independent carbon tax 
scenario RMB¥100/tC 
 Coal Oil 
Natural 
gas 
Thermal 
power 
Clean 
energy 
Capital Labour 
Agriculture (%) -19.994 -3.306 -10.039 -17.478 58.488 -2.623 -2.015 
Heavy industry (%) -15.302 2.511 -4.627 -14.484 64.238 1.302 2.845 
Light industry (%) -16.933 0.530 -6.470 -17.697 58.067 -2.387 -1.901 
Transport and 
communication (%) 
-18.289 -1.238 -8.114 -15.172 62.917 -0.188 -0.245 
Construction (%) -17.868 -0.739 0 -15.070 63.113 0.143 0.267 
Services (%) -18.012 -0.713 -7.626 -15.805 61.702 -0.579 -0.817 
Coal (%) -12.371 5.957 -1.420 -17.575 58.304 -0.732 6.665 
Oil (%) -16.989 1.062 -5.975 -14.642 63.936 0.739 2.553 
Natural gas (%) -17.788 0.762 -6.253 -15.221 62.824 0.050 0.200 
Thermal power (%) -11.373 7.299 -0.171 -2.123 87.979 1.543 8.014 
Clean energy (%) 0 0 0 -39.369 16.445 0.518 1.029 
Table 7.17 Changes of input factors for sectors in the independent carbon tax 
scenario RMB¥200/tC 
 Coal  Oil 
Natural 
gas 
Thermal 
power 
Clean 
energy 
Capital Labour 
Agriculture (%) -31.755 -6.065 -18.160 -34.515 126.015 -4.728 -3.694 
Heavy industry (%) -24.373 4.376 -9.063 -30.111 141.214 2.387 5.205 
Light industry (%) -27.198 0.464 -12.471 -34.866 124.802 -4.390 -3.541 
Transport and 
communication (%) 
-29.083 -2.375 -14.944 -31.157 137.602 -0.315 -0.368 
Construction (%) -28.407 -1.462 0 -30.989 138.181 0.276 0.489 
Services (%) -28.678 -1.462 -14.149 -32.098 134.356 -1.088 -1.528 
Coal (%) -20.174 9.972 -4.187 -34.456 126.218 -1.199 12.454 
Oil (%) -26.988 1.889 -11.230 -30.331 140.453 1.427 4.855 
Natural gas (%) -28.234 1.427 -11.632 -31.178 137.531 0.140 0.383 
Thermal power (%) -18.330 12.781 -1.740 -3.796 232.037 2.908 15.087 
Clean energy (%) 0 0 0 -63.202 27.003 0.901 1.434 
factors. For instance, at a carbon tax rate of RMB¥100/tC, heavy industry reduces 
the use of coal, natural gas and thermal power by 15.302%, 4.627% and 14.484% 
respectively, while increases in the use of oil, clean energy, capital and labour are by 
2.511%, 64.238%, 1.302% and 2.845% correspondingly. Similar changes could be 
also observed in the high-carbon sectors of oil, natural gas and thermal power. In 
addition, capital and labour flow from low-carbon sectors to high-carbon sectors. As 
can be seen from Table 7.16, both the inputs of capital and labour are reduced in the 
agriculture, light industry and services sectors. The clean energy sector does not use 
coal, oil and natural gas, so the changes of these factors in the clean energy sector are 
zero. The clean energy sector uses more capital and labour to support the increase in 
production, which has been reported in section 7.5.1. 
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Moreover, comparing Table 7.17 with Table 7.16 shows that the changes of input 
factors are larger at a carbon tax rate of RMB¥200/tC than at RMB¥100/tC, 
indicating that the energy consumption structure is changing as the carbon tax 
increases. At a carbon tax rate of RMB¥200/tC, the use of clean energy as an input 
increases by as much as 141.214% in heavy industry though from a relatively low 
amount. All-in-all, these changes of input factors imply that a carbon tax leads to a 
shift from high-carbon factors towards low-carbon and non-carbon factors, away 
from carbon-related factors towards capital and labour.  
7.6.2 The carbon tax recycling scenario 
Tables 7.18 and 7.19 present the changes of input factors for sectors under the 
carbon tax recycling scenario at the carbon tax rates of RMB¥100/tC and 
RMB¥200/tC respectively. It can be seen from the tables that the substitution effect, 
shifting from high-carbon factors towards low-carbon or non-carbon factors, is less 
than that in the independent carbon tax scenario at the same carbon tax rate. This 
implies that the effect of a carbon tax on improving the energy consumption 
structure is weakened by the lump-sum transfer to households. For instance, heavy 
industry uses less clean energy, oil, capital and labour but uses more coal, natural gas 
and thermal power as inputs in the recycling scenario than in the independent 
scenario. In addition, the sectoral changes of input factors between the independent 
scenario and the recycling scenario are larger at the carbon tax rate of RMB¥200/tC 
than at RMB¥100/tC, which indicates that the negative impact of recycling carbon 
tax on improving energy consumption structure is also increasing as the carbon tax 
rises.  
In short, the carbon tax has been suggested as being able to improve the energy 
consumption structure in China by shifting from high-carbon factors towards low-
carbon or non-carbon factors. The energy consumption structure effects also get 
more obvious as the carbon tax increases. However, the positive impact of a carbon 
tax in improving the energy consumption structure could be weakened when the 
carbon tax revenue is redistributed to households, and the negative effect is more 
apparent when the carbon tax rate becomes higher.  
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Table 7.18 Comparison of the changes of input factors for sectors in the independent carbon tax scenario and carbon tax recycling 
scenario under tax rate of RMB¥100/tC 
 Coal Oil Natural gas Thermal power Clean energy Capital Labour 
 I R I R I R I R I R I R I R 
Agriculture (%) -19.994 -18.483 -3.306 -3.003 -10.039 -9.131 -17.478 -15.737 58.488 52.123 -2.623 -2.387 -3.701 -1.831 
Heavy industry (%) -15.302 -14.142 2.511 2.294 -4.627 -4.168 -14.484 -12.964 64.238 57.131 1.302 1.183 5.213 2.585 
Light industry (%) -16.933 -15.634 0.530 0.511 -6.470 -5.839 -17.697 -15.939 58.067 51.759 -2.387 -2.168 -3.547 -1.724 
Transport and 
communication (%) 
-18.289 -16.905 -1.238 -1.119 -8.114 -7.366 -15.172 -13.598 62.917 55.985 -0.188 -0.172 0.369 -0.226 
Construction (%) -17.868 -16.516 -0.739 -0.666 0 0 -15.070 -13.505 63.113 56.153 0.143 0.129 0.490 0.243 
Services (%) -18.012 -16.647 -0.713 -0.640 -7.626 -6.917 -15.805 -14.184 61.702 54.927 -0.579 -0.525 -1.531 -0.741 
Coal (%) -12.371 -11.400 5.957 5.470 -1.420 -1.193 -17.575 -15.842 58.304 51.934 -0.732 -0.673 12.476 6.044 
Oil (%) -16.989 -15.705 1.062 0.968 -5.975 -5.411 -14.642 -13.110 63.936 56.866 0.739 0.668 4.864 2.311 
Natural gas (%) -17.788 -16.445 0.762 0.691 -6.253 -5.670 -15.221 -13.647 62.824 55.897 0.050 0.043 0.383 0.180 
Thermal power (%) -11.373 -10.496 7.299 6.668 -0.171 -0.071 -2.123 -1.935 87.979 77.041 1.543 1.398 15.114 7.262 
Clean energy (%) 0 0 0 0 0 0 -39.369 -36.246 16.445 15.099 0.518 0.474 1.435 0.960 
Table 7.19 Comparison of the changes of input factors for sectors in the independent carbon tax scenario and carbon tax recycling 
scenario under tax rate of RMB¥200/tC 
 Coal Oil Natural gas Thermal power Clean energy Capital Labour 
 I R I R I R I R I R I R I R 
Agriculture (%) -31.755 -29.792 -6.065 -5.550 -18.160 -16.662 -34.515 -31.189 126.015 112.146 -4.728 -4.340 -2.015 -3.380 
Heavy industry (%) -24.373 -22.852 4.376 4.042 -9.063 -8.199 -30.111 -26.963 141.214 125.175 2.387 2.184 2.845 4.764 
Light industry (%) -27.198 -25.463 0.464 0.507 -12.471 -11.318 -34.866 -31.520 124.802 111.126 -4.390 -4.014 -1.901 -3.229 
Transport and 
communication (%) 
-29.083 -27.277 -2.375 -2.154 -14.944 -13.667 -31.157 -27.961 137.602 122.098 -0.315 -0.294 -0.245 -0.351 
Construction (%) -28.407 -26.644 -1.462 -1.319 0 0 -30.989 -27.804 138.181 122.584 0.276 0.250 0.267 0.448 
Services (%) -28.678 -26.891 -1.462 -1.311 -14.149 -12.923 -32.098 -28.862 134.356 119.322 -1.088 -0.991 -0.817 -1.393 
Coal (%) -20.174 -18.839 9.972 9.274 -4.187 -3.583 -34.456 -31.165 126.218 112.220 -1.199 -1.121 6.665 11.351 
Oil (%) -26.988 -25.317 1.889 1.738 -11.230 -10.232 -30.331 -27.177 140.453 124.515 1.427 1.292 2.553 4.410 
Natural gas (%) -28.234 -26.490 1.427 1.301 -11.632 -10.618 -31.178 -27.991 137.531 122.007 0.140 0.119 0.200 0.348 
Thermal power (%) -18.330 -17.150 12.781 11.790 -1.740 -1.363 -3.796 -3.488 232.037 197.552 2.908 2.646 8.014 13.730 
Clean energy (%) 0 0 0 0 0 0 -63.202 -59.369 27.003 25.268 0.901 0.832 1.029 1.387 
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7.7   Discussion 
7.7.1 Comparisons with other studies for China 
As reviewed in section 6.2, several studies have already simulated the effects of a 
carbon tax in China. In this section, the results from this research will be compared 
with findings obtained by other CGE studies for China, such as the studies by Zhang 
(1996), Zheng & Fan (1999), Wang  et al. (2009b)  and Lu et al. (2009). 
After an imposition of a carbon tax, the percentage changes in CO2 emissions and 
GDP in this research are smaller
26
 than those reported in Zhang (1996), Zheng & Fan 
(1999) and Wang et al. (2009b) but larger than those in Lu et al. (2009). For example, 
a carbon tax rate of RMB¥100/tC could reduce CO2 emissions by 10.981% and 
decrease GDP by 0.613% in this research, but could only achieve 6.15% CO2 
reductions while leading to 0.38% GDP loss according to Lu et al. (2009). This may 
be due to the CGE models themselves. The models use different types of functions, 
choose different parameters and simulate under different assumptions, and so obtain 
different results. These differences could be considered as the distinguishing features 
of each research. However, another finding in this research, the decreasing marginal 
effect of carbon taxation, is consistent with the findings in Zhang (1996), Zheng & 
Fan (1999) and Lu et al. (2009).  
The findings in relation to the sectoral effects of carbon tax on production, household 
consumption, imports and exports in this research are generally consistent with other 
literature. However, due to the different ways of dividing sectors in the models, the 
high-carbon content sectors in each research may be slightly different. For instance, 
this research finds that production of coal, natural gas and thermal power are affected 
most severely by a tax. Zheng & Fan (1999) argue that the oil, coking and electricity 
sectors had higher carbon intensity and would be negatively affected more by a 
carbon tax. Lu et al. (2009) show that the changes of household consumption, 
imports and exports in the oil sector are the largest, while their changes in the 
agriculture sector are the smallest among all the sectors.  
                                                 
26
 Less CO2 emissions could be reduced at the same amount of carbon tax rate. 
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Most of the studies did not clearly explore the effects of a carbon tax on changing the 
energy consumption structure. Zhang (1996) finds that labour is released from the 
high-carbon content sectors due to output reduction effects, perhaps to be absorbed 
by the services sector, which is a low-carbon sector. In this research, however, it is 
found that labour flows from low-carbon to high-carbon content sectors because of 
the substitution effects between the input factors. The different results may be caused 
by different nesting structures of the production in the CGE models, namely, the 
substitution elasticities between input factors might be set differently. In the research 
of Zhang (1996), capital and labour are composited by a Cobb-Douglas function
27
 to 
form a value-added aggregate. Coal, oil, natural gas and electricity also are 
combined by a Cobb-Douglas function to form an energy aggregate. Then, these two 
aggregates combine, by means of a CES aggregation function, to the composite input 
factors. However, the input factors in this research are composited one-by-one by 
CES functions (see section 6.3.1). 
It is difficult to make comparisons with previous studies on the effects of recycling 
the carbon tax as the recycling methods used are different across the research. 
However, most findings (including this one) confirm the existence of cushion effects 
of complementary policy in China from different aspects. In this research, at a 
carbon tax rate of RMB¥100/tC, the GDP decreases by 0.613% and 0.556% under 
the independent carbon tax scenario and the carbon tax recycling scenario 
respectively. These results show that carbon tax recycling policy could help to 
cushion the negative impact of a tax on the economy in China, but this cushion effect 
is relatively limited, indicating that the possibility of ‘double dividend’ in China 
might also be relatively small. This finding is similar to that of other research. Lu et 
al. (2009) show that the negative impact of the carbon tax on production and 
competitiveness could be reduced little by reducing the enterprise tax at the same 
time, and household consumption could be simulated by subsidizing households. At 
a carbon tax rate of RMB¥200/tC, the decline of 0.74% GDP becomes 0.71% by 
reducing the enterprise tax and 0.67% by subsidizing households.  
 
 
                                                 
27
 In the Cobb-Douglas function, the substitution elasticity between the input factors is equal to one.  
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7.7.2 The suitability of using a carbon tax in China 
The experience of the Taiyuan SO2 emissions trading program so far does not 
provide much evidence in support of a carbon emissions trading scheme in China. 
The lesson from the Taiyuan case study is that the failure of the SO2 emission 
trading program is because of the problems of design, information, regulation and 
market. It appears that there is no easy solution to these problems in the short term. 
Perhaps in the long term a Chinese carbon emissions trading scheme could be 
designed properly. But at this stage, China, as a developing country, does not have 
the information symmetry and free markets to make an ETS work. In addition, due to 
the weak legal basis and the bureaucratic environment, China would not be able to 
operate an effective ETS. Moreover, China has little experience in implementing an 
effective national carbon emissions trading scheme. Running an efficient emissions 
trading system requires a long-term learning and adaption process, which suggests 
that it may be not possible for China to use a carbon emissions trading policy to 
reduce carbon emissions in the short term. 
However, China is under increasing pressure from the international community to 
make greater efforts to mitigate its carbon emissions. Researchers agree that GHG 
problems could not be solved without the participation of the large developing 
countries, especially China, India and Brazil (CPA Australia 2009). It is therefore 
necessary for China to take action and to participate in international efforts to reduce 
CO2 emissions. While a carbon emissions trading scheme is not feasible in China in 
the short term, the alternative and effective policy a carbon tax should be considered. 
The results of the Chinese carbon tax CGE model in this study confirm that a carbon 
tax can reduce CO2 emissions significantly with a relatively small negative impact 
on GDP. A carbon tax could be implemented and monitored relatively easily by 
using the current tax system (Ekins & Barker 2002). In fact, the EU plans to include 
all flights originating or landing in Europe into the EU ETS, which is actually a 
‘carbon tariff’ (The Space Mart 2011). In addition, Australia has chosen a carbon tax 
as a transitional tool to control CO2 emissions, with a commitment to establish a 
more efficient emissions trading system in the long term. 
Australia planned for a carbon trading scheme in 2007. In 2008 the Rudd 
Government proposed the CPRS, as a cap-and-trade emissions trading system for 
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GHGS and which was intended to take effect in July 2010 (Commonwealth of 
Australia 2008). However, the CPRS is argued to be flawed and poorly designed 
with too many exemptions and not enough incentives (ABC News 2009). Due to 
these criticisms and its potential negative impact on key economic sectors, the CPRS 
was rejected in the Australia Senate. The Productivity Commission of Australia 
advised that a carbon tax could be used as a transitional tool in mitigating GHG 
emissions because it is simple in administration and could be introduced in a revenue 
neutral way (The AGE 2007).  
Considering the context and the emissions trading practice in China, it seems that a 
carbon tax is more suitable than carbon emissions trading for China at this stage. The 
experience of Australia suggests that China could also use a carbon tax as a 
transitional policy and move to a carbon emissions trading scheme when the market 
mechanism in China gets more mature. It has been reported that China will tax the 
most energy intensive industries and give preferential tax treatment to develop green 
technologies (Radio Australia 2011). In the meantime, China plans to implement an 
ETS by 2015, starting with a small pilot scheme in 2012. The findings of this 
research provide further evidence for the feasibility of these planned actions. 
7.7.3 Policy implications for implementing a carbon tax in 
China 
If a carbon tax policy was going to be adopted in China for reducing carbon 
emissions, the first question that needs to be answered is, ‘At what level should the 
carbon tax be set?’. As a developing country, China still puts economic growth as its 
top priority, so it is unlikely that China would impose a high carbon tax. Moreover, 
starting with a relatively high carbon tax rate could make a carbon tax policy 
difficult to be accepted by industries and consumers alike. Therefore, in order to 
secure economic growth and to improve political feasibility, it might be better for 
China to start a carbon tax at a low level, and increase it gradually over time. Based 
on the findings from the Chinese carbon tax CGE model, it is suggest that 
RMB¥100/tC would be a suitable level initially. Under a carbon tax of RMB¥100/tC 
CO2 emissions would decrease by 10.981% and GDP fall by only 0.613%, indicating 
that the reduction of CO2 emissions would be relatively large while the negative 
impact on GDP would be comparatively small and acceptable. In addition, a carbon 
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tax rate of RMB¥100/tC would be comparable with the charges in some other 
countries. For example, the recent price of certified emission reductions in the CDM 
market is around €13 (RMB¥104) (Point Carbon 2011). Australia’s current carbon 
tax is AU$23/tC (RMB¥156/tC) . 
It has been found that a carbon tax would affect the international competiveness of 
domestic industries in China, especially for carbon-intensive industries such as coal 
and natural gas. Thus it is suggested that a carbon tariff can be employed as a 
complementary policy to help domestic industries gain competitiveness in the 
international market. The carbon tariff includes rebating a carbon tax levied on the 
exported products directly or indirectly and imposing a similar level of carbon tax on 
imported products that have not been levied in the exporting country. Through the 
adjustments of this kind of carbon tariff, China could achieve its purpose of reducing 
carbon emissions by taxing the domestic energy industries while maintaining its 
international competitiveness by allowing exports to compete in untaxed markets and 
by taxing imports up to the same carbon tax level.     
In addition to the international competitiveness, carbon-intensive sectors might be 
affected by a tax most seriously in term of productions. In order to protect carbon-
intensive sectors, some literature suggests exempting them. However, Barker et al. 
(1993) argue that exemptions, which implies different tax rates between the 
exempted and un-exempted sectors, may lead to two problems. First, the demands of 
these exempted sectors will increase, which is a counteraction of a carbon tax. 
Second, the un-exempted sectors may try to be reclassified as exempt, and thus limit 
the impact of a carbon tax on energy consumption and CO2 emissions. An empirical 
study for Norway confirms that extensive tax exemptions largely lower the 
effectiveness of the carbon tax in reducing CO2 emissions (Bruvoll & Larsen 2004). 
Liang et al. (2007) compares two complementary policies – relieving all the sectors 
with a uniform tax rate and totally exempting energy- and trade-intensive sectors 
from a carbon tax. They find that an exemption policy would cause larger negative 
impacts and distortions. Therefore, including an exemption policy in a Chinese 
carbon tax scheme is not suggested. However, a subsidy for carbon-intensive sectors 
to use more clean energy or adopt cleaner technology could be useful. As the final 
aim of a carbon tax is to change the energy structure of the economy, subsidizing 
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carbon-intensive sectors for using clean energy or clean technology could help to 
achieve this goal.  
This research also shows that subsiding households as part of a carbon tax policy 
could help to simulate consumption and to alleviate the negative impacts of the tax 
on the economy. In addition, reducing indirect taxation of enterprises is argued by 
some researchers as a means to reduce the adverse impact of the tax on production 
and competitiveness (Liang et al. 2007; Lu et al. 2010). Therefore, when designing a 
carbon tax scheme for China, it would be better to use some complementary policies 
such as subsidizing households or reducing indirect taxation on enterprises, to relieve 
the negative impact of the carbon tax on the economy.  
7.8   Conclusion 
By using a CGE model, the impact of a carbon tax policy in China were simulated 
for the environmental effect, macroeconomic impact, sectoral effects and energy 
consumption structure effects. Two policy scenarios were considered: the 
independent carbon tax scenario and the carbon tax recycling scenario. In the 
independent carbon tax scenario, the results of six different carbon tax rates from 
RMB¥50/tC to RMB¥300/tC were compared. In the carbon tax recycling scenario, 
the case where all the carbon tax revenue is redistributed to households at the carbon 
tax rates of RMB¥100/tC and RMB¥200/tC respectively was considered. The main 
findings can be summarized as follows. 
Overall the introduction of a carbon tax will have a negative impact on the economy. 
It will lead to decreases in household consumption, total consumption, exports, total 
demand and total supply, but cause an increase in imports. 
It appears that a carbon tax is an effective policy for China as it can significantly 
decrease carbon emissions without dramatically impeding economy growth. For 
example, with a carbon tax of RMB¥100/tC the CO2 emissions will decrease by 
10.981%, while the GDP falls by only 0.613%. Moreover, the marginal effect of a 
carbon tax in reducing carbon emissions diminishes and the economy tends to 
contract at a decreasing rate as the carbon tax rate becomes higher. This is because 
with the carbon tax infinite high, the consumption of fossil energy could not be zero.  
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The sectoral effects of the carbon tax vary across the different sectors. The carbon-
intensive sectors will be affected more severely in terms of production, imports and 
exports. There is no doubt that the coal sector would suffer most seriously from a 
carbon tax. Meanwhile, the energy structure will be improved after a carbon tax is 
imposed, with a shift from high-carbon factors to low-carbon or non-carbon factors.   
Subsidizing households in the meantime could help to reduce the adverse effects of a 
carbon tax on the economy. Household consumption will increase from the baseline, 
thereby mitigating the reductions in GDP, exports, total demand and total supply. 
However, the magnitude of these reductions is relatively small, which implies that 
the cushion effect of subsidizing households in China is minimal and limited. In 
addition, the effects of a carbon tax on reducing carbon emissions and improving the 
energy consumption structure would be weakened by a lump-sum transfer to 
households.  
Finally, this chapter compared the findings in this research with results from other 
studies for China and discussed the suitability of using a carbon tax in China. 
Considering the context and the emissions trading practice in China, it is suggested 
that a carbon tax is more suitable than a carbon emissions trading scheme at this 
stage. The experience of Australia with the carbon tax issue suggests that China 
could also use a carbon tax as a transitional policy and move to a carbon emissions 
trading system when the market mechanism becomes mature.  
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Chapter 8   Conclusion and policy implications 
8.1   Summary and conclusion 
Climate change has become a top concern worldwide. Scientific evidence has clearly 
indicated that the impacts of climate change are wide and serious. In order to tackle 
the threat of global climate change, the Annex I countries committed in the Kyoto 
Protocol to reduce carbon emissions by 5.2% below the 1990 level during the period 
2008–12, while no developing countries, such as China, made such a commitment. 
Driven by urbanization and industrialization, carbon emissions in China increased 
rapidly in the last two decades: in 2006 China became the world’s largest CO2 
emitter. Thus China is under great pressure to set a good example in mitigating 
carbon emissions. At the Copenhagen Summit in 2009, China made a voluntary 
commitment to reduce carbon emissions per GDP by 40–45% below its 2005 level 
by 2020. However, China currently mainly relies on command-and-control 
regulations to control carbon emissions, which may not be effective enough to 
achieve the target. There is an increasing concern about which policy instrument 
should be introduced for China to mitigate carbon emissions. This research 
attempted to find a suitable policy solution for China to reduce its carbon emissions 
and achieve its carbon reduction target in 2020. A summary of the discussions, 
findings and conclusions in each chapter follow. 
Chapter 2 reviewed the four major policy options for reducing emissions: command-
and-control regulations, subsidies, carbon tax and emissions trading. Each type of 
policy was reviewed, including relevant theories, practices and empirical studies. In 
particular, the emissions trading market, the key elements of a well-designed 
emissions trading program and the links from early schemes to national carbon 
trading schemes were discussed. By comparing these four kinds of policy options, it 
was concluded that command-and-control regulations are likely to be far less cost 
effective than other economic instruments in reducing emissions and they have many 
negative economic impacts on some sensitive sectors, and therefore this is not an 
optimal policy for reducing carbon emissions. Subsidies go against the polluter pays 
principle and are uncertain on the emission levels, and thus cannot be used as the 
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central policy for mitigating carbon emissions. A carbon tax may be an acceptable 
policy option if the tax revenue is used to subsidize households or to offset other 
distortional taxes. It appears that emissions trading is potentially the most effective 
and efficient policy as it is theoretically more cost effective, more certain about 
emission levels and more easily linked to other countries’ carbon reduction programs 
than the other options.  
Chapter 3 is an institutional chapter. It first looked at the energy consumption, 
carbon emissions and climate change situations in China. Energy consumption and 
carbon emissions in China have increased rapidly in the past decades and would 
continue to increase strongly in the future. Climate change has caused adverse 
effects in China and the adverse impacts would be further increased by future 
climate change. Reviewing the existing climate change policies in China found that 
the existing policies and measures in China were not enough to combat the 
increasing carbon emissions and it is necessary for China to adopt a major and more 
effective national policy, such as a carbon tax or an ETS, to address the climate 
change problem. Referring to the conclusions reached in Chapter 2, carbon 
emissions trading was considered first. Research Q1 was proposed: Is emissions 
trading a suitable policy for achieving carbon reductions in China? Therefore, the 
emissions trading practice in China, particularly the SO2 emissions trading program 
in Taiyuan city was reviewed. It appeared that no empirical studies had explored the 
recent outcomes of SO2 emissions trading practice in China, and whether the 
outcomes were consistent with the theory or were the same as the initial expectation 
remained unknown. Chapter 3 then reviewed the carbon policy environment in China 
and the necessary conditions for using a carbon emissions trading policy in China, 
such as whether the emissions measurement, the Chinese market and the legal 
authority is accurate, free and adequate enough for supporting a cap-and-trade 
emissions trading program.  
Chapter 4 presented the methodologies used for addressing research Q1 (Is emissions 
trading a suitable policy for achieving carbon reductions in China?), which were a 
case study and a GHGS perspective interview. Following an explanation of the 
research framework, the Taiyuan SO2 emissions trading case study was justified and 
described. As the only air pollutant emissions trading practices in China, the SO2 
emissions trading programs were the most available data than could be used for 
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evaluating the introduction of a carbon emissions trading system in China. Being the 
most representative case, the Taiyuan SO2 emissions trading program was chosen to 
reveal the actual emissions trading practice in China. Administrators from the 
Taiyuan EPB and managers in charge of SO2 trading affairs from the participating 
enterprises were selected as the interviewees. Content analysis was used to analyse 
the interview data. Another GHGS perspective interview was designed to collect 
experts’ views on the implementation of a carbon emissions trading system in China. 
With the findings from the case study and the interviews, the question of whether 
emissions trading is a suitable policy for achieving carbon reductions could be 
addressed. Reliability and validity tests were reviewed to ensure that the qualitative 
research in this thesis was robust.  
Contrary to expectation, it was found in Chapter 5 that the Taiyuan SO2 emissions 
trading program was not functioning anything like the ideal emissions trading model. 
Though emissions were effectively reduced, innovation and investment in clean 
technology were promoted and no investment leakage was found after the program 
was introduced, participants’ motivation was merely to comply with the caps rather 
than through the trading, implying that a similar result could be achieved with 
regulations. Moreover, whether cost savings had been realized or not was not clear. 
In addition, the Taiyuan SO2 emissions trading program was found to be defective in 
design and weak in administration. The most serious problem was that a true SO2 
emissions trading market had not been formed yet. It appeared that emissions trading 
might not be suitable for China to achieve the carbon reduction target at this stage. 
The GHGS perspective interview with experts on emissions trading and with 
policymakers on carbon problems further showed that the prerequisites of carrying 
out carbon emissions trading in China were not mature enough, leading to the 
conclusion that a carbon tax might be more appropriate currently. The research Q3 
was thus proposed: Is carbon tax a suitable policy for achieving carbon reductions 
in China?  
Chapter 6 described the Chinese carbon tax CGE model and the data used to assess 
the impact of introducing a carbon tax in China, the results of which could answer 
research Q3. CGE models were argued to be the most appropriate approach for 
environmental policy analysis: they had been applied to simulate the economic 
effects of a carbon tax in many countries, including China. It was assumed that the 
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carbon tax in China was an excise tax and only applied to the production of three 
kinds of fossil energy – coal, oil and natural gas. The impact to be assessed not only 
includes the effectiveness of a carbon tax in reducing carbon emissions and the 
subsequent impact on China’s economic growth, sectoral production and 
competitiveness, but also the effects on the energy consumption structure as this has 
not been examined in other studies. It should be noted that the Chinese carbon tax 
CGE model in this research was a static, multi-sectoral, open economy model that 
covered eleven sectors and was made up of eight modules. The SAM of China in 
2007 was constructed as the data source for the CGE model on the basis of the 
‘Input-Output Table of China in 2007’ and the China Statistical Yearbook 2008. A 
calibration approach was adopted to estimate some of the model parameters and the 
widely distributed non-linear programming package GAMS was used to solve the 
model.  
In Chapter 7 the impact of a carbon tax in China were simulated in two different 
scenarios (an independent carbon tax scenario and a carbon tax recycling scenario) 
under different carbon tax rates, including the environmental, macroeconomic, 
sectoral and energy consumption structure effects. The results show that although the 
introduction of a carbon tax would have a negative impact on the economy, it 
appeared to be an effective policy as it could significantly reduce carbon emissions 
without dramatically impeding economic growth. The sectoral effects of the carbon 
tax differed among the sectors: carbon-intensive sectors would suffer the most. 
Interestingly, the model shows a shift away from high-carbon factors toward low-
carbon or non-carbon factors, indicating that the energy structure would improve 
after a carbon tax was imposed.  
However, the marginal effect of a carbon tax in reducing emissions, impeding 
economic growth, widening the gaps between sectors and improving energy 
consumption structure diminished as the carbon tax rate increased. By redistributing 
all the tax revenue to households, it was found that the adverse effects of the tax on 
the economy could be reduced to some extent, but the effect of the carbon tax in 
reducing carbon emissions and improving the energy consumption structure would 
be weakened. Considering the findings of emissions trading in China in Chapter 5 
and the simulation results of the Chinese carbon tax CGE model in this chapter, it 
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was suggested that a carbon tax might be more suitable than a carbon emissions 
trading scheme at this stage.  
8.2   Policy implications of this research 
This research aimed to find out what policy option China should adopt to achieve 
carbon reductions. Though emissions trading is argued to be the most effective and 
suitable policy for addressing climate change problem theoretically, it was found 
from the Taiyuan SO2 emissions trading practice and the GHGS perspective 
interviews that emissions trading might not be suitable for mitigating carbon 
emissions in China at this stage. This is because the institutional framework needed 
to support a cap-and-trade emissions trading program (e.g., an accurate and 
consistent emissions monitoring system, a consistent and objective enforceable 
measures, and an efficient free market) are not ready yet. Building these supporting 
infrastructures and using emissions trading in China will require considerable time, 
resources and effort. Considering that China does not yet have the institutional 
capacity in place to support a broad regional emissions trading program, it is 
preferable to develop a carbon tax at this stage. The results of the Chinese carbon tax 
CGE model in this research confirmed that the tax could be an effective policy in 
reducing carbon emissions significantly with a relatively small negative impact on 
economic growth. The experience of Australia with a carbon tax suggests that China 
could also use a carbon tax as an initial tool to control carbon emissions and move to 
a carbon emissions trading system in the long run when the market mechanism 
becomes mature and the institutional capacities are in place.  
8.3   Main contributions of this research  
This thesis has made five significant contributions to the body of knowledge as well 
as the practice of addressing climate change.  
First, this thesis provides a comprehensive review of the theoretical and empirical 
literature on the four main policy options used to reduce carbon emissions. It has 
detailed China’s energy consumption, carbon emissions, climate change situations 
and existing climate change policies, which provides a comprehensive understanding 
of the Chinese carbon context.  
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Second, this is the first research that explores the SO2 emissions trading practice in 
China from first-hand data. The findings of the Taiyuan SO2 emissions trading 
program in this research not only enriches emissions trading literature for China, but 
also provides policy suggestions on carbon reduction options and helps to improve 
the administration of the current program. In addition, the experience of the Taiyuan 
SO2 emissions trading program in this research can contribute to a better design and 
implementation of other emissions trading programs as well as a future carbon 
trading program in China. 
Third, the carbon tax CGE model of the Chinese economy and environment used in 
this research has improved existing models in three aspects. First, the electricity 
sector is divided into thermal power and clean energy sectors according to the means 
of generating electricity, and attempted to simulate the impact of a carbon tax on 
optimizing the energy structure more precisely. Second, the energy mix production 
function employs a CES function instead of the Cobb-Douglas function, which 
allows for the substitution elasticity between energy factors not being equal to one. 
Third, the energy factors are nested individually, which overcomes the limitation that 
every two energy factors have the same substitution elasticity and facilitates an 
investigation of the changes of energy consumption structure. In addition, the effects 
of the carbon tax on improving energy consumption structures have been first 
investigated by using the CGE model, which fills a research gap for China.  
Fourth, this research provides rigorous evidence for policymakers to make related 
policy decisions. For example, the carbon tax simulation results from the proposed 
Chinese carbon tax CGE model can be very useful for policymakers to comprehend 
the carbon tax at the national level.  
Finally, this research may motivate other developing countries to actively participate 
in finding a suitable policy solution for mitigating their national carbon emissions.   
8.4   Limitations and future research  
While this thesis has achieved its main objectives, there are still some limitations, 
mainly owing to the methodologies used and the unavailability of data. Future 
research should try to overcome the limitations.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
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First, it was not possible to include all the SO2 emissions trading practices in China 
in the case study analysis. For example, only a little second-hand information for the 
SO2 emissions trading program in Henan province could be found. Also, because of 
the inability to investigate two or more SO2 emissions trading practices personally, 
the case study in this research is a single case and the readers should be cautious in 
generalising the findings from the Taiyuan case.  
Second, CGE models have some inherent limitations for practical policy decisions. 
The most frequently mentioned limitation is the lack of empirical validation
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(Borges 1986). Furthermore, they are built on the general equilibrium assumption 
and the perfect competition assumption, which might not be representative of the 
real world. These limitations are common to almost all modelling simulations.  
Third, the Chinese carbon tax CGE model in this research is not a dynamic CGE 
model. This is partly due to the unavailability of data for a dynamic CGE model. 
Also, a static CGE model is believed to be sufficient for achieving the research 
purpose. But limitation of the static CGE model is that it does not account for the 
possible technology progress that enables firms to more efficiently utilize the energy 
inputs, which in turns help to reduce the emissions. Future research could construct a 
dynamic Chinese CGE model that considering the price-induced technological 
change to predict the impact of a carbon tax in the long term.   
Fourth, the lump-sum transfer of the tax revenue in the CGE model is equal to every 
household without any regard to the income level of the households. Future research 
would be possible to disaggregate the households into several deciles so that 
compensation can be carried out favouring the low income households as generally 
discussed in the literature. 
Fifth, the clean energy data used in the Chinese carbon tax CGE model are estimated 
data. In the 42-sectors I/O table, the clean energy sector is part of the electricity 
sector. It is separated from the electricity sector by using the Electricity Balance 
Table in the China Statistical Yearbook 2008. However, the input and output data of 
clean energy in different sectors could not be found and can only be estimated on the 
                                                 
28
 Most of the CGE models are calibrated rather than econometrically estimated. The calibration 
procedure is based on the elasticities borrowed from other literature, which may be not suitable in the 
research due to different definitions of variables or level of disaggregation (Zhang 1996). 
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basis of the average percentage of used and produced clean energy. Future research 
could use the actual clean energy data and generate more precise simulation results.  
Sixth, the econometric approach was not applied in estimating the relative 
parameters of the CGE model due to insufficient time-series data and computing 
resources. Future research could use the econometric approach instead of the 
calibration approach to estimate some of the parameters of the CGE model.    
Finally, future research could use a CGE model to examine the existence of ‘double 
dividend’ in China (i.e. levy a carbon tax while cut other distorting taxes such as the 
income tax), or include both a carbon tax and an ETS in one CGE model to obtain 
some more exciting results.  
8.5   A final word  
When I had all but finished this thesis, Economic Information Daily, a state-run 
Chinese newspaper reported that proposals for a new environmental taxation system 
had been submitted for review to the Ministry of Finance (Liang & Wang 2012; 
Maher & Sainsbury 2012). In the proposal, a carbon tax scheme, aimed primarily at 
large users of coal, crude oil and natural gas, is expected to be implemented before 
the end of China’s 2011–15 five year plan. The tax rate is likely to be RMB¥10 
(US$1.59) for each tonne of carbon but will increase gradually. In addition, it is said 
that the Chinese Government has been working on plans to pilot emission trading 
schemes in key provinces and cities from 2012, with a national program to be 
operating by 2015 (Maher & Sainsbury 2012; Radio Australia 2011). A spokesman 
for Australian Climate Change Minister Greg Combet said China was already taking 
action to tackle climate change.    
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Appendix 1 List of important events in emissions trading practices 
in China 
Time Events and Activities 
1987 
China started an emission permits pilot in water pollution.   
Emissions permits were transferred between the Shanghai 10
th
 Steel Factory 
and the Tangshan Electroplating Factory in Minhang District, Shanghai. The 
Electroplating Factory was compensated RMB¥40 000 for the economic loss 
every year. 
Shanghai Novel Colour Picture Tube Co. Ltd. bought emission permits of 
395 kg CO2 per day from Shanghai Hong Wen Mills. 
1987–present 
Since the water pollutants emissions trading was carried out in Minhang 
District, Shanghai, 37 transactions have been achieved, involving 1301 kg/d 
CO2 emissions permits and RMB¥13.91 in total. 
March 1988 
‘Interim measures on the management of water pollutants emissions permits’ 
was released by SEPA. 
June 1988 
SEPA identified 18 cities as pilot units for implementing water pollutants 
emissions permits, including Shanghai, Beijing, Tianjin, Shenyang, Xuzhou 
and Changzhou. 
July 1989 
According to the Article 9 of ‘Water Pollution Control Act implementation 
rules’, the enterprises or institutions that discharge pollutants into the water 
should be regulated by the emissions permits.  
1990 
SEPA began selecting some cities for piloting air pollutants emission permits, 
including Baotou, Liuzhou, Taiyuan, Pingdingshan, and Yangzhou. 
April 1991 SEPA began the air pollutants emissions permits pilot in 16 cities. 
1993 
Kaiyuan City Government, Yunnan Province published the ‘Interim measures 
on the management of air pollutants emission permits in Kaiyuan’. The 
Kaiyuan EPB released the ‘Measures on air pollutants emissions trading in 
Kaiyuan’, indicating the implementation of total quantity charges and 
emissions trading for SO2, smoke and dust. 
Local laws and regulations in Liaoning Province stipulated that all pollutant 
emissions units must be managed by permits. 
1994 
SEPA carried out air pollutants emissions trading in Baotou, Kaiyuan, Liuzhou, 
Taiyuan, Pingdingshan and Guiyang cities. 
SEPA announced the end of emission permits pilot work and started to 
implement the emissions permits system in all of the pilot cities. 
1995 
According to the Article 19 of ‘Water Pollution Control Ordinance in Huaihe 
River Basin’, all emission permit owners in the Haihe River Basin should 
ensure that their emission amount is no more than the total emissions quantity 
stipulated by the emission permits. 
September 1996 
In ‘The plan of controlling the total emission quantity of the national major 
pollutants in the 9
th
 Five-year Plan’, the State Council formally proposed total 
quantity control as one environmental policy, which provided the system basis 
for implementing emissions trading in China. 
1997 
The Beijing Environment and Development Committee and the US 
Environment Defense Fund (EDF) carried out a research project on emissions 
trading. In the first stage of the project, Benxi and Nantong were chosen as the 
case study cities for the research on implementing emissions trading at the city 
level. 
In Jiaxin the EPB, the Price Department and the Finance Department published 
‘The measures on the management of total quantity control of water pollutant 
emissions and the compensation of using emissions right in Shuizhou District’. 
The Shuizhou Wastewater Treatment Co. Ltd, a state-owned asset management 
company, was responsible for collecting the fees for using emissions rights. All 
the fees were used for constructing the living wastewater treatment factories in 
the villages of the district. 
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August 1998 
Taiyuan adopted the ‘Administrative regulation for total quantity control of air 
pollutants emissions in Taiyuan city’, which is the first local regulation that 
includes total quantity control of emissions trading in China. 
April 1999 
During the visit of Premier Zhu Rongji to the US, Mr Xie Zhenhua (the 
director of SEPA in China) and Ms Carlo Brown (the director of the US EPA) 
signed a cooperation agreement, which included a project named ‘The 
feasibility research on using market mechanism to reduce SO2 emissions in 
China’. Nantong, Jiangsu and Benxi, Liaoning were selected as the pilot cities 
for this project. 
September 1999 
SEPA and the EDF signed a memorandum of cooperation on ‘The research on 
how to use the market instruments to help the local governments and 
enterprises achieve the total quantity control of pollutants emissions stipulated 
by the State Council’. 
November 1999 
SEPA and the EPA held ‘The international seminar on discussing the 
feasibility of implementing SO2 emissions trading in China’ in the Beijing 
International Conference Centre. 
March 2000 
Article 10 of the revised ‘Rules for the implementation of the Water Pollution 
Control Act’: the local EPB allocates the water pollutant emission permits 
according to the total quantity control plan. 
April 2000 
Article 15 of the revised ‘Air Pollution Control Act’: implement total quantity 
control and emissions permits system for the major air pollutants in the regions 
not meeting the prescribed air quality standards and the two acid rain control 
areas designated by the State Council. This provides a legal basis for total 
quantity control policy.   
October 2000 
Fifteen experts from SEPA, the State Planning Commission, the Chinese 
Research Academy of Environmental Science, Benxi EPB and Nantong EPB 
visited the US and investigated the US SO2 emissions trading program. They 
held ‘The second seminar of using market mechanism to control SO2 emissions 
in China and US’ in the US with the EPA. 
November 2001 
Dongyang and Yiwu, two cities in Jinhua District, Zhejiang Province, signed 
an agreement for transferring water rights. The Yiwu city paid 
RMB¥0.2 billion to Dongyang for the permanent use right of 50 million m3 
water in Hengmian water reservoir. This is the first water rights trading 
between cities in China. 
2001 
SEPA, the State Electricity Company and the US EDF organized several 
seminars regarding SO2 reductions and emissions trading in Huangshan, 
Beijing, Nanjing etc. 
September 2001 
The ADB and the Shanxi Provincial Government launched the ‘SO2 emissions 
trading program’, which was implemented by the RFF and CAEP jointly. This 
program was piloted in Taiyuan city and 26 large enterprises participated. 
With the help from the RFF and CAEP, Taiyuan drafted the ‘Administrative 
regulation for SO2 emissions trading in Taiyuan city’, which is the first local 
regulation on SO2 emissions trading in China. 
Nantong Tiansheng Guangfa Power Co. sold 1800 t SO2 emissions permits to 
Nantong Acetate Fiber Co. Ltd, with a contract lasting for 6 years. 
2002 
Jiangsu Taicang Port Green Power Co. Ltd bought annual 1700 t SO2 
emissions permits from 2003–05 from Nanjing Shimonoseki Plant. 
The Hongkong Special Administration Government and the Guangdong 
Provincial Government published ‘Joint announcement of improving the air 
quality in Pearl River Delta’: both areas are respectively responsible for 30% 
SO2 reductions by 2010, and emissions trading is considered as one of the 
instruments for both areas to cooperate in reducing air pollutants emissions. 
March 2002 
SEPA published ‘The notice of promoting the total quantity control and 
emissions trading research projects of SO2’, implementing SO2 total quantity 
control and emissions trading demonstration work in the Shandong, Shanxi, 
Jiangsu, Henan, Shanghai, Tianjin, Liuzhou provinces or cities. The largest 
emissions trading demonstration work launched by the Chinese government so 
far. 
May 2002 SEPA published ‘The notice of organizing the SO2 total quantity control and 
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emissions trading demonstration work’, and cooperated with the EDF in 
implementing pilot projects of ‘SO2 Total Quantity Control and Emissions 
Trading’ in the Shandong, Shanxi, Jiangsu, Henan, Shanghai, Tianjin, Liuzhou 
provinces or cities. 
June 2002 
Xiuzhou District, Jiangxing city firstly carried out pilots in emissions trading. 
All the emission enterprises must buy the ‘original’ emissions permits first and 
then introduce the emissions permits into the market for trading. 
July 2002 
SEPA organized ‘SO2 emissions trading’ pilot meeting with Shandong, Shanxi, 
Jiangsu, Henan, Shanghai, Tianjin, Liuzhou provinces or cities, clearly defining 
the specific steps and implementation plan of the emissions trading pilot work. 
September 2002 
‘The 10th Five-year Plan of acid rain and SO2 pollution control in two control 
areas’, which was approved and conducted by the State Council, started to 
implement SO2 total quantity control and emission permits in two control areas. 
October 2002 
The Taiyuan Government published the first city level regulation on SO2 
emissions trading: ‘Administrative regulation for SO2 emissions trading in 
Taiyuan city (trial)’. 
The Jiangsu EPB and the Jiangsu Economy and Trade Office jointly designed 
‘Interim measures on the management of SO2 emissions trading in Jiangsu 
electric power industry’. 
October 2002 
Eleven enterprises from Honghe and Wangdian Villages, Xiuzhou District, 
which are famous for sweater dyeing, participated in the launch ceremony of 
the first compensation using emission rights. The trading contracts between the 
enterprises involved RMB¥1.4359 million. 
2003 
With coordination from the Henan EPB, Yima Coal and Gas Co. bought 900 t 
SO2 emissions permits annually from the Henan Zhongyuan Gold Smelter. 
The State Electric Power Changzhou Generating Co. Ltd paid Zhenjiang Jianbi 
Power Plant RMB¥3 million annually for 2000 t SO2 emission permits per year 
for 2006–10. 
March 2002 
In the Tenth National People’s Congress Meeting, Xie Zhenhua, the director of 
SEPA, clearly expressed that China started to pilot SO2 emissions trading in 
some key areas. 
April 2002 
SEPA and the EDF cooperated in carrying out training seminars on SO2 total 
quantity control and emissions trading nationally.  
December  2005 
The ‘Implementing the scientific concept of development and strengthening 
environmental protection’ suggested implementing total quantity control for the 
pollutants, promoting emissions permits system and carrying out pilots in 
emission trading.  
Data source: Adopted from Wang et al. (2009a, pp. 34-6) 
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Appendix 2 Progress on emissions trading practice since 2006 
Date Activities Policy Scope Policy Objects 
March–June 2006 
The Ministry of Finance and the former SEPA jointly investigated emission trading 
schemes and compensation for the use of emission rights. 
Nationwide 
Air and water pollutants 
emissions trading 
30
 
August 2006 
The City University of Hong Kong organized a seminar, ‘Emissions trading in China: 
from concept to practice’. 
Electric Power Sector in 
Hong Kong 
SO2, NOX etc. 
January 2007 
The Minister of Finance suggested steadily promoting pilot projects in reforming the 
compensation for the use of resources and environment. 
National Power Sector 
and Taihu Lake Basin 
SO2, COD, Ammonia 
30 January 2007 
Guangdong and Hong Kong Governments published ‘The experimental plan of 
implementing emissions trading in thermal power plants in the Pearl River Delta’. 
Region (Pearl River 
Delta) 
Mainly SO2, also included 
NOX , and PM10 
March 2007 
‘The technology research for SO2 emissions trading in electric power sector’ was 
started with the support of national technology.  
National Electric Power 
Sector 
SO2 
29 April 2007 The first SO2 emissions trading scheme implemented in Wuhan, Hubei Province. Region (Wuhan city) SO2 
1 July 2007 
The Ministry of Finance and SEPA decided to carry out emission trading pilot 
projects in the electric power sector and Taihu Lake Basin.  
 SO2, COD, Ammonia 
7 June 2007 
The ‘Comprehensive proposal on energy conservation’ from the State Council 
proposed the finishing of the drafting of the administrative regulations on the 
management of SO2 emissions trading and so on. 
National Electric Power 
Sector 
SO2 
13 August 2007 
Zhuji city published ‘Interim regulations on the compensation for the use of 
pollutants emission permits in Zhuji city’. 
District (Zhuji city) SO2, COD 
29 August 2007 
Zhuji city published ‘Rules for the implementation of the interim regulations on the 
compensation for the use of pollutants emission permits in Zhuji city’. 
District (Zhuji city)  
September 2007 
The ‘Rules on water pollution control in Taihu Lake (revised)’ was approved by the 
Standing Committee of the Jiangsu People’s Congress. It suggested that the Taihu 
Lake would gradually carry out the paid initial allocation and trading of major water 
pollutants emission permits. 
Region (Taihu Lake, 
Jiangsu) 
COD 
27 September 2007 
The Jiaxing Government published ‘Rules on the implementation of emissions 
trading of the major pollutants in Jiaxin city (Trial)’. 
District (Jiaxin city) COD, SO2 
10
 
November 2007 
Jiaxing established the first domestic emissions trading institution – Emission 
Allowances Reserve and Trade Centre. 
 COD, SO2 
13 December 2007 
The Ministry of Finance and SEPA approved Jiangsu carrying out pilot projects in 
the paid use and trading of emission rights in Taihu Lake. 
` Mainly CO2 
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31 December 2007 
Jiangsu, Zhejiang and Shanghai planned to carry out joint pilot projects in the paid 
use and trading of emission rights in the Yangtze River Delta region. 
Region (Yangtze River 
Delta) 
COD, SO2 
31 December 2007 
The third China-US strategic dialogue established cooperation in the SO2 emissions 
trading of electric power sector.  
Nationwide SO2 
1 January 2008 
The ‘Administrative regulations on the charges of using the major water pollutants 
emission rights in Taihu Lake, Jiangsu (Trial)’ was implemented. 
Taihu Lake Basin, 
Jiangsu 
COD, Ammonia, Total 
Phosphorus 
1 January 2008 
The ‘Administrative regulations on the charges of using the SO2 emission rights in 
Jiangsu (Trial)’ was implemented. 
Jiangsu Province SO2 
March 2008 
Wuhan Guanggu Property Exchange planned to establish a platform for emissions 
trading, bringing emissions trading into the property trading market. 
Region (Hubei Province) COD, SO2 
25 March 2008 
The ‘Administrative regulation for SO2 emissions trading in Taiyuan city’ was 
formally implemented. 
District (Taiyuan city) SO2 
May 2008 
The Tinjin Property Rights Exchange, CNPC Assets Management Co. Ltd and the 
Chicago Climate Exchange prepared the establishment of the Tianjin Emissions 
Exchange. 
Natiowide 
Quantifiable, indicator and 
standardized environmental 
products 
15 May 2008 
The National Environmental Economics Institute and the Pilot Technology Team 
conducted emissions trading investigations in Jiangsu and Zhejiang. 
Electric Power Sector 
and Taihu Lake 
CO2, SO2 
11 June 2008 
The Environmental Planning Institute of SEPA began to develop the management 
platform for the SO2 emissions trading in the electric power sector. 
Electric Power Sector SO2 
17–18 June 2008 
A seminar, ‘Paid use and trade of water pollutants emissions rights’, held by the 
Environmental Planning Institute of SEPA in Jiaxing. 
Nationwide 
Water pollutants emissions 
trading 
5 August 2008 The Beijing Environment Exchange was established. Nationwide 
A trading platform for 
environmental products. 
5 August 2008 The Shanghai Environment & Energy Exchange was established. Nationwide 
A trading platform for all 
kinds of interests in the 
environment and energy. 
30 June 2008 
The ‘Plan of piloting the paid use and trading of the major pollutants emission rights 
in Zhejiang Province’ was demonstrated by experts. 
Region (Zhejiang 
Province) 
COD, SO2 
6 August 2008 
The ‘Overall plan of implementing comprehensive pilots of emissions trading in 
Binghai New District, Tianjin’ 
Nationwide 
COD, SO2 ,carbon emissions 
and so on 
 
 
14 August 2008 
The Ministry of Finance, SEPA and the Jiangsu Provincial Government launched 
pilot projects on the paid use and trading of major water pollutants emission rights in 
Regions (Su, Xi, Chang 
along the Taihu Lake and 
COD 
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Taihu Lake in Wuxi city. areas of Nanjing, 
Zhenjiang) 
10 September 2008 Heilongjiang SO2 emissions trading platform was established. Heilongjiang Province SO2 
24 September 2008 The Tianjin Emissions Exchange was established, auctioning the excess allowances. 
International (CO2) 
Domestic (COD, SO2  
etc.) 
COD, SO2 ,carbon 
emissions, environmental 
technology, energy services 
etc. 
November 2008 
An international seminar of emissions trading was held by the Environmental 
Planning Institute of SEPA in Nanjing. 
  
 Data source: Wang et al. (2009a, pp. 37-8) 
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Appendix 3 Administrative regulations for SO2 emissions trading in 
Taiyuan city 
1. In order to protect and improve the environmental air quality, achieve the total 
quantity control target of sulphur dioxide at the least cost through sulphur dioxide 
emissions trading, and promote the harmonious development of environment, society 
and economics, this regulation is established according to ‘The People’s Republic of 
China Air Pollution Prevention Law’ and ‘Administrative Regulation on the Total 
Quantity Control of Air Pollutant Emissions in Taiyuan city’, and the actual situation 
in Taiyuan city. 
2. The sulphur dioxide emissions trading is refer to: the activities of buying and 
selling the sulphur dioxide emission allowances between the pollution discharge 
units under the total quantity control. 
3. All the sulphur dioxide emission units in the administrative division scope of 
Taiyuan city are covered by this regulation. 
4. All the sulphur dioxide emissions trading should obey the rules of market 
economy, and the allowances in the total quantity control can be transferred with 
compensation under the instructions of the government. 
5. The city environmental protection administrative department is responsible for the 
supervision and management of the sulphur dioxide emissions trading. The related 
Plan, Economy, Law, Finance and Price departments manage the sulphur dioxide 
emissions trading according to respective responsibility. 
6. The units engaged in sulphur dioxide emissions trading are not exempted from 
other legal obligations of environmental protection. 
7. According to the total national and provincial quantity control targets of sulphur 
dioxide emissions, the city environmental protection administrative department 
formulates the total quantity control objective and the yearly reducing plan of 
sulphur dioxide emissions for this city. 
8. Based on the total quantity control target and the data reported by the pollution 
discharge units and then approved by the city environmental protection 
administrative department, the city environmental protection administrative 
department works out five-year’s sulphur dioxide emissions yearly emission 
allowances in the first year of each five-year’s plan. The emissions allowances are 
allocated to the pollution discharge units after authorizing by the people’s 
government of the city. 
9. In the yearly emission allowances received by each pollution discharge unit from 
the city environmental protection administrative department, each ton of sulphur 
dioxide allowable emission is equal to a sulphur dioxide emission allowance. 
10. The reduced sulphur dioxide emission allowances, which due to the central 
supply of heat, closing down, suspension of business, merging, transferring, moving 
and bankruptcy, should be recalled or adjusted in time by the city environmental 
protection administrative department. 
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11. The sulphur dioxide emission allowances of the existing pollution discharge 
units will not be increased because of the reconstruction, extension, merge and 
separation. The newly built enterprises can obtain the yearly emission allowances by 
trading, and participate in the sulphur dioxide emission allowances distribution in the 
next five-year plan. 
12. The sulphur dioxide emission allowances owned by the pollution discharge units 
can be traded.  The surplus emission allowances can be stored, but cannot be used in 
advance. 
13. When use the storage allowances, the pollution discharge units must fill in 
‘Taiyuan application of using sulphur dioxide storage allowances’. The storage 
allowances only then can be used after being approved by the city environmental 
protection administrative department. 
14. The allowances trading adopt the way which both parties have agreed. Based on 
the reducing cost of sulphur dioxide and the market conditions, the trading price is 
decided freely by the both parties. The buyers and sellers need to sign the ‘Taiyuan 
sulphur dioxide allowance trading contract’ after concluding a transaction. The 
contract only then becomes effective after being identified and filled by the city 
environmental protection administrative department. 
15. The recalled or adjusted allowances, which are brought forth because of the 
above article 10
 
and so on, can be auctioned by the city environmental protection 
administrative department. The concrete details of auction are formulated by the city 
environmental protection administrative department. 
16. The pollution discharge units can obtain the emission allowances by auctioning. 
The auction income is turned in the finance to improve the air quality specially. 
17. For the pollution discharge units, the actual sulphur dioxide emissions in each 
year are no higher than the sulphur dioxide emission allowances that they hold at the 
end of the year. 
18. The city environmental protection administrative department establishes the 
sulphur dioxide emission allowances tracking system and the transaction 
management system, sets up the sulphur dioxide emission account to track the target 
enforcement and allowances trading of each pollution discharge unit, and publishes 
the information and the guiding price of sulphur dioxide emission trading. 
19.  The pollution discharge units should install the continuously online monitoring 
equipment to accurately measure and master the emissions of sulphur dioxide, and 
then pass the data to the city environmental monitoring central station regularly. 
20. Each pollution discharge unit must fill in ‘Taiyuan pollution discharge units’ 
seasonally report of sulphur dioxide’ in the end of each season and ‘Taiyuan 
pollution discharge units’ yearly report of sulphur dioxide’ before 15th January of 
each year, and then report them to the city environmental protection administrative 
department for approving. 
21. If the pollution discharge units want to change the emission way of sulphur 
dioxide, they should submit applications to the city environmental protection 
administrative department 30 days in advance, and fulfil the change registration 
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formalities. They cannot change the way if the applications are not approved.  If the 
city environmental protection administrative department has not replied clearly in 20 
days since the submission of the application, it is regarded as the agreement of the 
change. 
22. In March of each year, after compiling ‘Taiyuan sulphur dioxide emissions 
yearly report’ and ‘Taiyuan sulphur dioxide emission allowances trading contract’ of 
all the pollution discharge units in the city, the city environmental protection 
administrative department publishes last year’s ‘Taiyuan sulphur dioxide emissions 
and emissions trading bulletin’, notifying the sulphur dioxide emission allowances 
and transactions information of pollution discharge units.  
23. The pollution discharge units, whose actual sulphur dioxide emissions surpass 
the emission allowances they owned in the whole year, will be fined from 3000 to 
8000RMB per excessive allowance by the city environmental protection 
administrative department, but the total penalty is less than 30000RMB. 
24. Without the confirmation of the city environmental protection administrative 
department, the emissions trading is regarded as the invalid trading. And both the 
trading parties will be fined from 3000RMB to 30000RMB by the city 
environmental protection administrative department. 
25. The units violate other relevant provisions of this regulation will be punished by 
the city environmental protection administrative department according to relevant 
laws and regulations. 
26. The enforcement officers of environmental protection administrative department, 
who neglect of duty, abuse of power, play favouritism and commit irregularities 
during the implementation of the supervision and management of sulphur dioxide 
emissions trading, will be administrative executed by the unit or the higher 
authorities. Those constitute a crime shall be held criminal responsibility. 
27. The pollution discharge units who are unsatisfied with the administrative penalty 
decision can apply for administrative reconsideration or bring an administrative 
lawsuit. 
28. The specific issues in the application of this regulation are interpreted by the 
legislative affairs office of municipal government, and organized and implemented 
by the city environmental protection administrative department. 
29. This regulations are put into force after 30 days of announcement. 
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Appendix 4 Interview questions 1 
Interviewees: Managers response for the emissions trading affairs in the 
companies  
General information: 
1. How long have you been working in this company? ................................................. 
2. What is your position now? ........................................................................................ 
3. How long have you been working in this position? ................................................... 
Interview questions: 
Part 1: Basic situation of your company 
1. Could you please give a brief introduction of your company at first?  
(1) Background or history 
(2) The main business and employees 
(3) The total assets, net profits, market share and production of your company 
(4) Fuel price, energy consumption and emission cost 
(5) How does the government support your business? 
(6) Where can I get more information about your company?  
2. How is the SO2 emissions trading going for your company? 
(1) How many emission permits were allocated to your company annually since 
2003?  
(2) How many emissions did your company actually emit each year? 
(3) Have your company done any transactions of emission permits since the SO2 
trading program was implemented?  
(4) If so, how many times? When? With whom? How much? Why?        
(5) Where can I get more information on your emissions trading?                                                                                                                             
Part 2: The SO2 trading practice 
1. What are the impacts of SO2 trading program on your company?  
(1) The emission amount  
(2) The emission cost 
(3) Innovation and investment in clean technology 
(4) Direct and indirect investment outside Taiyuan city 
(5) Any other impacts? 
(6) Where can I get more information? 
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2. What do you think about the SO2 trading program? 
(1) Is it effective in reducing the SO2 emissions? 
(2) Is it better than the previous command-and-control regulations?  
3. As your known, what do other companies covered by the SO2 trading program do 
in facing of the SO2 cap-and-trade program? 
4. In your opinion, what are the problems of the existing SO2 trading program?  
5. Could you please give some suggestions for making it better? 
Part 3: The future carbon trading program 
1. From your experience with SO2 trading, what do you think about using emissions 
trading to achieve carbon reductions? 
2. What kind of experiences or lessons you have learned from SO2 trading practice 
that would be applicable for carbon trading? 
3. Based on the SO2 practice, how to design the key features of a carbon trading 
scheme if it were going to be implemented in China? 
(1) Targets 
(2) Coverage 
(3) Allocation 
(4) Banking and borrowing 
(5) Linkage 
(6) Monitoring and enforcement 
(7) Any other features need to be considered carefully? 
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Appendix 5 Interview questions 2 
Interviewees: Administrators from the Taiyuan Environmental Protection Bureau 
General information: 
1. How long have you been working in the Environmental Protection Bureau? ........... 
2. What is your position now? ........................................................................................ 
3. How long have you been working in this position? ................................................... 
Interview questions: 
Part 1: The SO2 trading practice 
1. How is the SO2 trading program going since it was implemented?  
(1) Number of trades between companies 
(2) When? Who? Why? How much? 
(3) Enforcement, monitoring and leakage 
(4) Where can I get more information? 
2. What are the impacts of SO2 trading program on the companies?  
(1) The emission amount  
(2) The emission cost 
(3) Innovation and investment in clean technology 
(4) Direct and indirect investment outside Taiyuan city 
(5) Any other impacts? 
3. What do you think about the SO2 trading program?  
(1) Is it effective in controlling or reducing the SO2 emissions? 
(2) Is the SO2 trading market really existing? 
(3) Is it better than the previous command-and-control regulations?  
4. What have the government done to help the 23 companies adopt the SO2 cap-and-
trade program? 
(1) Direct financial support 
(2) Indirect financial support 
(3) Other supports 
(4) Where can I get more information? 
5. In your opinion, what are the major problems of the existing SO2 trading program?  
6. How could the SO2 trading program be improved? 
Part 2: The future carbon trading program 
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1. From your experience with SO2 trading, what do you think about using emissions 
trading to achieve carbon reductions? 
2. What kind of experiences or lessons you have learned from SO2 trading practice 
that would be applicable for carbon trading? 
(1) What might be the differences between SO2 trading and carbon trading? 
(2) Anything unusual about Taiyuan city compared to other regions? 
3. Based on the SO2 practice, how to design the key features of a carbon trading 
scheme if it were going to be implemented in China? 
(1) Targets 
(2) Coverage 
(3) Allocation 
(4) Banking and borrowing 
(5) Linkage 
(6) Monitoring and enforcement 
(7) Any other features need to be considered carefully? 
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Appendix 6 Interview questions 3 
Interviewees: policy-makers, scholars on carbon reductions issue and managers 
from Carbon Exchanges 
General information: 
1. What kind of work you are engaged in? ..................................................................... 
2. What is your position now? ........................................................................................ 
3. How long have you been working in the carbon area? .............................................. 
Interview questions: 
1. What do you think about using emissions trading to achieve carbon reductions? 
2. What are the necessary considerations for China when using emissions trading to 
achieve carbon reductions? 
(1) Market conditions 
(2) Economic development level 
(3) Legal base and enforcement  
(4) Is China different to EU situation? 
3. How to design the key features of a carbon trading scheme if it were going to be 
implemented in China? 
(1) Targets 
(2) Coverage 
(3) Allocation 
(4) Banking and borrowing 
(5) Linkage 
(6) Monitoring and enforcement 
(7) Any other features need to be considered carefully? 
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Appendix 7 Plain language statement 
 
TO:  Participants  
Full Project Title: Emissions Trading in China: Lessons from Taiyuan city 
Student Researcher: Zhen (Jane) Lu 
 
I am Jane, a PhD candidate in Faculty of Business, University of Southern Queensland, 
Australia. My research project is about the emissions trading in China. I would like to invite 
you to take part in this research project. 
You are invited to participate in this research project because (your company is included by 
the SO2 trading program in Taiyuan City. As the manager responsible for SO2 trading affairs 
in the company, you have the first hand information of the emissions trading practice. I got 
your private contact details from the official website of the company.)(you are the 
administrator from the Taiyuan Environmental Protection Bureau who in charge of the SO2 
trading program in Taiyuan City. As the representative of the administrators, you have the 
absolute qualification to talk about the lessons and experience of the emissions trading in 
China. I got your private contact details from the official website of Taiyuan Environmental 
Protection Bureau.) (you are an scholar expert on carbon reductions issue. I got your private 
contact details from your published journal articles.) (you are the manager of the Carbon 
Exchange who are an expert in carbon trading area. I got your private contact details from 
the official website of the Shanghai/Tianjin Carbon Exchange.) (you are the policymaker on 
the carbon reductions issue who has the administrative power to make policy decisions or at 
least has influence on policy decisions of carbon reductions issue. I got your private contact 
details from the official website.)  
Please read this Plain Language Statement carefully. Its purpose is to explain to you as 
openly and clearly as possible all the procedures involved so that you can make a fully 
informed decision as to whether you are going to participate. Feel free to ask questions 
about any information in the document.  You may also wish to discuss the project with a 
relative or friend or your local health worker. Feel free to do this. 
Once you understand what the project is about and if you agree to take part in it, it is asked 
that you sign the Consent Form. By signing the Consent Form, you indicate that you 
understand the information and that you give your consent to participate in the research 
project. 
 
1. Purpose of Research 
 
The purpose of this project is to investigate whether emissions trading as a policy option can 
help China achieve carbon reductions. This research project will help the researcher obtain 
the PhD degree.  
 
U n i v e r s i t y  o f  S o u t h e r n  Q u e e n s l a n d  
 
The University of Southern Queensland  
 
Plain Language Statement 
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Previous experience has shown that emissions trading, as a market-based policy, may be 
the most suitable instrument for reducing carbon emissions. But at this stage, it is difficult to 
assert which policy instrument is more effective in reducing carbon emissions in China in the 
absence of large scale applications and rigorous analysis. If an emissions trading system 
were going to be implemented in China to reduce carbon emissions, its effectiveness and 
design features need to be carefully assessed by examining the evidence from existing 
emissions trading practice in China and elsewhere. 
  
2. Procedures 
 
Participation in this project will involve  
 
 The interview will be a face-to-face semi-structured interview. Each participant will be 
interviewed for one time and each interview will last for 45-60 minutes. 
 
 Tape recording will be considered during the interview. But if the interviewee feels 
uncomfortable about recording, the researcher will take notes instead. 
 
 The participants will get both environmental and economic benefits for taking part in the 
research. 
 
 No potential risks are expected for the participants. 
 
3. Confidentiality 
 
The digital data will be stored on a special disk with encryption. The written documents and 
recording tapes will be locked in a personal filing cabinet. According to the rules, all the data 
will be stored for 5 years and then destroyed. 
Any information obtained in connection with this project and that can identify you will remain 
confidential. It will only be disclosed with your permission, subject to legal requirements. If 
you give me your permission by signing the Consent Form, I plan to publish the results in a 
PhD and academic journals. 
In any publication, information will be provided in such a way that you cannot be identified. 
The conclusions of the study will be drawn in aggregate terms and any individual opinion will 
be reported in a de-identified form.  
 
4. Voluntary Participation 
 
Participation is entirely voluntary. If you do not wish to take part you are not obliged to. If 
you decide to take part and later change your mind, you are free to withdraw from the project 
at any stage. Any information already obtained from you will be destroyed.  
Your decision whether to take part or not to take part, or to take part and then withdraw, will 
not affect your relationship with the University of Southern Queensland. 
Before you make your decision, the researcher will be available to answer any questions you 
have about the research project. You can ask for any information you want. Sign the 
Consent Form only after you have had a chance to ask your questions and have received 
satisfactory answers. 
If you decide to withdraw from this project, please notify the researcher. This notice will allow 
the researcher to inform you if there are any health risks or special requirements linked to 
withdrawing. 
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5. Queries or Concerns 
 
Should you have any queries regarding the progress or conduct of this research, you can 
contact the principal researcher: 
 
Zhen Lu (Jane) 
Faculty of Business, University of Southern Queensland 
Address: Unit 103C, 536-571 West Street, Toowoomba QLD 4350 
Ph: +61 7 4631 5599 
Mobile: +61 421192872  
Email: Zhen.Lu@usq.edu.au 
 
If you have any ethical concerns with how the research is being conducted or any queries 
about your rights as a participant please feel free to contact the University of Southern 
Queensland Ethics Officer on the following details. 
 
Ethics and Research Integrity Officer 
Office of Research and Higher Degrees 
University of Southern Queensland 
West Street, Toowoomba 4350 
Ph: +61 7 4631 2690 
Email: ethics@usq.edu.au 
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Appendix 8 Consent sheet 
 
             TO:  Participants 
 Full Project Title: Emissions Trading in China: Lessons from Taiyuan city 
 Student Researcher: Zhen (Jane) Lu  
 I have read the Participant Information Sheet and the nature and purpose of the 
research project has been explained to me. I understand and agree to take part. 
 I understand that I may withdraw from the research project at any stage and that this will 
not affect my status now or in the future.  
 I understand that while information gained during the study may be published, I will not 
be identified and my personal results will remain confidential. 
 If the interview will be audio taped, I understand that the tape will be retained and locked 
in the filing cabinet for 5 years and will not be accessible to any other person except the 
researcher.  
 I confirm that I am over 18 years of age.  
 
 
Please advise the following information and sign the sheet: 
 
Interview form: face-to-face interview (   )     telephone interview (  )        
Interview time………………………………………….…. 
Interview place…………………………………….……… 
 
 
Name of participant………………………………………………………………....... 
 
 
Signed…………………………………………………….Date……………………….. 
 
If you have any ethical concerns with how the research is being conducted or any 
queries about your rights as a participant please feel free to contact the University of 
Southern Queensland Ethics Officer on the following details. 
 
Ethics and Research Integrity Officer 
Office of Research and Higher Degrees 
University of Southern Queensland 
West Street, Toowoomba 4350 
Ph: +61 7 4631 2690 
Email: ethics@usq.edu.au  
 
U n i v e r s i t y  o f  S o u t h e r n  Q u e e n s l a n d  
 
The University of Southern Queensland  
 
Consent Form 
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Appendix 9 Profile of coded enterprises and coded managers 
Coded 
Enterprise 
Enterprise 
Property 
Industry 
Total Assets  
(US$ million, 
US$1= 
RMB¥6.5) 
SO2 
Emission 
Permits 
 in 2007 
(t) 
Coded  
Manager 
EN1 State-owned Firepower generator 1967 30000 MA1 
EN2 State-owned 
Smelting and pressing 
of ferrous metals 
6086 13000 MA2 
EN3 State-owned Firepower generator 303 7500 MA3 
EN4 State-owned 
Coal mining and 
dressing and firepower 
generator 
6323 3300 MA4 
EN5 State-owned 
Coal mining and 
dressing and production 
and supply of gas 
1184 1952 MA5 
EN6 State-owned Firepower generator 31 800 MA6 
EN7 State-owned 
Raw chemical materials 
and chemical products 
863 780 MA7 
EN8 State-owned 
Special purpose 
equipment 
2246 720 MA8 
EN9 Joint venture 
Smelting and pressing 
of ferrous metals 
127 280 MA9 
EN10 
Provincial- 
owned 
Ordinary machinery 88 240 MA10 
EN11 Private Concrete manufacturing 15 236 MA11 
EN12 State-owned 
Special purpose 
equipment 
1108 150 MA12 
EN13 State-owned Concrete manufacturing 185 135 MA13 
EN14 Joint venture Rubber products 121 128.65 MA14 
EN15 
Collective-
owned 
Beverage 
manufacturing 
55 114 MA15 
EN16 State-owned Concrete manufacturing 13 110 MA16 
EN17 Joint venture 
Beverage 
manufacturing 
3 54.3 MA17 
EN18 State-owned 
Electronic and 
communications 
equipment 
17 49 MA18 
EN19 State-owned Ordinary machinery 34 42.22 MA19 
EN20 State-owned 
Special purpose 
equipment 
123 35 MA20 
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Appendix 11 Data source for the 2007 China social accounting 
matrix 
Row account  Column account  Included items and data source  
1. Activity 2. Commodity 
Domestic production, domestic sales =Total 
production – Export, Row margin 
 9. Foreign countries 
Input-Output Table of China in 2007(I/O table 2007), 
Export 
 10. Total I/O table 2007, Total production 
2. Commodity 1. Activity  I/O table 2007, Total intermediate input 
 5. Household I/O table 2007, Total household consumption 
 7. Government I/O table 2007, Government expenditure  
 
8. Saving-
investment 
I/O table 2007, Gross capital formation 
 10. Total Total demand= sum of all the items in the row 
3. Labour 1. Activity I/O table 2007, Wages & salaries  
 10. Total 
Labour factor income = sum of all the items in the 
row 
4.Capital 1. Activity 
I/O table 2007, Value-added capital=Depreciation of 
fixed capital + Gross operating surplus 
 10.Total Capital factor income= sum of all the items in the row 
5.Household 3. Labour I/O table 2007, Wages & salaries 
 4. Capital 
China Statistical Yearbook 2009~ Funds Flow 
Statement 2007(Actual Objects Trading), The income 
that households get from the capital factor = Interest + 
Dividend + Land rent + Others 
 6. Enterprise Row margin  
 7.Government 
China Statistical Yearbook 2009~ Funds Flow 
Statement 2007(Actual Objects Trading) 
Transfer payment for households from government = 
Social insurance benefits + Social financial subsidy + 
Other transfers 
 10. Total 
Households total income= Households total 
expenditure 
6. Enterprise 4. Capital 
I/O table 2007, Enterprise capital income, Column 
margin 
 7.Government 
Transfer payment for enterprises  from government, 
column margin 
 10. Total 
Enterprises total income= sum of all the items in the 
row 
7. Government 1. Activity I/O table 2007, Production tax (indirect tax) 
 2. Commodity  China Financial Yearbook 2008, Tariff  
 5. Household 
China Statistical Yearbook 2009~ Funds Flow 
Statement 2007 (Actual Objects Trading), Individual 
income tax + Social insurance payment 
 6. Enterprise 
China Financial Yearbook 2008, Enterprise income 
tax 
 9. Foreign countries 
Transfer payment for government from foreign 
countries, Column margin 
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 10. Total 
Government total income= sum of all the items in the 
row 
8. Saving-
investment 
5. Household 
China Statistical Yearbook 2009~ Funds Flow 
Statement 2007 (Actual Objects Trading), Households 
saving 
 6. Enterprise Enterprise saving, Column margin 
 7. Government Government saving, Column margin 
 9. Foreign countries 
China Statistical Yearbook 2009~ Funds Flow 
Statement 2007 (Actual Objects Trading), Saving in 
foreign countries 
 10. Total Total saving = Total investment 
9. Foreign countries 2. Commodity  I/O table 2007, Import 
 10. Total 
Total foreign exchange expenditure = sum of all the 
items in the row 
10. Total 1. Activity Total input = Total production 
 2. Commodity Total supply = Total demand  
 3. Labour Labour factor expenditure = Labour factor income 
 4. Capital Capital factor expenditure = Capital factor income 
 5. Household 
Household consumption = sum of all the items in the 
column 
 6. Enterprise Enterprise expenditure = Enterprise income 
 7. Government Government expenditure = Government income 
 
8. Saving-
investment 
Total investment = Total saving  
 9. Foreign countries 
Total foreign exchange income = Total foreign 
exchange expenditure  
Note: Some of the data in the 2007 China social accounting matrix (SAM) is different from the origin data due to 
the requirement of the equilibrium of the SAM table.  
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Appendix 12 Data source for all the parameters (including the 
exogenous variables) 
Calibrated 
Parameters 
(including 
exogenous 
variables) 
Implications of the variables Data source 
  
  
Transforming coefficient in the NG-oil mix 
function of sector i 
Calibrated based on 
the benchmark data 
set- 2007 SAM table 
of China 
  
  
Transforming coefficient in the fossil energy mix 
function of sector i 
  
  
Transforming coefficient in the electricity 
function of sector i 
  
  
Transforming coefficient in the energy mix 
function of sector i 
  
  
Transforming coefficient in the capital-energy 
mix function for sector i 
  
  
Transforming coefficient in the labour-capital-
energy mix function for sector i 
  
  
Transforming coefficient in the CET function of 
sector i 
  
 
 
Transforming coefficient in the Armington 
function of commodity j 
  
   
Share of natural gas in the NG-oil mix function 
of sector i 
  
   
Share of NG-oil mix in the fossil energy mix 
function of sector i 
  
   
Share of thermal power in the electricity function 
of sector i 
  
   
Share of fossil energy in the energy mix function 
of sector i 
  
  
 
Share of capital in the capital-energy mix 
function of sector i 
  
  
 
Share of labour in the labour-capital-energy mix 
function of sector i 
  
  
 Share parameter in the CET function of sector i 
  
  
 
Share parameter in the Armington function of 
commodity j 
    
The intermediate input of j for each unit of 
output in sector i 
   Capital value-added tax rate 
   Labour value-added tax rate 
    Individual income tax rate 
      Enterprise income tax rate  
    Import tariff rate of commodity j 
     World price of imports of commodity j (in US$) 
     World price of exports in sector i (in US$) 
       Share of total capital income for households 
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Share parameter of household expenditure on 
commodity j 
          
Transfer payment from government to 
households 
          
Transfer payment from the government to 
enterprises 
          Transfer payment from enterprises to households 
          Net foreign borrowing 
    Marginal propensity of consumption 
    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  ̅ The quantity investment of commodity j 
  ̅̅ ̅̅   
Government purchase of commodity j (in 
quantity) 
    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ Saving in foreign countries 
  ̅̅ ̅̅   
Household consumption of energy type j (in 
quantity) 
   ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ Total available labour force 
   ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  Total available capital stock 
    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ Price index of GDP 
Basic price in the 
model        
   
Exogenous 
Parameters 
Implications of the variables Data source 
  
  
Substitution parameter between natural gas and 
oil in sector i 
Wissema & Dellink 
(2007, p. 6) 
  
  
Substitution parameter between NG-oil mix and 
coal in sector i 
Wissema & Dellink 
(2007, p. 6) 
  
  
Substitution parameter between thermal power 
and clean energy in sector i 
Wissema & Dellink 
(2007, p. 6) 
  
  
Substitution parameter between fossil energy and 
electricity in sector i 
(Wissema & Dellink 
2007, p. 6) 
  
  
Substitution parameter between capital and 
energy in sector i 
He et al. (2002, p. 45) 
  
  
Substitution parameter between labour and 
capital-energy mix in sector i 
He et al. (2002, p. 45) 
 
 
  
Substitution parameter between domestic 
consumption and exports in sector i 
He et al. (2002, p. 46) 
 
 
 
 
Substitution parameter between domestic supply 
and imports of commodity j 
He et al. (2002, p. 46) 
       
Ratio of the carbon tax revenue redistributed to 
households                                                                    
Set by the researcher, 
different scenarios 
    Carbon emissions coefficient of energy type j 
Zheng & Fan (1999, p. 
134) 
 
 
 Conversion coefficient of energy type j 
Zheng & Fan (1999, p. 
134) 
   
Carbon tax rate, expressed as a fixed amount of 
Chinese currency per ton of CO2 emissions 
Set by the researcher, 
different scenarios   
  
245 
 
Appendix 13 The value of parameters set exogenously 
Activities 
(Commodities) 
  
    
    
     
     
     
     
     
 
        
Agriculture  0.5 -1 0.9 -9 -2.333 -0.099 0.8 0.667   
Heavy industry 0.5 -1 0.9 -9 -2.333 -0.099 0.8 0.667   
Light industry 0.5 -1 0.9 -9 -2.333 -0.099 0.8 0.667   
Transport and 
communication 
0.5 -1 0.9 -9 -2.333 -0.099 0.75 0.5   
Construction 0.5 -1 0.9 -9 -2.333 -0.099 0.75 0.5   
Services 0.5 -1 0.9 -9 -2.333 -0.099 0.75 0.5   
Coal 0.5 -1 0.9 -9 -2.333 -0.099 0.75 0.667 0.54 0.973 
Oil 0.5 -1 0.9 -9 -2.333 -0.099 0.75 0.667 0.84 0.973 
Natural gas 0.5 -1 0.9 -9 -2.333 -0.099 0.75 0.667 0.0006 0.973 
Electricity 0.5 -1 0.9 -9 -2.333 -0.099 -1 -0.111 0 0 
Clean energy 0.5 -1 0.9 -9 -2.333 -0.099 -1* -0.111* 0 0 
* The substitution elasticity in CET function and Armington function of clean energy sector is assumed to be the 
same as that of the electricity sector. 
Sources: Wissema & Dellink (2007), He et al. (2002) and Zheng & Fan (1999) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
